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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1966  there  were  about  700  airline  companies  operating in 
1  the  Western  world  •  They  employed  750,000 persons and  earned 
$10,630  million with about  6,000 aircraft which  carried 200 
million passengers in 1966  and  flew  27,490 million ton/km. 
These results were  achieved in a  decade  which  saw  tremendous 
changes  both in the  equipment  employed and in the operation of 
air transport.  The  air transport industry entered the  jet era 
in October 1958.  The  remarkable  increase  in productivity 
achieved with aircraft of this type is reflected in the  218% 
expansion in total capacity available2  between  1958  and 1966, 
as against an increase  of 35%  in the  number  of aircraft in 
service. 
The  following sections will be  devoted to a  consideration of 
the  main  components  of the  market  for civil and  commercial 
aircraft,  namely,  the  material and  fleets,  airline companies 
and traffic. 
2.  TYPES  OF  AIRCRAFT 
The  aircraft used  for  the  purposes  of civil and  commercial 
transport are  classified,  according to the  type  of power unit 
with which  they are  equipped,  as piston-engined,  turboprop  and 
jet aircraft;  and,  according to their range,  as short-,  medium-
and long-range aircraft. 
1  Of  these,  rather more  than  100  were  engaged in international 
services. 
2  In available  ton/km. 
675 The  last types  of  long-range  piston-engined aircraft were 
the  DC7-C  and  the  Lockheed  1649  A,  introduced in 1956  and 
1957· 
The  first  turboprop aircraft to enter into service was  a 
medium-range aircraft  (Viscount);  next,  two  long-range air-
craft were  brought  into service:  the Bristol Britannia and 
the  Lockheed Electra1• 
More  recently,  the  turboprop  has  been  used  on  short-medium 
range  routes with tye  types:  Fokker E272  (in 1958)  and Dart 
Herald,  Handley Page  and  Avro  748  (in 1962).  Lastly,  in 1964, 
the  twin  turboprop  Nord  262  entered service  on  short routes 
with low traffic density. 
The  jet went  into service  on  the North Atlantic route as a 
long-range aircraft  (Comet  4  and Boeing 707)3  in October 
1958.  The  following  year  the first medium-range  jet - the 
Caravella  - was  introduced on  European routes.  On  American 
routes the  first medium-range  jet plane  was  the trijet Boeing 
727,  which appeared after 1960  with the special feature  of 
landing on  a  short runway  and in airports near cities. 
1  They  were  not  very successful,being almost  contemporaneous 
with  the  first  four-engined  jets. The  Bristol Britannia went 
into service  on  the  London-New  York  route in December  1957. 
2  Still being built in 1968. 
3  In actual fact,  Comet  1  had entered service in 1951.  A few 
serious accidents  due  to a  phenomenon  which until then  was 
poorly understood - metal  fatigue  - compelled the  designers 
(de Havilland)  to  engage  in years  of further studies.  The 
final version,  the  Comet  4,  thus went  into service in 1958, 
in direct competition with  the  B 707,  which was  much  more 
advanced in design. 
/ For medium  distances,  the  BAC  111,  Douglas  DC-9  and  Boeing  737 
were  also planned.  For short distances  the  jet plane  tried 
to  compete  with  the  Fokker F.28. 
Towards  1965,  the increased volume  of traffic and  the  con-
gestion at airports and  in airlanes,  together with the need 
for a  reduction in operating costs made  it necessary to seek 
new  solutions through the  production of high capacity air-
craft. 
So  far as long-range aircraft were  concerned,  at the outset 
the  types already in production  were  modified by lengthening 
the  fuselage  and  increasing the  take-off weight  and  the  pay-
load1.  For 1969-70 the entry into service of the first air-
craft of the  new  generation is forecast  - the Boeing 747 
Jumbo  jet. In the field of medium-range aircraft Boeing has 
converted the B  727  into the  B 727-200,  increasing the load 
capacity as  compared with the  preceding model.  The  big medium-
range  planes - the airbus  - of new  design will not  go  into 
service before  the seventies  (L-1011  and DC-10). 
The  effort to secure high speeds has  led to the design and 
development  of supersonic aircraft:  the  Concorde  and the 
B  2707,  the  introduction of which is forecast  for the  seven-
ties. 
The  aircraft employed  for  the  transport of freight  were,  up 
to 1960,  piston-engined planes adapted2  from  passenger air-
craft  (Douglas  DC-6A  and Lockheed L  1049 H)  or converted when 
replaced by  new  planes3•  The  Douglas  DC-7F,  which  was  from 
the outset planned as the  cargo version,  is an exception. 
1  The  Douglas  succeeded in increasing by  40%  the  capacity of 
the  modified DC-8,  in this way  creating an aeroplane  of the 
new  generation. 
2  Being built.  3  Particularly jet planes. 
677 The  reason  for  the  conversions  lay in the  fact that no  purely 
"cargo planes",  built only for military purposes  were  avail-
able,  and aircraft could be  used  which  were  technically ex-
cellent but  economically obsolete.  The  civil aeroplane  devised 
specifically for  the  transport of  freight  made  its appearance 
in 1961  with the  first deliveries of the  Argosy and  Canadair 
CL-441•  The  production of versions adapted  from passenger 
planes continued,  however,  in the sixties.  In view  of the 
limited demand  for  freight-carrying planes,  this solution 
offers a  twofold advantage.  On  the  one  hand,  it makes it pos-
sible to keep  the unit cost  of aircraft within acceptable 
2  limits  ,  and  on  the  other hand,  it constitutes a  source  of 
considerable saving for airline  companies  which use  the  two 
models3•  Amongst  the aircraft of this type,  the turbojets 
Boeing 707-320,  Douglas  DC-8F  and Vickers  VC10  cargo are 
particularly important.  In many  cases,  however,  users have 
opted for  the  mixed version - passengers and  freight. 
The  evolution  from  the  piston engine  to the  turboprop,  and 
ultimately the  jet, has  brought  about  a  parallel evolution 
in the  capacity,  speed,  use  and price of aircraft,  as is 
shown  by  the  following  table: 
1  Adapted  from  the Bristol Britannia turboprop. 
2  The  series of  cargo planes  would  be  relatively small 
and  therefore  more  costly. 
3  As  a  result of standardization of equipment  for  main-
tenance  and  overhauls;  stocks of spare parts can  be 
reduced and  some  of the  equipment is interchangeable. ·
·
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 3.  NUMBERS  OF  AIRCRAFT 
3.1  Total Number 
The  total number  of aircraft owned  by  the airline companies 
of the  ICAO  member  states
1  increased,  between  1958  and  1967, 
by  some  1,600 units,  but at very different rates according 
to  the  category of plane  (Fig.  1). 
The  fleet  of piston-engined aircraft begins to decrease  as 
from  1960.  Turboprop aircraft increase,  after 1961,  at a 
greatly reduced rate and,  lastly,  turbojets increase  from 
14 to 2,200 units and,  from  1964  onwards,  exceed the  number 
of turboprop planes. 
Consideration of  the  number  of aircraft owned  by  the  com-
panies which are  members  of  IATA
2  shows  (Fig.  2)  a  less 
marked  increase in the  total number  of planes and a  greater 
impact  of  jet aircraft: 
- the  number  of  jets exceeds  that of turboprops as early 
as in 1962; 
1 
furthermore,  in the  period 1959-66,  the  total number  of 
piston-engined aircraft falls by  more  than 50%. 
ICAO  (International Civil Aviation Organization)  is an 
association which  groups  the airline  companies  of 101 
states,  excluding the  Iron Curtain countries  (with the 
exception of Yugoslavia),  the People's Republic  of China, 
North Korea  and  North Vietnam. 
2  The  International Air Transport  Association:  groups  101 
of the  chief airline companies.  This association handles 
91%  of the  scheduled world traffic and  97%  of the  scheduled 
international traffic. 
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Source  lATA  682 The  following  table gives  the  figures  for  the  number  of dif-
ferent  types of commercial  transport aircraft owned  by  the 
ICAO  and  IATA  member  companies  between  1958  and 1966: 
Breakdown  by  Percentage at the  End  of Each Year  (1958-66) 
ICAO  Companies  ~;;a 
CATEGORY  r  1SGO  - 1%8  1959  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965 
Turbojet  0,2  2,6  7.7  11,9  14.7  16.4  19,1  23,3  29.0  I 
Tu:rboprop  9.1  12,9  14,4  16.5  17,2  17.5  17,3  17,7  19,5 
Piston-engined  9:>.7  84.5  77,9  71.6  68,1  66.1  63.6  59,0  51,5 
TOTAL  100.0  100,0  100,0  100,0  ~  100,0  100,0  100.0  100.0  100,0 
Source:  ICAO 
--
IATA  Companies 
CATEGORY 
·~ 
1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966 
Turbojet  0,4  4.1  11,4  17,4  22,5  25.8  31,0  35,8  44,4 
Turboprop  8,5  12.7  14,4  18,4  20,0  20,4  19.8  19,2  19.2 
Piston-engined  91.1  83.2  74.2  64,2  57,5  53,8  49.2  45.0  36,4 
TO TALE  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100.0  100,0  100.0  100,0 
Source:  IATA 
683 From  the  above it will be  seen that during  the  period 1958-66 
the  proportion of piston-engined aircraft owned  by  ICAO  com-
panies fell  from  90.7  to 51.5%  and in the  case  of the  IATA 
companies  from  91.1  to }6.4%. 
The  growing  importance  of jet aircraft is,  however,  much 
more  significant1  than  would  appear  from  a  mere  consideration 
of their numerical  preponderance. 
Fig.  3,  which is taken  from  ICAO  estimates,  shows  the  portion 
of total capacity accounted for  by  the  various  categories of 
aircraft. Thus  jets,  which in 1966  represented 35.4%  of the 
world's civil aircraft,  contributed,  in the  same  year,  79% 
of the total capacity offered. 
1  Owing  to the  greater potential production and the 
different average  service life. 
684 F'IG.  3  Capaeit7 (t/ka),  b7  Categor7 of Aircraft (1957-67) 
( ICAO  Companies) 
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685 The  trend of the average  characteristics of aircraft fleets 
over the  past  decade  is clearly shown  in the  ICAO  table 
(Fig.  4)  concerning the total scheduled air transport ac-
tivities of the states which are  members  of that organization. 
On  an  average,  the  capacity per aircraft has  been  doubled, 
the  speed multiplied by 1.5 and  operating expenses per t/km 
available1  have  decreased by  31~. 
The  jet engine  has  brought  to air transport speed,  capacity, 
longer range  and greater profitability but has,  on  the other 
hand,  required new  investments,  part of which is provided by 
the state  (lengthening of runways,  construction of bigger 
airports,  development  of ground aids and air traffic control) 
and part by  the airline  companies  (aircraft,  ground instal-
lations,  training and instruction of staff). 
2  In relation to such costs it is possible  to  make  an estimate 
of the  most  important item in the  expenditure of the airline 
companies,  i.e., aircraft purchases3•  During  the  decade 
1958-68,  3,254 aircraft were  purchased,  for a  total value 
of about  $17,000 million.  In 1968  an additional 1,573 air-
4  craft were  on  order for a  total value  of $19,000 million 
(see Tables 3/1  and 3/1a). 
1 
2 
Expressed  in dollars at current value. 
Estimate  drawn  up  on  the  basis of average  sale prices, 
including the initial allowance  for  spares  (20%  of the 
basic price). 
3  Excluding  piston-engined aircraft,  light aircraft  (feeders) 
and helicopters. 
4  Including  the  value  ($7,258 million)  of the  supersonic 
planes  on  which  options are  now  held. 
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 3.2 Breakdown  by  Type  of Aircraft and  by  Country 
Information  concerning orders and deliveries is available 
annually for  each  type  of aircraft1  (Tables 3/2- 5). The 
orders  for  jet aircraft deserve  special attention.  There  is 
seen  to  be  an initial period  (up  to 1961)  marked  by  large 
orders,  followed  by  a  definite fall.  The  appearance  of new 
types  of aircraft and  the greater  funds  available to the 
airline  companies result in an appreciable  increase in orders 
for  jets after 1965  {Fig.  5). 
A total of 76%  of the aircraft in service in the  world2  in 
1968  and  83%  of those  ordered were  built in the US.  The  per-
centages increase appreciably if only  jet aircraft are  con-
sidered  {80  and  88%  respectively)  and still more  if account 
is taken of the  value  of the aircraft instead of their number 
(83%  for aircraft in service and  88%  for  those  on order). 
Aircraft made  in Europe3  represent  2~ of the  world total 
expressed in units but only  16%  of their yalue  (Tables 3/6 
and 3/6a).  The  lower proportion of the  value of the European 
products is due  to  the fact  that they consist mainly of 
medium/short-range aircraft  (chiefly turboprop)  which are 
manufactured at relatively low unit prices.  With  reference 
to  the aircraft ordered in 1968,  the  proportioD of European-
made  equipment  decreases appreciably and represents  only 15% 
1  ICAO  statistics. 
2  Data  compiled  on  the basis of the  World  Airline SurYey 
carried out  by  "Flight International".  The  yalues  do 
not  coincide  with the  ICAO  statistics because  they also 
include  the  fleets of  companies  with non-scheduled 
services. 
3  United Kingdom,  France  and the Netherlands. 
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689 in number  and  12%  of the value.  As  regards  the geographical 
distribution of the  fleets1,  the  position  (Tables 3/7  and 
3/8 is as  follows: 
Breakdown  of Commercial  Aircraft Fleets in Number 
and in Value  by Geographical  Areas  (April 1968) 
(%) 
Area  Number 
USA  51.2 
Europe  25.6 
- EEC  Countries  9.9 
- United Kingdom  8.5 
- Other European  countries  7.2 
Other countries  23.2 
Total  100.0  ----- --~--
After the  USA  and Europe  the Far East is the region with the 
highest percentage  of aircraft,  both in regard to the total 
numbers  owned  and in regard to  the  number  of  jets. 
The  breakdown of  the  world's  jets by  geographical areas cor-
responds in practice to that of the traffic. The  greater 
amount  of air transport  (US,  Europe,  Far East)  is accompanied 
2  by fleets that are not  only more  powerful  but also more 
modern,  as is shown,  so  far as  the latter aspect is concerned, 
by  the  percentage  breakdown  of orders  for  jets in 1968  (Tables 
3/7 and 3/8 mentioned above).  Three  types of European aircraft 
1  Only  jet and turboprop aircraft. 
2  For example,  the  US  and Europe  together represent  83%  of 
world capacity expressed in MTK  (million tons/km). 
690 (Caravella,  BAC  111  and Fokker F.27)  are at present operated 
by United States companies.  The  first to  be  marketed in the 
US  was  the Fokker F.27.  Its success  was  remarkable:  473  air-
craft were  sold,  no  fewer  than 195  of them in the US  and 
Canada.  This success  must  largely be  attributed to the  agree-
ments  concluded between Fokker and  the  American  company  of 
Fairchild Hiller. The  latter undertaking had secured  from 
1  Fokker  the  licence  to  build the F.27  in the  US  for the  whole 
of the  Western  hemisphere  and also acted as distributors in 
that geographical area  for  the Dutch-made  versions.  The 
Fairchild Hiller company  built a  total of 138  F  227  and has 
sold 183 aircraft  (F  227  and F-27).  The  presence in the  US 
of a  distributor,  who  in this case  was  also the manufacturer 
under licence of the plane,  seems,  at least as much  as the ex-
cellence of  the  machine,  to account  for  the  success of the 
F-27. 
The  Caravella  was  marketed in the  US  as  from  1961,  i.e., in 
a  period that was  very difficult for airline companies  through-
2  out  the  world  ,  and in particular for  American  companies. 
The  introduction of long-range  jets in the  immediately pre-
ceding years had led,  on  the  one  hand,  to a  marked reduction 
in load factors  and,  on  the  other hand,  to an increase in 
costs for financing and for  the  amortization of new  invest-
ments.  For these reasons  the  American  companies  did not 
welcome  the  Caravelle3,  which,  moreover,  had  created serious 
problems  for  them  on  medium-length routes also.  Account  must 
1  Series 200. 
2  In 1961  the  losses of the  ICAO  companies  amounted  to 
a  record total of $118  million. 
3  Bought  only by United Airlines  (20). 
691 also be  taken of the  fact that the French plane had been 
designed  for European  operation,  i.e.,  for  medium  distances 
considerably shorter than those  in the us. 
The  third European  jet to be  marketed in the  US  was  the 
BAC  111.  This plane  was  designed at a  time  when  airlines 
had become  fully aware  of  the  economic  advantages offered 
by  jets and already  foresaw  the  usefulness of aircraft 
specifically designed for  medium  hauls  of less than  4oo  km. 
The  BAC  111  therefore  came  into being  when  the  companies' 
demands  were  at their height  and  was  in direct competition 
with another aircraft - the  Douglas  DC-9. 
As  a  result of the  difficulties encountered by Douglas  the 
British firm  was  able  to deliver the  BAC  111  with a  lead 
of eight months  over the  DC-9.  However,  sales  (61  units), 
which at first were  more  than satisfactory, very soon 
stopped short since  Douglas  was  in a  position to offer 
almost  immediately  new  series of the  DC-9  with carrying 
1  capacities definitely greater than that of the  BAC  111  1 
w~h was  exactly what  the airlines,  whether  American or not, 
were  looking for. 
The  same  reasons,  i.e.,  the  delay in delivery of the  American 
SST  as  compared with the  date  forecast  for the entry into 
series of  the  Concorde,  have  in all probability led some 
American  companies  to take  out  options  on  the  Anglo-French 
supersonic aircraft. 
The  following  diagrams  show  the  percentage  of American  (Fig. 
6a)  and European aircraft  (Fig.  6b)  in relation to the  total 
value  of the  fleets  operated by  the airline  companies  in the 
different regions. 
1  The  engines  of  which  (Rolls-Royce  Spey)  were  much  less 
powerful  than  those  of the  DC-9  (Pratt and  Whitney JT9D). 
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 4.  AIRLINE  COMPANIES 
In  the  Western  world the  number  of airline  companies  engaged 
in providing services,  both scheduled and otherwise,  is about 
700.  The  most  important,  however,  are the  101  companies  which 
1  are members  of  IATA  and,  of these,  the  21  which handle  more 
than 70%  of the  scheduled services  throughout  the  world. 
In the activity and in the  management  of the airline  companies 
the state plays a  part of  undoubted importance.  On  the  one 
hand,  scheduled carriers operate  on  the basis of  government 
agreements,  with  fares  subject to government  approval,  from 
airports which are publicly owned  and are  managed  by  the state. 
On  the  other hand,  55%  of the  IATA  companies2  are  completely 
or for  the greater part state-owned and in many  cases3  receive 
government  subsidies and loans.  In most  cases and according 
1  See  footnote  2  on  page 6. 
2  The  percentage  rises to 73  if the  US  airlines,  which are all 
private,  are  excluded.  So  far as  companies  under  the  flags 
of EEC  countries and  of the United Kingdom  are  concerned, 
the  position at the  end of 1966  was  as  follows  (source: 
Interavia November  1967): 
Country  Flzins Flas Carrier  State Partici;Eation 
(%) 
Belgium  Sabena  65.0 
France  Air France  70.0 
Germany  Lufthansa  79o4 
Italy  Alitalia  96.2  (IRI) 
Netherlands  KLM  50.5 
United Kingdom  BEA  100.0 
BOAC  100.0 
3  Including the  local US  companies  which receive subsidies 
from  the  CAB. I 
~ 
\ 
\ 
to the statements of those directly concerned,  this close 
connection with the state does not influence either manage-
ment activities or the policy of the  companies with regard 
to supplies. Subject to the necessary exceptions,  therefore, 
the aims  and activities of the  companies are, it would  seem, 
not unlike  those of the private operators. 
In regard to the  management  of the airline companies,  a  clear 
difference in productivity can be  seen - in terms of turnover 
per employee  - between European and American airlines, as 
appears  from  the  following table  (1967  figurea)a 
C E E  U K  U S A 
·l:urnover 
COMPAGN'f 
~Turnover 
COMPAGNl  'rurntver 
COt.PAGNY  per employee  per employee  per  em~ oyee 
(S)  (S) 
I 
lufthansa  17,841  B E A  11,955  United Airlines  23,870 
Air France  17,600  B 0  A C  20,068  P.A.A  26,075 
SABENA  s,47B  *  l'WA  29,170 
Alitalia  23,655  American  Airlines  25,490 
K L M  14,313  Eastern Airlines  23,493 
Delta  Airlines  25,007 
Northwest  Airlines  37)435 
Braniff Airways  23,583 
National  Airlines  31,521 
Western  Airlines  26,432 
AVERAGE  ( tota  ~  16,604  15/lt)3  26,093 
of;.uri:over/tota~  e'mp  oyees) 
•  1966  figure.  Sourcea  Annual Reports  of the varioue 
compan1es. 
The  divergence  noted seems  to be all the  more  marked  and less 
justifiable if it is borne  in mind  that: 
(a)  the intercontinental fares,  which are decide4 upon 
at  IATA  meetings,  are accepted and applied by all 
the  member  companies; 
695 (b)  the  US  domestic  fares are  on  an average  lower  than the 
1  European  fares 
(c)  for  the  majority of US  airlines the  percentage  of domestic 
traffic in relation to the  total is appreciably higher 
than that of the European airlines. 
The  market  constituted by  the airline companies is charac-
terized by: 
(a)  keen  competition at the  world level and  on  intercontinental 
2  routes  ,  under a  system of fixed rates; 
(b)  strong competition between  American operators on the  domes-
tic routes of the United States and  on  routes to neigh-
bouring countries; 
(c)  poor  competition between European operators on  European 
routes,  competition on  those  routes being limited by 
numerous  pooling agreements  between  the European  companies; 
(d)  a  legalized monopoly,  acting in favour  of  companies  flying 
the  national flag and  companies associated with them,  on 
the  domestic  routes of  the  various European  countries(. 
1 
2 
The  fare  per passenger/km is 17.5 cents in the US;  in 
Europe  for  EARB  member  companies it is 21.5  cents on 
European routes and as high as 30  cents  on  certain do-
mestic routes  (Source:  F.  Simi and J. Bankir,  Avant et 
apres  Concorde,  1968). 
Particularly over the  North Atlantic. 
3  The  importance  of the  presence  of private operators 
should not  be  underestimated.  They  do  not,  howeTer, 
at least for  the  moment,  exercise a  decisive influence 
(see  the  "National Reports"). 
I 
I I 
It is the  first characteristic which is the basic  one  in that 
it not  only makes it necessary for  the  competing  companies  to 
have  competitive aircraft and services,  but also calls for 
undertakings  of a  certain size and structure,  management  ef-
ficiency,  reliability and an  image  capable  of meeting  compe-
tition at world level in a  world market. 
Of  the  remaining points,  reference will only be  made  here to 
the  differences in political and geographical conditions be-
tween the US  and Europe  as  factors  - in our view not entirely 
the  only ones  - accounting for the different situations that 
may  be  encountered. 
The  characteristics mentioned under  (a)  and  (b)  impel airline 
companies  to adopt  procurement policies which are not dissim-
ilar and  which have  as their aim  and  common  denominator the 
reduction of aircraft operating costs to  a  minimum,  this man-
ifesting itself in an effort to achieve  a  high degree  of homo-
1  geneity  in their respective  fleets. 
Furthermore,  the relatively low profit margins  of the  companies, 
on  the  other hand,  and  the  nat.ure  of the  demand,  on  the  other, 
have,  especially in recent  time,  necessitated ever-increasing 
diversification of the  equipment  employed  by airline companies, 
in relation both to the  distances  covered and to the type  of 
t~affio handled. 
In view  of the  basic characteristic of the airline  companies, 
which is mentioned above,  they must  strive,  even in markets 
which are relatively or  wholly protected,  to achieve  the  max-
imum  efficiency with regard to their equipment  and their man-
agement,  together with the  utmost reliability and  the best 
1  As  regards  types  of aircraft,  wherever possible,  and 
especially manufacturers. 
697 image,  and all this in a  market area that will certainly be 
more  extensive  than the  markets to  which  we  are referring 
here. 
During the past decade,  and more  particularly at the  begin-
ning of that period,  the airline  companies  spent large amounts 
of money  on  the purchase  of jets. The  cost of the necessary 
financing and the higher level of amortization,  at a  time  when 
the  demand  was  not yet equal to the  supply,  combine,  together 
with other factors,  to  explain the  deficit of the  ICAO  com-
panies as  shown  in the  graph  on the.following page. 
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2
 From  1962  onwards  the  gross profits of the  scheduled world 
airlines  (ICAO)  increased continually,  reaching appreciable 
levels. The  situation was,  on  the  contrary,  somewhat  less 
brilliant if account is taken of net profits,  which appear 
to be  fairly meagre- when  they are not in fact  outright losses 
- as the result of costs not related to operational management, 
such as interest payable  on  loans  contracted for  the purchase 
of aircraft and  equipment.  The  amount  thus devoted to financing 
such purchases has  increased continually and in recent times 
has risen to considerable levels. 
It may  be recalled,  for instance,  that the total long-term 
indebtedness  of all the  US  companies  rose  by  a  factor  of 8 
between 1954  and  1964  ($1,800  million in 1964  as against 
225  million in 1954).  In 1964  this indebtedness represented 
more  than 60%  of the  capital invested. 
However,  this tendency to increase  investments,  both in 
absolute and in relative value,  shows  no  sign of diminishing. 
The  total orders in 1968  ($19,000 million)  exceed in value 
both the purchases in the  whole  of the  previous  decade  and 
the total turnover of the airline  companies  in 1966  ($10,630 
million). 
All this has accentuated the  process of expansion  on  the  part 
of the airline  companies  and,  in more  recent times,  has  led 
the latter to bring pressure  to bear  on  manufacturers  with  a 
view to securing longer periods for payment. 
The  leasing of aircraft is also assuming  ever-increasing 
importance.  This particular form  of contract,  by  which  the 
airline  companies rent aircraft directly from  the  manu-
facturers,  enables  the  former  to spread their expenditure 
over a  period whilst at the  same  time  enjoying greater 
700 flexibility in the  management  of their equipment1• 
The  year 1958  may  be  said tohave  marked  the  beginning of the 
phase  of expansion and  the  emergence  of different  forms  of 
cooperation;  the  entry into service of  jet aircraft impelled 
the  companies  to seek various solutions with the  object of 
pooling their resources  by  means  of agreements  for cooperation 
in various fields  (technical,  commercial  and  financial)  and 
in many  different  forms. 
Until 1958,  if we  leave aside  the  SAS  (Scandinavian Airlines 
2  System)  consortium  ,  the  classical form  of cooperation  (agree-
ments  concerning pools,  joint lines,  ground services at air-
ports,  etc.)  had  enabled airline  companies  to overcome  the 
difficulties arising from  an excess of competition. 
Tha SAS-Swissair agreement  of 1958  - under which  each  company 
concentrates its own  strength on  certain types of aircraft, 
1 
2 
The  most  recent needs  of the airline  companies  obviously 
affect the  financial situation of the manufacturers.  At 
the  end of 1967,  for  instance,  Boeing had tied up  $248 
million in long-term loans  and $114 million in leased 
aircraft. The  corresponding figures  for McDonnell  Douglas 
were  $107  million and  $27  million respectively on the 
same  date. 
Created in 1951  without legal status by  the Danish, 
Norwegian and Swedish airlines  (DDL,  DNL  and ABA), 
which  continue  to exist with their own  legal status. 
The  consortium  formed  under earlier agreements  of 1946 
(for the  transatlantic lines)  and 1948  and 1949  (for 
the European lines)  is merely an  economic  entity 
responsible  for organizing air transport. 
701 whilst allowing the  other  company  to  use  some  of its planes  -
marks  the  beginning of a  tendency towards  ever greater co-
operation.  In the  same  year a  few airline companies  of coun-
tries in the European Economic  Community  endeavoured,  without 
success,  to  find a  basis for  cooperation within the  framework 
of the  projected Air Union. 
Recently  the  idea of a  system  of technical cooperation has 
been gaining more  and  more  ground in both Europe  and in the 
United States. This  would  make  it possible to spread amongst 
the  associated companies  the  heavy  cost of ground facilities 
and to reduce  management  costs whilst increasing the return 
from  investments  made  by  the  various partners in accordance 
with  the  requirements  of a  unified fleet. 
In 1967  the first conference,  which  was  held in Paris  (the 
Montparnasse  Committee),  proposed that a  statute for technical 
cooperation  be  drawn  up.  The  airlines represented at that 
Conference  were  Air Lingua,  Alitalia,  BOAC,  Iberia,  KLM,  DLH, 
Sabena,  SAS,  Swissair and  Air France.  The  statute laid down 
certain important principles such as the need for standardi-
zation of aircraft. From  this beginning and this setting two 
consortia emerged  for  the  operation of the  B 747.  These  are: 
- KSS,  made  up  of  KLM,  SAS  and Swissair1; 
- ATLAS,  made  up  of Air France,  UTA,  Alitalia,  Lufthansa and 
Sabena; 
and  one  for  the  DC-10  (KSSU,  made  up  of KLM,  SAS,  Swissair and 
UTA). 
It is probable  that others will be  created,  for  example,  for 
supersonic aircraft and  for  those  of the  Airbus  type. 
1  This  consortium was  actually  formed  before  the  creation 
of the  Montparnasse  Committee,  but  the  companies  that  were 
members  of it agreed to their group  being incorporated in 
that Committee. 
702 In 1961,  eleven countries of French Africa1 set up,  under  the 
name  "Air Afrique",  a  multinational  company  the capital of 
which  was  subscribed as to 66%  by  the  African  member  countries 
and as to 34%  by France. 
The  member  states use  this  company  for  their international 
services and  they  may  also employ it for their own  domestic 
purposes. 
In British Africa,  after the  dissolution of the Federation 
of Rhodesia  and Nyasaland in 1963,  Central African Airways 
have  con~inued to operate  on  international routes and have 
set up  three subsidiaries for services inside the three states. 
In East  Africa the  independence  of Kenya,  Tanganyika,  Zanzibar 
and Uganda  has  not  changed  the structure of East African Air-
ways. 
In Latin America  there  have  in the  course  of the past  few 
years been attempts  - so  far unsuccessful  - to  form  several 
groupings.  In addition,  without  leading to actual mergers, 
many  pooling agreements  have  been  concluded which involve  a 
system of partial leasing. 
At  the  national level modifications in the structure of air-
line  companies  have  been  numerous  and varied according to  the 
states concerned and to the  conditions under  which air trans-
port is operated.  Although it is not possible,  within the 
limits of the present study,  to  give  an analysis of all the 
changes  made  in the different  countries2  it is nevertheless 
1  Twelve  in 1964. 
2  Amongst  the  numerous  groupings  those  of the  following  com-
panies  may  be  mentioned:  Alitalia,  BUA,  Varing,  United Air 
Lines,  Middle  East,  Air Liban,  UTA,  VIASA,  All  Nippon  Air-
ways. 
703 advisable  to mention: 
(a)  the  tendency  towards  the partial or total concentration 
of companies,  even  though  some  of the  projects of the 
more  important  companies  have  not  been  carried out1; 
(b)  the  tendency  towards  geographical specialization,  a 
distinction being  made  between international and  do-
mestic  services.  In  the United States there is already 
a  clean division between  the large international com-
panies  (domestic  trunk-lines)  and  the  local companies, 
whilst it is only in recent years that European national 
airlines have  tended to entrust an ever-increasing part 
of their domestic  traffic to separate  companies  which 
in most  cases are subsidiaries of  them2• 
This policy and  the  creation of subsidiary companies  for 
non-scheduled services (charter flights,  package  tours,  etc.) 
has  made  it possible to  expand  the national airlines and at 
times  to  make  better use  of aircraft that are technically 
sound but  economically obsolete. 
1  Projects:  PAA/TWA,  American/Eastern,  BOAC/BEA, 
Air  Canada/CPAL,  Air India/Indian Airlines. 
2  Air Inter in France,  ATI  in Italy,  NLM  in the 
Netherlands. 
704 5.  AIR  TRAFFIC 
1  5.1  General Survey 
In 1967  the  ICAO  companies'  scheduled traffic amounted  to 
2  32,770 million TKP  of passengers,  freight and mail;  this 
traffic is 3.4 times  that in 1958  and  has  consequently in-
creased at an annual average  compound  rate of 14.6%. 
During  the  period considered the  increase in capacity was 
even  more  marked  - a  total of 63,500  million  ATK3  in 1967 
as against 17,100 million in 1958;  with an average  annual 
compound  rate of 15.7%  (Fig.  7)  and an absolute increase of 
a  factor of 3.7. This results in a  drop  in the  average  load 
factor,  which fell  from  56.3%  to 51.6%4 between 1958  and 
1967. 
This  decrease  was  particularly marked after 1960  (50.5%  in 
1963),  whilst a  slight upward  movement  is noted ia 1964  and 
a  decline after 1966. 
1  The  majority of the statistics used  were  compiled by 
the  ICAO  on  the  basis of the  scheduled services,  and 
therefore  do  not  include non-scheduled traffie (char-
ter flights,  package  tours,  etc.),  which in recent 
years  has  grown  considerably and in 1966  represented 
about  10%  of total  ICAO  traffic. 
2 
TKP  = ton/km  performed. 
3  ATK  = available  ton/km. 
4 50.5 in 1968. 
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706 The  decrease  in the  load factor  was  more  pronounced  on  the 
domestic  routes  (49.2%  from  1962  to  1964)  than  on  the  inter-
national routes  (52%  over  the  same  period). 
During the period under  consideration  the  distribution of 
world air traffic by  category  (passengers,  freight  and  mail) 
did not  change  appreciably  (Fig.  8).  The  average  annual in-
creases recorded in the  ten-year period were  16.7%  for 
freight,  13.9%  for  passengers  and 16.8%  for mails. 
The  TKP  for passengers is still more  than three-quarters of 
the  total,  even  though the  figure  for 1967  is slightly below 
that for  1958  (73.7  as against 77.7%). 
International traffic increased by  278%  between 1958  and 
1967,  whilst domestic  traffic showed  an increase of 217%. 
The  proportion of the  former  in relation to the total there-
fore  increased slightly. 
However,  the proportion of international traffic (Fig.  9), 
which increased continuously up  to 1964  (48%  of total), 
subsequently fell to  42%  in 1967. 
Throughout  the  decade,  21  airline  companies  constantly handled 
more  than 70%  of  the  scheduled traffic of the  ICAO  companies 
(Table 3/9). 
These  21  companies  break  down  as  follows,  by  continent: 
- 10 in North  America  (UAL,  PAA,  AA,  TWA,  EAL,  Delta,  Air 
Canada,  Northwest,  National,  Braniff); 
- 9  in Europe  (Air France,  Alitalia,  BEA,  BOAC,  Lufthansa, 
KLM,  Sabena,  SAS,  Swissair); 
- 1  in Australia  (Qantas); 
- 1  in Japan  (JAL). 
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709 On  account  of the  location of the  chief companies,  air traf-
fic is not uniformly distributed.  However,  there are  three 
major  zones.: 
- one  developedz  the North  American  continent,  which in 
itself,represents more  than one-half of  the  world 
traffic; 
- one  in the  course  of development  and still striving 
after large-scale operation,  which includes:  Europe, 
the  Mediterranean and  certain parts of Asia; 
- one  heterogeneous  zone,  mainly made  up  of the  devel-
oping nations. 
5.2 Regional Survey 
The  breakdown  of the  traffic handled  by  the  world airline 
companies,  listed by  countries of origin,  did not  undergo 
any  fundamental  changes  between 1956  and  1967. 
North America- which,  after the  decline in 1961,  returned 
to the  percentage  levels of 1956  - constitutes the area of 
maximum  air traffic  (64.5%),  followed  by  Europe  (21.7%), 
whilst the  remaining  countries,  taken together,  account  for 
only 13.8%  of the  scheduled world traffic in TKP,  as is 
shown  by  the  following  table: 
Breakdown  of Traffic Handled•,  by Regions  (Total 100) 
REGION  1956  1961  1957  • In t/km. 
North  America  64,9  60.2  64.5 
Europe  18.7  24.0  21.7 
Far East  3.2  4,1  4,8 
South America  6,2  5,0  3,0 
Oceania  3,8  3.2  2.6 
Africa  2.3  2.2  2,1 
Middle East  0.9  1.3  1,3  Source:  ICAO 
710 This table  shows  for South  America  and Oceania an increase 
in traffic which is below  the  world average.  In Europe,  on 
the  other hand,  air traffic has  developed at a  higher rate, 
particularly round about  1961. 
Examination of world  traffic  (domestic and international 
services)  on  a  country-by-country basis shows  that the 
proportion accounted for  by  the  American  companies  - which 
had  declined between  1961  and  1964 - remained by far the 
greatest:  58.7%  in 1967  (Tables 3/10 and  3/10a).  The  second, 
third and  fourth places are  constantly occupied,  in that 
order,  by  the United Kingdom,  France  and  Canada,  which  to-
gether represent about  14%  of world traffic each year. 
The  countries of the  European  Community  handle  on  an average 
1.11%  of the  total traffic (in TKP),  whilst the sum  of the 
traffic of USA,  the  United Kingdom  and  the  EEC  countries in 
196?  was  equal to  75%  of the  world scheduled traffic. 
In the  international services the first place is still oc-
cupied  by  the  American  companies  (2?%  of the traffic handled 
in 1967),  followed  by  the  British and French  companies  with 
1.11% and  1.8%  respectively. 
For the  principal countries and at world level the  growth of 
traffic is shown  by means  of a  graph in Fig.  10,  whilst the 
average  annual increases  (1957-67)  in traffic as a  whole  and 
in international traffic are  shown  in Fig.  11. 
Of  the  international routes,  the  North Atlantic is undoubtedly 
the  most  important axis.  For  1964 the  estimate1  was  as high as 
2,500 million TKP,  equal to 25.8%  of international traffic. 
1  The  only statistics available UATA)  do  not  give  any in-
dications as  to TKP  but only as  to  the  number  of passen-
gers and  the  tons  of freight  and mail.  The  estimate is 
taken from  an  ITA  study by  Besse  and Mathieu. 
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712 FIG. 11  Increase in Scheduled Services,  by Countries  (1957-67) 
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Up  to 1964  the  relative importance  of North Atlantio traffic 
was  appreciably greater for freight  and mail  than  for pas-
senger traffic,  the  North Atlantic route accounting for 16-
17%  of world  freight  and postal traffic as against  11~ of 
world passenger traffic. 
The  introduction of long-range  four-engined  jets,  which  made 
it possible  to fly across the Atlantic non-stop,  at the  same 
time  reducing  the  time  of the  flight  from  13  to 7 hours, 
together with a  policy of fare  reductions,  has  modified the 
structure of North Atlantic passenger traffio,  as is shown 
in the  following  graph  (Fig.  12): 
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714 In 1957,  air traffic  (49.5%)  had almost  overtaken sea traf-
fic:  1,018,000 passengers as against 1,037,500.  In 1967,  air 
traffic absorbed  more  than  90%  of the  North Atlantic passenger 
traffic. 
It is estimated that the  American  companies  handled 36%  of the 
traffic on  this route,  followed  by  the British (12%),  French 
(8%),  German,  Italian and Canadian carriers. 
With 1,400 million TKP  (scheduled services),  the intra-
European  (international)  traffic of the  companies  which are 
1  members  of the  EARB  represents about  11%  of world regular 
international traffic and 5.5%  of total world scheduled traf-
fic  (domestic  and international services). 
In Western Europe,  49  companies  handle  6%  of  ICAO  world traf-
fic  over some  300,000  km  of routes  flown  1,000 times  a  year. 
The  American  companies,  with  a  territory twice  the size,  have 
a  network of 450,000  km  flown  more  than 5 1000  times a  year 
and  they handle  40%  of  ICAO  traffio2• 
Throughout  the period  (1958-66)  intra-European traffic devel-
oped at a  more  rapid rate  (+209%)  than  US  domestic traffic 
(+129,%)  and  world traffic  (+186%),  but at a  lower rate  than 
the international traffic of the  ICAO  companies  (+320%). 
The  US  domestic  network still constitutes the area of greatest 
air traffic,  totalling  45%  in 1966,  i.e., 12,400 million TKP 
out  of a  total 27,480,  even  though in the  course  of the period 
(1958-66)  the rate of expansion of Amerioaa  dvmestic  traffic 
was  appreciably lower  than  the world rate3• 
1  European  Air Research Bureau,  a  body of which  17  European 
2  companies are  members. 
With 50  companies. 
3  In recent years,  air transport has  gained a  first-rank posi-
tion in the us.  In 1965  the percentage of passengers/km trans-
ported by air was  59  whereas rail and road transport accounted 
for only 15 and  26%  respectively.  In 1954 the  figures  were 
respectively 26,  39  and 35%. 
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Intra-European,  North Atlantic and  US  domestic air traffic 
together represent about  6~ of the  world total (Fis.  13) 
and this percentage did not vary much  during the period 
19.54-64. 
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If account is taken of international traffic alone  (Fig.  14), 
it is found  that,  in 1964,  intra-European traffic and North 
Atlantic traffic together  r~presented rather less than 40% 
of the  ICAO  total. 
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717 6.  STRUCTURE  AND  SIZE  OF  THE  LIGHT  AIRCRAFT  MARKET 
Definition 
According to international standards,  aircraft weighing 
not more  than 5,650 kg  with a  normal load are considered 
to be  light aircraft. 
In the  following ·study,  however,  small  jets - such as the 
French Mystere  20  and the British HS  125  - the  weight  of 
which exceeds  the  abovementioned limit will be  included in 
the general aviation category. 
Use  of light aircraft 
The  various possible uses  of light aircraft include: 
- commercial transport 
- short distance  taxi. services 
scheduled short distance services 
- military communications 
- aerial reconnaissance  and photography 
- agricultural aviation (in particular crop-spraying) 
- training 
- travel and business 
- air competitions. 
Categories of aircraft 
Light aircraft are generally subdivided into four  main 
categories: 
single engined up  to a  maximum  of  four seats 
- light twin-engined with five  seats 
- medium  twin-engined with 6-8  seats 
-large (up  to 10 seats). 
718 World  total 
In 1965  the  total number  of light aircraft in service in the 
Western  world  was  about  140,000 units,  including military 
planes. 
The  consistent growth in these numbers  from  1949  to 1965 
is shown  by  the  following  graph: 
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Year The  total value  of the  light aircraft in service in 1965  may 
be  estimated approximately $1,700 million,  of which about 
700 million,  in respect of 55,000 planes,  relate to military 
aircraft and aircraft operated by airlines. 
The  United States oonsitutes the most  important market  for 
general aviation, it being estimated that about 75%  of the 
total mentioned above is located in the US. 
The  French total is about  4,800 planes,  the British about 
1,000 and  the  German  about 1,500. 
Production 
Production of light aircraft in 1965  exceeded 14,000 units 
and  was  increasing steadily (especially from  1963  onwards) 
as is shown  in the  following graph: 
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720 Of  the  14,000 aircraft produced in the  Western  world in 
1965,  12,300  were  built in the  United States.  Of  these, 
2,200  were  exported and  10,100 were  sold on  the  home  market. 
France,  also in 1965,  produced 500  units,  Britain 14o  and 
Belgium 125.  A comparison of the  number  of aircraft produced 
with the  corresponding value  shows  the increase in average 
unit prices that marked  the period 1949-65,  as  follows: 
Year 
1949 
1957 
1965 
Average unit price 
$5,600 
$19,600 
$35,000 
The  cause  of the  increase  in unit prices was  the  introduction 
1  of  turboprop  and  jet aircraft  ,  which,  moreover,  together 
with the  improvement  of pressurization plant and instruments, 
contributed decisively to the development  of general aviation. 
Unlike  the general situation in Europe,  the  big American 
producers of commercial aircraft are virtually unrepresented 
in the  general aviation sector.  Such aircraft are  constructed 
in the  United States by  specialized firms,  three of which 
2  account  for an average of 75%  of total world output  • 
Qualitatively,  however,  European production is of a  high 
level,  which is indicated by  the  fact  that some  European 
planes are  constructed and sold in the US  with considerable 
succesa3• 
1  About  4,ooo  jets were  built in 1965. 
2  In 1965  Cessna produced 5,629 aircraft,  Piper 3,776  and 
Beech 1,192. 
3  Such as the D.H.  125  (UK),  the  Mystere  20  (France) 
and  the Hansa  10  (Germany). 
721 The  market  and its organization 
The  size of the  United States market is such that it cannot 
be  compared with the  world  market1•  This is due  to various 
factors  - economic,  social,  geographical  (includin~the s~~cial 
distribution of installations)  and  to  the  way  in which,  espe-
cially in recent years,  has  been  organized in the  USA. 
Mention  may  be  made  of: 
(a)  the  abundance  of available airports2  and of landing 
strips reserved for light aircraft; 
(b)  the  existence of  some  three  to  four  thousand  fixed 
base  operators - genuine  connecting links  between  the 
manufacturers  and users  - who  generally supply  the 
following  services:  repairs,  fuel supplies,  flying 
instruction,  leasing of aircraft,  charter services, 
purchase  and  sale of new  and  used planes. 
(c)  a  highly  developed organization  for  granting loans3 
to purchasers  which includes,  in addition to special-
ized credit  companies  and  banks,  finance  companies 
1 
4  specially set up  by  the  manufacturers  themselves  • 
See  the  above  remarks  concerning  the  total number  of 
aircraft in the  US  and  the  domestic  demand. 
2  10,125 in 1967  as against 306  in France,  176 in the 
United Kingdom  and  128 in Germany. 
3  The  term varies  from  five  to seven years. 
4 This is the  case  with Cessna  and  Beech. 
722 7.  ESTIMATE  OF  COMHERCIAL  AVIATION  DEVELOPMENT  IN  THE  SEVENTIES 
7.1  Introduction 
The  analysis of  the  supply,  i.e., deliveries of civil and 
commercial aircraft,  has  been  divided into  two  sections. 
The  first consisted in determining  the  future  demand  for 
air traffic  (passengers and  freight)  on  the  basis of ex-
isting documentation.  In  the  second this future  demand  has 
been  converted into requirements  (and subsequently into 
deliveries)  of aircraft in 1980. 
7.2 Forecasts of Traffic 
In  view  of the  existence  of  numerous  and  detailed forecasts 
of traffic made  both  by  users  (airline  companies  and  their 
1  associations)  and  by  manufacturers  ,  it was  felt to be  un-
necessary to  draw  up  a  new  and  different  forecast  of world 
traffic  (and  for  the  chief routes). 
The  approach used  for  the  principal forecasts  employed in 
this study may  be  summarized  as  follows: 
- at user level,  the  forecasts  cover  a  period of not  more 
than 10 years and  have  been  established mainly  on  the 
basis of  the  following  factors: 
1 
(a)  past  trends 
(b)  economic  indices 
(c)  transport  costs 
(d)  flexibility  (cost  and  incomes)2 
And  others  by  the  chief airports. 
2  ICAO  estimates that the flexibility of demand  (expressed 
in seats/km)  is equal to 2,  i.e., a  1%  drop  in the  fares 
leads  to  an  increase  of  2%  in additional traffic. 
723 - at manufacturer level,  the  forecasts attempt to establish, 
at least in its broad outlines,  the  prospective  supply  for 
a  period of 15-20 years  with  the  object of drawing  up  as 
accurate an estimate as possible  for  the first ten years. 
Boeing forecast 
The  pattern chosen  by  Boeing  consists in a  multiplicative 
function of the different factors raised to an appropriate 
power calculated on annual variations and not  on absolute 
1  values  • 
The  method  takes account  of six factors  of which  three are 
in actual fact significant- population,incomes  ~nd cost-
and of one  factor  which is equally important:  the  speed of 
the aircraft.  In regard to  the  cost,  the  study introduces 
the  notion of "sensitivity threshold112  and also brings in 
some  psychological factors. 
In addition,  an attempt is made  to distinguish the  two  com-
ponents  in the  kilometre  traffic:  the  number  of  journeys and 
the  average  length of  journey,  which are  not  governed  by  the 
same  influences.  The  number  of  journeys is linked with popu-
lation,  incomes  and  cost,  whereas  the  average  distance of 
the  journey  depends  on  the  structure of the  networks,  the 
part played by  airtransport in the particular country and 
the  operating conditions. 
Fig.  15 is a  graphical representation of the  Boeing  forecast 
of international air traffic  (passengers),  by  geographical 
areas,  in 1975. 
1  To  eliminate  any  correlations that  may  exist between  the 
different parameters. 
2  Below  which  a  variation in cost has  no  appreciable effect 
on  demand. 
724 f'IG.  15  Boeing Forecast - International Air Traffic  (1975) 
!Passengers) 
The  area of the  circles is proportional to the  number 
of passengers travelling  from  or  to  each  zone  (1975  fore-
cast).  The  width  of the  lanes is proportional to  the 
traffic. 
On  the  chief routes  the  figures  indicate  by  how  many 
times,  according  to Boeing,  traffic in 1975  will be 
greater than  in 1965. 
725 Douglas  forecast 
The  forecasts  devised  by  Douglas  are  the  result of a  aerie~ 
of studies and partial analyses  concerning: 
- gross national product; 
- total traffic; 
- comparative  development  of  numerous  economic  indices 
and  of air transport; 
number  of  families  who  travel by air; 
- total income  and available income; 
portion of available income  set aside  for air travel. 
Lockheed  forecast 
Analysis  by sector based  on: 
- study of past results  (trend of annual variations 
following  on  the rate of increase); 
- gross national product; 
- qualitative data:  introduction of  new  transport hardware 
(air and  ground),  improvement  of possibilities in the 
tourist field,  growth  of desire  to travel,  etc. 
For passenger and  freight  traffic the  forecasts  of the  three 
American  manufacturers  (Boeing,  Douglas  and Lockheed)  and 
ICAO  are  shown  in Figs.  16  and  17  respectively.  In  view of 
tly{ striking discrepancy between  the various  forecasts,  IATA 
1as formulated  forecast  hypotheses  by  calculating the  average 
-values of the principal forecasts  (world forecasts  both for 
international traffic and  for  American  domestic traffic). 
The  average  value  consist of rates of annual increases clas-
sified in three  periods:  1965-70,  1970-75  and  1975-80.  The 
classification into three periods is very important insofar 
as  the  rate  for  the  period 1970-75  is lower  than that  for 
726 the  preceding period and  there is (in terms  of the rate  of 
increase)  an  even  more  accentuated fall in the period 1975-
80.  By  applying,  for  each period,  the  annual average  rates 
to  the  initial traffic of 1965  we  obtain the  curve  of the 
demand  for  transport  - broken  down  into passengers and 
freight  and also into international traffic and  American 
domestic  traffic - shown  in Fig.  18  which is adopted in 
this study for calculating the  forecast  of the  number  of 
aircraft in service. 
To  obtain separate  forecasts  for  two  other important routes 
- the  North  Atlantic and  the  intra-European services - the 
average  rates of  the  Lockheed,  ICAO,  Sperry and  Bjorkman 
forecasts  were  calculated in the  absence  of  IATA  averages 
(Fig.  19).  The  annual average  increases  (1965-80)  for  total 
traffic and  for international traffic are not  very different 
from  those  for the  period 1958-65:  13.5%  (total)  and  15.0% 
(international)  as against 13.6%  (total)  and  15.7%  (interna-
tional)  in the  period covered  (1958-65). 
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731 7.3 Types  of Aircraft1 
On  the  basis of  their respective  ranges  and  transport capaci-
ties the  types  of aircraft which will be  in service in the 
period 1969-80 have  been  grouped in the  following  categories: 
-supersonic  (Concorde,  B 2707); 
- large-capacity long-range  turbojets  (B  747,  DC-8  (Series 60), 
C-5A); 
-long-range turbojets  (B  707,  DC-8,  VC10); 
- large  capacity medium/long-range  turbojets  (L-1011,  DC-10, 
A-300); 
-medium-range  turbojets  (B  727/200,  Trident); 
-short/medium-range  turbojets  (DC-9,  B 737,  BAC  111,  F.28, 
VFW  614,  Mercure). 
Obviously,  the  typementioned include  some  but not neces-
sarily all of the  aircraft that may  be  in service in 1980. 
In this connection it should be  noted that even if the  majority 
of  the aircraft are in the production or planning stage,  there 
are  considerable  margins  of uncertainty concerning the exist-
ence and/or the year of entry into service of some  projects 
(e.g.,  the  supersonics). 
At  the very  worst it may  be  assumed that the  ton/km offered 
will be  made  up  with other types  of planes.  Account  must  be 
taken of the possibility that m&dium/short  range aircraft 
with  V/STOL  characteristics may  be  developed  and  go  into 
service. 
1  Excluding general aviation aircraft. 
732 7.4 Estimate of the  Number  of Aircraft in Service in 1980 
and  Demand  in the Period 1968-79 
The  demand  for air transport has  been  converted into require-
ments  by  numbers  and  types  of aircraft,  in accordance  with 
subjective opinions and  on  the  basis of specific assumptions. 
In  the  first place it is assumed that the  contribution of 
each individual area to  the total traffic and  the routes of 
1980  is the  same  as  the  present one. 
Another assumption is that there is a  load factor  which is 
equal to the average  for  the period 1957-67,  i.e., 52.5%  on 
international routes and  49.2%  on  domestic  routes
1
• 
If the  forecast  for  demand  in respect of passengers and 
freight in ton/km units is known,  the  two  factors  can  be 
used to  forecast  the  total TK  available  for passengers and 
freight  and also  for  routes  and  categories of traffic  (Table 
3/11). 
Once  ·the  total TK  available and its subdivisions are  known, 
as  was  stated above,  a  breakdown  by  category becomes  possible 
2  (Fig.  20)  on  the  basis of the  productivity of each category 
and of the possible  market  penetration of the different air-
craft produced. 
It has  been assumed  that the  total demand  for aircraft is 
made  up  partly of the additional  demand  (for the additional 
traffic)  and partly of the  demand  for  replacements  (in re-
spect of the part covered by aircraft due  to  be  withdrawn 
from service). 
1  These  coefficients are  lower  than the  figure  which  the  com-
panies normally  consider to  be  the  optimum  (55%).  It is also 
felt that a  certain reduction is acceptable  for  the  future 
insofar as the effects must  be  felt of the increase in capac-
ity offered due  to  the  introduction of high-capacity aircraft. 
2  Calculated on  the  average  annual utilization,  the speed and 
the  capacity. 
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-10 The  distribution of  ATK  by  categories of aircraft has  been 
worked  out at world level and  for  each market  area. 
In this phase  the  chief factors  considered are unrelated to 
the  demand  for air transport and are  linked with: 
- the  dates  for  the  p-lanning-out  of the  turboprop aircraft 
and the first  jets; 
- the introduction of new  types; 
the rate of delivery planned by  the  major manufacturers. 
With reference  to the first  two  points,  the  assumptions are 
as  follows: 
(a)  The  Viscount  and Electra turboprops are to  be  withdrawn 
from  service  during  1969. 
(b)  The  jet aircraft will be  gradually phased out starting 
from  the  year  shown  opposite  the  name  of each  type: 
1.  cv  880/990  1968 
2.  DC-8  1969 
3.  Caravella  1970 
4.  B  720  1970 
5.  B 707  1970 
6.  VC10  1973 
7.  BAC  111  1973 
(c)  The  new  aircraft will be  introduced in  the  following 
order: 
1o  B  747  1970 
2.  L-1011  and  DC-10  ~972 
3.  Concorde  1972 
4.  A-300  1973 
5- Mercure  1974 
6.  B  2707  1976 
735 The  initial estimate of the  demand  for aircraft has also 
been critically revised in the  light of the pattern of or-
ders placed by  the  companies in each area.  Successive approx-
imations have  ultimately led to  the  determination of the 
hypothetical  demand  of the airline companies in each area, 
by  types  of aeroplane. 
Requirements,  by  categories,  have  been  converted into deliv-
eries of aircraft at an interval  (generally one  year)  ahead 
of the  time  they are actually needed. 
Finally,  forecasts of purchases  of aircraft were  later cor-
rected on  the  basis of the  orders anticipated,  up  to 1980, 
1  by  the  chief manufacturers  •  It should be  pointed out that 
this estimate  represents  one  of the possible solutions and 
not necessarily the  most  accurate. 
The  uncertainty is due  above all to the  fact  that different 
_categories of aircraft can be  used alternatively on  the  same 
route  and this renders  the  breakdown  of traffic on  such route, 
by  categories of aircraft,  more  speculative2• 
Amongst  other factors,  the uncertainty  concerning  the  mar-
keting of supersonic planes is particularly significant, 
there being a  possibility that regulations  may  be  drawn  up 
with the  object of limiting their use  over certain areas 
because  of the  sonic  boom.  Restrictions on  landing rights 
and permits to fly over areas of high traffic density are 
also possible. 
1  And  also having regard to the  fact  that in the aerospace 
sector supply is more  rigid than  demand. 
2  That is to say,  dependent  on  factors that are difficult 
to predict by  economic statistics. 
736 According  to  the  estimates  the  world  fleet  in 1980  should 
be  composed  of 7,240  jet aircraft,  with  a  value,  at 1967 
prices
1
,  of $90,000 million.  World  demand  in the  twelve-year 
period 1968-79
2 
should not  be  much  different  from  this  figure. 
The  breakdown  of demand  by  major  geographical areas in the 
twelve-year period considered has  been assumed  to  be  as 
follows: 
I  Value  Aircraft 
$million  t'  10  Units  t'  f,l 
'Europe 
I 
21,630  24,2 
Canada  4 ,?.62  4.7 
us  I  53,-164  59,4 
. 1  ~769  23.9 
44S  6,1 
4.239  57,4 
I 
Central  &. South An1erica  27ss9  3.2  328  4.4 
Middle  East  959  1.1  77  1.1 
Far East  s,365  6.0  408  5,5 
Africa  1,295  1.4  120  1.6 
T 0  T A l  89,534  100.')  ----
7,389  100.0 
In particular,  the  distribution of  demand  at the European 
level is found  to  be  as  follows: 
Value  Aircraft 
$million  %  Units  ~ 
EEC  Countries  12,362  57.1  832  47.0 
United Kingdom  51350  24.7  490  27.7 
Total EEC  +  UK  17,712  81.8  1,322  74,7 
Other European  Coun- 3,918  18,2 
trie~ 
447  25.3 
·r  0  T  A.  L  E tl  R 0  P"  21,630  100,0  1,769  100.0 
1 
20%  of the  basic price is included as initial allowance 
for  spare parts. 
2  See  Tables 3/12-15. 
737 The  share of  world  demand  (in value)  accounted for  by  the 
EEC,  UK  and US  is respectively 13.8,  11.2 and 59.4%,  whereas 
at the  level of European  demand  (24.2%  of the  world total) 
the  share of the  EEC  is 57.1%  and that of the  UK  24.7%. 
7.5 Qualitative Characteristics of the  Demand  for  Commercial 
Aircraft in the Seventies 
The  forecast  of a  substantial increase in freight  and pas-
senger traffic in the  seventies is now  accepted by all the 
airline companies. 
This forecast rests in fact  on  a  fairly sound basis.  Even 
supposing minimal  increases in present  fares,  the rise in 
per capita income  in the states which  today provides a 
large percentage  of  the  demand  for air transport should 
guarantee  an increase in the  demand  itself. 
The  assumption  of a  trend  towards  higher  fares,  in real 
terms,  does  not,  however,  seem  to  be  acceptable  to us  and 
the  variations in recent  years  merely  confirm this view. 
The  forecasts  of an  increase  in the  demand  for air transport 
may  therefore  be  regarded as  objectively realistic. 
In this context  the  question arises of what is likely to be 
the  attitude of the  airline  companies  and  what  policies they 
will adopt  to maintain  the profitability of their undertakings. 
It would  appear that  the  solution can  be  found  only in greater 
productivity with respect  to  management,  the  services offered 
and  the  equipment  employed.  At  the  management  level,  activity 
should  be  developed  mainly in two  directions:  automation of 
certain operations  (e.g.,  check-in,  seat reservations,  etc.) 
and  reduction of the  high  cost of ground  facilities,  training 
of flying personnel,  etc., this being  a  programme  that  can 
be  carried out  by setting up  associations of the  ATLAS  type. 
738 At  the level of the  services offered more  consistent efforts 
should  be  made  along the  lines already indicated in the  form 
of charter flights and  package  tours,  which  ensure  high utili-
zation factors  for  the  planes  thus  employed. 
Such arrangements have,  however,  a  wider significance.  Through 
them  the airline  company  offers its own  clients a  range  of 
services of  which  the  most  typical,  i.e., air transport,  con-
stitutes a  part that is sometimes  by  no  means  predominant. 
The  activity of the airlines therefore  seems  destined to 
become  more  far-reaching  and  more  diversified and  their image 
will as a  result undergo  a  change. 
Greater productivity with regard  to the  equipment  employed 
must  be  pursued  through a  diversification of the  equipment 
itself in terms  of the  services offered,  the  type  of trans-
port and  the  different routes.  If an  adequate  demand  for 
transport is assumed,  the  possibility emerges  of specializing 
the  machines  in relation to  the  features  of the  demand. 
The  B 747  freight  carrier,  intended solely for  the  transport 
of containers,  is only the  first striking example  of what 
may  be  expected in the  future. 
Linked  with this problematical aspect  there is also a  further 
factor,  namely,  the  introduction of  jumbo  jets and  supers~nic 
aircraft on intercontinental routes.  It seems  clear already 
that the  entry into service  of these aircraft will have  con-
siderable repercussions  on  the  policy of the various  countries 
with regard to airports.  The  general lines of this policy are 
practically laid down  already in the  sense  that a  few  air-
ports within each country will be  equipped and specialized 
for  intercontinental traffic.  Though  not  so  far-reaching, 
there will certainly be  similar effects when  large  medium-
range aircraft  (the  Airbus)  go  into service. 
739 The  characteristic feature  of the  airport networks  of the 
various  countries will therefore have  to  be  the  existence  of 
a  limited number  of airport centres to  which it will be  neces-
sary to direct the  flow  of passengers and  freight  coming  from 
other cities and  vice versa.  This  therefore  foreshadows  a  new 
type  of specialized transport  (airport to airport)  using 
medium/short  and  short-range aircraft,  the  volume  of which will 
doubtless  be  considerable. 
The  need to  employ appropriately designed aircraft on  these 
routes is  sel~vident and  the airline  companies  interviewed 
have  explicitly admitted this. 
To  revert to the  subject of this short  chapter,  it may  be 
expected that in the  seventies  the airline  companies'demand 
for  commercial aircraft will be  more  diversidied than in the 
past,  which  may  have  favourable  implications  for European 
manufacturers,  who  are in the  forefront,  in two  fields  of 
study that are  fairly promising,  namely,  short take-off and 
vertical take-off aircraft. 
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The market for military aircraft and missiles 1o  MILITARY  AIRCRAFT  AND  MISSILE  FORCES  OF  THE  EEC  MEMBER  STATES, 
THE  UNITED  KINGDOM  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES 
European  and United States military aircraft and missile  forces 
at the  end  of 19671  broke  down  as  follows  (total and  by  coun-
try of origin2): 
EEC,  UK  and US  Military Aircraft and Missiles 
at 31  December  1967 
Total number  Country of  . 
or~g1n  I 
Country  Units  EEC  % 
~- -
8ELGIOM  749  1.6  21.8 
ttl  931  2,0  16.9 
ITALY  1 ,0.33  2,2  29,1 
GERMAN·y·  3,758  8,0  50.5 
FRANCE  3,400  7.3  67,6 
TOTAL  E.E(.  9,871  21.1  48,8  ---
UK  3,795  8,1  0,6 
UK  ~~-
0~5  77,7 
1.3  81,8 
0.2  70.7 
2.6  46,9 
- 32,4 
1,2  50.0 
85.9  13,5 
-··-·i 
pean  TOTAL 
~o1:1n- rles 
I 
! 
l 
I 
~~ilS~ r-
-----------1 
l 
- 100, o  I 
- 100.  0 
- 100.  0 
- 100, 0 
-
100,  0 
- 100,  0 
- 100,  0 
TOTAL.  eF.c  +  UK.  13,666  29.2  35,4  24,7  39,9  - 100, 0 
v~  :n1o64  70,8  - - 100.0  - 100, 
TOTAL  EEC:..  +  \Ji~  +  us  46,730  100.0  10.4  7,2  82,4  -
1(;0. 
1 
2 
See Tables 3/16-18.  The  airforces of the  EEC  countries and 
of the United Kingdom  are  described in detail in the re-
spective national reports. 
Cases  of EEC/UK  collaboration have  been  classified under 
the  EEC;  cases  of  construction under  US  licence  have  been 
taken  to  be  of  US  origin and  cases  of Canadian  construc-
tion as  of US  origin.  Equipment  of Soviet  origin has  not 
been  taken into consideration. 
0 -· 
The  conventional value  of the airforces of the EEC,  UK  and 
US  at the  end  of 19671has  been estimated respectively at 
~0,276, 5,083 and  4o,650  million.  The  breakdown  by  Community 
member  countries and  the  origin of the different forces is 
shown  in the  following table: 
--r---·  ---·----~---
Total value  Country of origin  (%) 
--r  - I 
million  " 
EEC  us  UK  others . TOTAL 
BELGiuM  608  1.1  30,3  69,6  0 .1  100,0 
NL  643  1.1  13.5  85,9  0  100,0 
ITAL"t  1,408  2,5  19.6  80,3  0 .1  100,0 
GERI·tANl'  4,28:?  7,6  24,8  74.5  0 ,7  100,0 
2 
fRANCE  3~35  6.0  78,6  21,4  100  .. 0 
TOTAL  ~EC:  10,276  18,3  41,2  58,5  0  100,0 
IJK  5fJ83  9,1  10,9  26.1  63 ,0  100,0 
TOTAL  ti.~C  +UK  15,359  27,4  31,1  47,8  21 .• 1  100,0 
3 
40,6::D  ~  72,6  - 100,0  100,0 
lOTAl  E£C.  +  UK  +  u~  56,009  100.0  8,5  85,7  5,.8  100,0 
-
1 
See  footnotes  1  and  2  on  the  previous page. 
2 
Exclud~ng the  FNS  (nuclear strike force). 
3  Excluding  non-bal~istic missiles. 
744 In terms  of value,  the share  of  the  total aircraft and mis-
1  aile  forces  of  the  three areas accounted  for  by the US 
(72.6%)  is striking.  Beyond  this,  although significant in 
itself,  the  absolute  value  of the US  aircraft and missile 
forces is impressive  ($40,650  million)2;  even  more  note-
worthy is the fact that 85.7%3  of the  forces  of the  three 
areas are  of United States origin  (as against  8.5%  EEC  and 
5.8%  UK). 
The  examination carried out  below with reference  to  defence 
expenditure  and  to the  general pattern of developments  in 
the  military aviation sector in the  EEC  and in the  UK  will 
help  to  explain the  reason  for this difference.  The  fact 
remains,  however,  that it is impossible not  to be  struck by 
the  vast extent of the  domestic  military market in the US. 
This fact,  together with the similar finding  which  emerged 
in regard to the  civil market,  provides  some  explanation of 
the size and vitality of the US  aerospace  industry. 
1 
2 
EEC,  United Kingdom  and United States. 
To  which  must  be  added $15-20,000  million for non-
ballistic missiles already delivered to  the  three 
services. 
3  Equivalent to $47,906  million. 2.  EXPENDITURE  AND  TRENDS  IN  MILITARY  AVIATION  AND 
MISSILE  SECTORS 
The  potential market  for military aircraft and missiles in 
the  EEC  was,  throughout  the  period prior to 1968,  far  from 
negligible,  especially in relation to  the  size of the  EEC 
space  industry. 
Defence  spending in the  EEC1 in the  period 1958-68  was  on 
average  17-18%  of the  US  figure,  whilst the  EEC  space in-
dustry had in the  same  period a  payroll equivalent to 14-16% 
of that of the  US  space  industry. 
On  the  other hand,  the situation was  quite  different in the 
UK,  where  the  space  industry,  with a  payroll equal,  on  aver-
age,  to  25%  of that of the  US,  had at its disposal a  military 
m~rket which,  in terms  of total expenditure  on  defence, 
amounted  to barely 10%  of the  US  market at the  beginning of 
the  period and  then fell to little more  than  7%  in 1968. 
It is true that the  EEC/US  ratio in regard to total defence 
spending  cannot  be  directly transferred in the  same  way  as 
the  ratio for procurements  from  the  space  industry.  Expend-
iture for  the  purchase  of missiles and  military aircraft by 
the  EEC  accounts  on  average  for barely  10%  of all defence 
spending,  whereas  in the United States it amounts  to as  much 
as  15-18%  of the  total.  Account  must  also  be  taken of the 
fact  that,  in the  EEC  group,  some  countries also include 
under  the  head  "procurements"  expenditure  that  would  be  more 
properly listed under  R&D. 
Although  in size it is by  no  means  negligible,  the  EEC  mili-
tary space  market  has  never  formed  a  single unit.  It should 
1  See  Table  3/19. 
746 rather be  regarded as  a  non-homogeneous .group  made  up  of so 
many  national,  for  the  most  part independent  markets.  The 
influence of its total size  has never in practice  made  itself 
felt,  at all events as  far as  the  EEC  space  industry is con-
cerned. 
It is only within  the  framework  of  NATO  that it was  for  a 
certain period possible  to ensure  the  utilization of equip-
ment  which  was  common  to  the  various nations  (F-104G,  the 
Hawk  and Sidewinder missiles)  and  was  produced under  US 
licence  by  the  EEC  space  industry. 
The  manufacture  of such equipment,  although it has  exercised 
a  notable  influence  on production  capacity and  on  the  mastery 
of certain technologies  employed in the  manufacture  under 
licence  of aircraft and missiles,  has nevertheless not  proved 
capable  of constituting a  common  basis  on  which  to  develop 
international projects  for  the  continuation of the  R&D  effort 
within the  EEC. 
Furthermore,  France  did not participate in this,  so  that  the 
influence  of  NATO  joint production,  however  great,  ultimately 
proved to  be  of limited duration. 
The  general pattern of  the  EEC  market  for military missiles 
1  during the period 1958-68  may  be  subdivided into  two  phases 
a)  In  the  first phase  (up  to  1965)  several EEC  countries 
(Belgium,  Netherlands,  Italy,  Germany)  collaborated in 
the  joint production of aircraft and missiles within the 
NATO  framework  (F-104G,  G91,  Hawk,  Sidewinder)  with  the 
aim  of modernizing their respective  armed  forces,  which 
up  till then had  been  supplied with  equipment  obtained 
1  The  "National Reports" relating to the  EEC  member  countries 
and to the  United Kingdom  contain a  detailed description of 
the  policy of the  various states in regard to the aircraft 
and missile sector. from  the  US  or  from  the  United Kingdom  as  MAP  aid or,  to 
a  lesser extent,  purchased  from  those  countries. 
(b)  In the  second phase,  all attempts at  joint production 
within the  framework  of  NATO  having been abandoned,  each 
country pursued its own  policy for procuring aircraft and 
missiles,  sometimes in association with other states, 
whether  or not  members  of the EEC  (UK),  by means  of 
special programmes  (Transall,  Atlantic,  Jaguar,  Anglo-
French helicopters,  etc.). 
In this second phase  a  special contribution to collabor-
ation was  made  by France  which,  as already stated,  had 
not  taken part,  in the  first phase  but had pursued the 
independent  development  of home-grown aircraft and mis-
siles to replace  those  obtained from  the United States 
or manufactured under British licence. 
The  end  of  the period thus  was  marked  by  the  complete 
break-up  of the potential single market  constituted by 
the  EEC  member  countries. 
Belgium  and  the  Netherlands  pursued a  policy of procure-
ment  abroad,  combined  with subcontracting to their own 
aerospace  industry,  the first being oriented towards 
France  and  the  second  towards  the  US  (or  the  Canadian 
subsidiaries of the US  industry). 
Germany,  except  for  the Transall and Atlantic  programmes 
already mentioned  and others in the  tactical missile 
sector in collaboration with France,  adopted a  policy of 
purchasing US  material  (directly or under  licence)  for 
its short- or medium-term  needs  and placed contracts with 
its own  space  industry for  a  series of advanced studies, 
particularly in the  VTOL  sector,  with  the  object of en-
abling it to  produce its own  designs at a  later stage. 
748 Italy continues its policy of  manufacture  under licence 
of  US  aircraft and missiles in order to  ensure  work  for 
its own  space  industry,  which,  however,  also carries  o~t 
certain programmes  which  are  of  considerable  technical 
sophistication,  even  though strictly confined to the 
national  framework  (G91Y,  G222,  M.B.326). 
France  continues to  draw  on  its own  industry,  using 
French-designed aircraft,  and resorts to the  US  only  for 
the  procurement  of special equipment  required in small 
quantities.  In  the  missile sector it is developing its 
own  nuclear strike  force  and  has  gone  so  far as  to pro-
duce  ballistic missiles of its own  design,  as  well as 
a  whole  series of home-grown  tactical missiles. 
During  the  same  period Britain also has  passed  through 
two  phases.  In  the  first it endeavoured  to maintain its 
own  armaments  industry at the  level hitherto reached, 
entrusting it with the  construction of a  whole  series of 
prototypes  of aircraft and  missiles  of  advanced  design, 
probably  more  from  motives  of technological prestige and 
in the  hope .of  exports  than in order  to  meet  the  real 
need  of national defence. 
This policy was  suddenly abandoned because  of the  con-
tinually rising costs entailed.  After having  procured or· 
sought  to procure  direct  from  the  US  sophisticated hard-
ware  for its own  forces  (Polaris,  F-111)  for  the  purpose 
of keeping the  qualitative level equally high,  the  United 
Kingdom  resigned itself to  a  down-grading,  both qualita-
tive and  quantitative,  in the aircraft and missile sector, 
thereby aligning itself with  some  of the  EEC  countries. 
Towards  the  end  of the  period the United Kingdom  thus 
found  itself in the  position of having  abandoned  the 
development  of advanced  home-grown  designs,  limiting itself,  on  the  one  hand  to  the  manufacture  under licence or 
the  procurement  of  US  equipment  and,  on  the  other hand,  to 
financing its own  space  industry only  for  the  carrying out 
of programmes  that  were  easily "exportable" or could be  im-
plemented in collaboration with French industry (light fighter 
planes,  trainers,  helicopters,  tactic~l missiles,  etc.). 
The  dispersal of effort,  both among  the  various  countries and 
within individual countries,  resulted in American influence re-
maining  very strong throughout  the period,  with the  sole exception 
of the  case  of France,  as has  been seen. 
3.  ASSUMPTION  CONCERNING  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  DEMAND  FOR  MILITARY 
AIRCRAFT  AND  MISSILES  IN  THE  SEVENTIES 
3.1  Introduction 
Any  forecast  of the military market  for aircraft and missiles 
in the  EEC  countries must  be  based  on  appropriate  assumptions 
concerning: 
(a)  the  armed  forces  budgets  of individual countries  for  the 
procurement,  maintenance  and repair of aircraft; 
(b)  the  needs  of the  armed  forces  of the  individual countries. 
In  regard to point  (a),  two  different assumptions  are possible; 
The  first is that the  military expenditure  of the  individual 
countries remains  constant at the absolute value it had  reached 
in 1967.  The  second is that this expenditure represents  a  more 
or less constant percentage  of the  GNP  of  the  individual  coun-
tries and  therefore  increases  by  an  average  of  4%  each year1 
during the period under investigation.  Depending  on  the  country 
considered,  one  or other of  the  two  assumptions is taken as  the 
"more  probable"  on  the  basis of the  trend  shown  by military ex-
penditure in the  period 1957-67  and,  where  known,  on  the  basis 
1  Average  annual  compound  rate of increase. 
750 of the  declared policy of the  government  of the  country in 
question. 
The  needs  of the  armed  forces  of each  country for aircraft 
and missiles have  been estimated,  for the  period under  con-
sideration,  on  the assumption that they maintain their oper-
ational efficiency at a  constant level,  i.e., replacing air-
craft and missiles  by  others of more  modern  design as  soon 
as  those  which  they possessed in 1967  become  obsolete.  Re-
placement is on  the  basis of equivalent operational efficiency 
of the  type  of aircraft or missile and not  simply  on  that of 
numerical parity. 
In the  case  of classes of aircraft which are  found  during 
the period to be  no  longer tactically efficient,  provision 
is made,  if necessary,  for  their replacement  by other classes 
(e.g.,  the  replacement  of light aircraft for  the  army  air 
forces  by helicopters)  whilst  maintaining in service,  for 
auxiliary duties,  the  types  henceforth functionally obsolete 
until the  supply of  them  is exhausted. 
An  assumption of this kind presupposes that,  during  the  period 
considered,  the  defence  of the  EEC  member  countries is not 
completely divorced  from  the  NATO  framework  and  that therefore 
the European countries  do  not  need  to  provide  themselves  with 
their own  intercontinental missile  forces  or  to  increase  the 
operational efficiency of their own  armed  forces.  It pre-
supposes also that,  during the  period under  consideration, 
there will not  be  any  international crises  of  notable  impor-
tance.  This  was  the basic assumption underlying the  estimate 
of the  size of the  military markets  of the  EEC  and  the  United 
Kingdom  in the  period 1968-80. 
For a  satisfactory estimation of  what  part of this market  can 
be  supplied  by  the  EEC  or United  Kingdom  space  industry and 
751 what  part must  be  supplied  by  the  space  industries  of other 
countries it is,  however,  essential to  draw  up  certain 
working hypotheses,  which in the  context  of this study have 
been defined as  follows: 
(a)  For political reasons  the  governments  of the  EEC  countries 
will place  orders  for  the  production of aircraft and  mis-
siles with the  national space  industries,  reserving for 
them  the  status of "privileged supplier",  in order to 
reduce  the  cost  of the  supplies themselves also. 
(b)  Only  when,  for the  production of a  certain type  of air-
craft or missile,  it might  become  necessary  to  introduce 
into  the  EEC  some  completely new  technologies  which  have 
never been  tried  out previously,  even at the  level of a 
prototype  (successful or unsuccessful),  will the  govern-
ments  have  recourse  to  foreign industries,  unless  the 
size of the  series to be  produced  does  not  justify the 
acquisition of the  new  technologies.  The  choice  between 
production  on  the basis of a  home-grown  design  (developed 
within  the  country or  in collaboration with other indus-
tries of the  EEC,  and/or with  the  UK  industry and/or with 
that of the  US  and  production under  licence will be  made 
on  a  case-by-case basis having regard to  the  policy hith-
erto pursued  by  the particular government,  the actual 
te~hnical possibilities of collaboration  (apart  from  any 
political difficulties that  may  arise and  any  differences 
in views  among  the individual armed  forces)  and  the  ex-
isting facilities  of the  space  industry of the  country 
concerned. 
(c)  In the  case  of production in collaboration,  the  share-out 
between  the industries of the  participating countries will 
be  made,  both as  regards  the  design studies and  as  regards 
752 the series manufacture,  in proportion to  the  orders 
placed by  the  individual countries. 
(d)  In the  case  of production under  licence it will be  agreed 
that  10%  of  the  value  is to  be  paid to  the  company  which 
developed  the  design as  payment  for  the  licence and  for 
the acquisition of the  technical knowhow  necessary. 
(e)  The  capacity of the EEC's  aero-engine  industry will not 
improve  qualitatively during the period considered;  it 
will therefore  always  be  necessary  to  purchase  higher 
powered  engines  from  the  US  or  the  United Kingdom  or else 
to produce  them  under licence  from  one  of those  two  coun-
tries. In  the  event  of a  choice  being possible it is 
assumed  that preference will always  be  given  to the  United 
Kingdom  space  industry. 
(f)  The  Communist  countries will not  be  taken into consider-
ation as possible suppliers. 
(g)  From  the overall cost  of aircraft and missiles will be 
deducted  the  value  of the  ground electronic equipment  and 
the avionics,  estimated on  the  basis of similar designs, 
in order to arrive at the  value  of the  orders  earmarked 
for  the  EEC  (or UK)  space  industry. 
(h)  Finally,  in regard to maintenance  and  repairs, it will 
be  assumed  that  these are  always  entrusted to  the  national 
space  industry,  which is normally  the  case,  except,  of 
course,  for  supplies  from  other  countries in the  case  of 
spare parts which are  not  produced  (even under licence) 
in the  country concerned. 
This series of assumptions naturally leads to the  supposition 
that the  EEC  governments  pursue  a  very definite policy of 
entrusting to the EEC  aerospace  industry the  study and 
753 implementation of all the aircraft and missile projects that 
it is technically in a  position to  handle.  This  presupposes 
also  that the  EEC  aerospace  industry has  the  will and  the 
initiative to tackle  development  problems  in a  practical 
way,  so  that it will be  in a  position to  meet  the  new  demands 
of the  national military market as  they arise,  but  without 
involving itself in new  sectors  (e.g.,  the  design  of high-
powered  turbo-engines in the  EEC). 
Both  these  bonditions  seem  to  be  sufficiently realistic,  even 
though  the  first of them  presupposes,  in a  certain sense,  the 
governments'  willingness  to  support  their respective aero-
space  industries1,  while  the  second will inevitably entail 
the  formation  of international industrial groupings,  since 
some  of the  programmes  that  must  be  implemented  in the  EEC 
during  the  period 1968-80  can  not  conceivably  be  efficiently 
handled  on  a  national scale.  The  framework  outlined also ex-
cludes  completely  any  form  of direct intervention by  the  US, 
whose  industry would  be  limited to  meeting  the  needs  of the 
EEC  with its own  supplies in respect of  those  of  them  which 
could not  be  satisfied by  the national industry of the indi-
vidual countries.  The  US  would  in the  meantime  continue  to 
supply  the  EEC  with all the  military hardware it needed via 
NATO  without attaching any  strings,  even  in regard  to stand-
ardization. 
Finally, it is assumed  that the  position of the United Kingdom 
will remain that of a  nation outside  the  EEC  and  that it will 
intervene  only in the  form  of a  joint participant  in cases 
in which its technological  capacity is required and in which 
it has  a  direct interest  from  the  point  of view of its own 
supplies. 
1  In most  cases it would  be  more  economical  to  obtain supplies 
from  the  US. 
754 It is assumed,  however,  that  the United Kingdom  also will 
give  preference  to carrying out  a  programme  in collaboration 
with the  EEC  rather than to  the direct  procurement  or pro-
duction under  licence  of  US  designs. 
All the  assumptions listed above,  and  the  presuppositions  on 
which  they are  based,  are  obviously subject to discussion. 
With their aid,  however,  it is possible  to arrive at an  over-
all estimate  of what  the  domestic  military market  might  re-
present  for  the  EEC 1s  aerospace  industry during the  period 
1968-80  as  a  result  of  concordant  decisions  taken  by  the 
various  governments  and  companies  involved. 
3.2 National Financial Resources  and  Needs  in Regard  to  the 
Procurement,  Maintenance  and  Repair  of Aircraft and Missiles1 
3.2.1  Belgium 
Financial resources:  Of  the  total defence  budget  of $535 
million for  1967,  spending  on aircraft and missiles  may  be 
estimated  (on  the basis of  the  average  for  1956-65) at $38 
million. 
According  to  the  basic assumption  this would  mean  that  a 
budget  of $456  million would  be  available  for  the  period 
1968-80,  if expenditure  remains  constant at the  1967  level, 
or $593  million if defence  spending  increases at an average 
annual rate of  4%  (compound). 
Needs:  At  the  end of 1967  the  Belgian air force  was  composed 
of aircraft and  missiles  worth  a  total of $608  million  (about 
70%  of  US  origin and  30%  EEC)2 •  During  the  period 1968-80 
maintenance  and  spare parts for  this air force  will require 
1  The'~easible 1 '  selections of new  missiles are listed in this 
Section in the  light of the hypotheses  and reservations for-
mulated in Section 3.1. 
2  See  Table  3/20. 
755 total funds  that  can  be  estimated at  $405  milliono  On  the 
basis of the  budgetary data given above,  it is seen that 
the  amount  of  the  funds  to  be  allocated for  the  procurement 
of  new  hardware  to replace  technically obsolete  equipment 
is somewhat  small.Furthermore,  the  Belgian air force  will 
have  to undertake  to1: 
(a)  purchase  Mirage  5  planes,  already ordered  from  France, 
at a  total cost  of  $150  million; 
(b)  modernize its transport  command  by  the  purchase  of trans-
port aircraft  (possibly the Transall)  and  heavy helicop-
ters  (possibly the  Sud Frelon)  at a  total cost of $100 
million; 
(c)  replace F-104G  fighters  (possibly  by  the  MRCA  75  Panther) 
at a  cost of $75  million; 
(d)  purchase  light helicopters  (possibly of  EEC  design); 
(e)  replace Entac anti-tank missiles  (possibly by Milan  mis-
siles)  and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles  (possibly by 
missiles  of EEC  design  if the  Panther is procured)  at 
a  cost of $7  million; 
(f)  replace  Honest  John tactical missiles and  Nike  anti-air-
craft missiles at a  total cost  of $130  million; 
(g)  purchase  trainers worth  $32  million  (possibly of EEC 
design)  and  target drones  with  $1  million  (possibly of 
EEC  design). 
The  total cost of maintenance,  spares and  purchases  would 
thus  be  $908  million for  the  period 1968-70,  a  figure  which 
is much  higher than the  amount  available,  unless  a  great in-
crease  in defence  expenditure  is assumed. 
1  See Table 3/21. 
756 Since  Belgian defence  expenditure,  as  a  percentage  of GNP, 
is the  lowest  of all the  EEC  countries  (3.7%  in 1955,  2o8% 
in 1967),  it may  be  assumed  that no  further  reduction in 
terms  of its proportion of GNP  is possible in the  future. 
This  would  provide  justification of the  assumption that the 
total funds  available  for  1968-80  would  be  nearer to $593 
than to $405  million. 
Even  on  such an assumption it is nevertheless  obvious  that  the 
Belgian air force  will have  to give  up  marwof  the  modernization 
programmes  necessary in order to maintain operational efficien-
cy at the present level. 
It may  be  noted  that the  programmes  to be  abandoned  might,  in 
addition to  the  Panther be  those  for  the  replacement  of tacti-
cal and anti-aircraft missiles  (which  might  possibly be  sup-
plied by  the  US  under MAP),  air-to-air missiles  (Sidewinder 
being kept  in service),  heavy  transport planes  (which are not 
indispensable in view  of the  geographical situation and  the 
lack of defence  interests outside Europe).  With  due  account 
also  for  the  corresponding decrease  in expenditure  on  main-
tenance  and spares,  this would  bring the total spending  for 
the  period 1968-80  down  to $590-610  million,  i.e., within 
the  limite of the  figure available. 
On  such assumption  the  Belgian air force  would in 1980  have  a 
value  (at 1967  prices)  of $515  million and  would  be  made  up 
as to  75%  of EEC  products and as to  25%  of American  equipment. 
3.2.2 Netherlands 
Financial resources:  Defence  expenditure  1967:  $876  million 
of which  $115  million went  on  supplies  of aircraft and  mis-
siles  (estimate  based  on  data  for 1956-65).  On  the  assumption 
of  a  budget  fixed at the 1967  value,  this would  give  a  figure 
757 of $1,380 million,  which  would rise  to  $1,794 million if 
an average  annual  compound  increase of  4%  were  assumed. 
Needs:  At  the  end  of  1967  the  Netherlands air force  had  a 
value  of  $643  million  (86%  of  US  (or  Canadian)  origin and 
1  14%  EEC)  • 
In addition to spendingonmaintenance  and  spares  (which  could 
be  estimated at $700 million),  it would  be  necessary during 
the  period  1968-802: 
(a)  to procure  fighter planes:  a  decision has already been 
taken to order the  Canadair F  5  at a  total cost  of $167 
million; 
(b)  to replace  the  F-104G  (possibly by  the Panther,  but  the 
competing  Swedish  Viggen  and French Mirage  F1  should not 
be  ruled out)  at a  cost  of  $300  million; 
(c)  to  replace  the  Grumman  D 2A  sea reconnaissance aircraft 
through the  (probable)  purchase  of other Atlantic planes 
at a  cost of  $30 million; 
(d)  to replace Fokker S  11  trainers  (possibly  by  the  Italian 
SIA  202  or the  German  SIAT  223)  at a  cost of $2  million; 
(e)  to replace anti-tank missiles  (possibly by  the  Milan)  at 
a  cost  of $3  million; 
(f)  to purchase  heavy  helicopters  (possibly  the  Frelon or 
machines  developed  from  it) at a  cost  of  $20  million; 
(g)  to  replace  the  Sidewinder air-to-air missile  (possibly by 
EEC  products  in view of the  choice  of the  Panther)  at a 
cost  of  $3  million; 
1  See  Table  3/22. 
2  See  Table  3/23. 
758 (h)  to  purchase  light helicopters  for  the  army  (possibly 
EEC  products)  at a  cost  of $15  million; 
(i)  to  replace  remote-control target  drones  (possibly  by 
EEC  products  )  at a  cost of S1  million; 
(j)  to purchase  transport aircraft  (possibly EEC  products) 
at a  cost  of ·$15  million; 
(k)  to replace  naval missiles  (probably  through  the  purchase 
of  UK  missiles  developed  from  those at present· employed) 
at a  cost  of  $8  million; 
(1)  to phase  out anti-aircraft and tactical missiles  obtained 
from  the  US  via  NATO;  these  would  probably replaced  by 
other missiles of  US  origin,  for  a  total amount  of  $105 
million. 
Procurement,  maintenance  and  spares  would  cost  a  total of 
$1,369  million during the  period 1968-80.  This  figure  is 
virtually the  same  as  the  appropriations  for  the  same  period, 
if it is assumed  that  defence  expenditure  remains  constant in 
terms  of absolute  value.  It may  therefore  be  anticipated that 
expenditure  on aircraft and missiles  by  the Netherlands  will 
represent  by  and  large  an  ever-decreasing proportion of GNP, 
which is in line with the  general trend of  Netherlands  defence 
spending  (5.6%  of GNP  in 1955,  4.0%  in 1967). 
On  the  basis  of the  assumptions  formulated,  the  Netherlands 
air force  would  in 1980  have  a  conventional value  of $756 
million,  26%  of it accounted  for  by  products  of  US  origin, 
63%  by  EEC  products  and  1%  by British equipment. 
759 3.2.3 Italy 
Financial resources:  Defence  budget  for  1967:  $2,075  million, 
of which  $190  million is allocated for aircraft and missiles 
(estimate  on  the  basis of 1965  data). 
With  expenditure  constant at the  1967  level,  $2,280  million 
would  be  available  for  the  purchase  of aircraft and missiles 
in 1968-80 and this  would  rjse  to  $2,964 million if an annual 
increase  of  4%  is assumed. 
Needs:  At  the  end  of 1967  the  conventional value  of the 
Italian air force  was  $1,407  million  (80%  of  US  origin and 
20%  EEC) 1•  It should be  pointed out,  however,  that,  in ac-
cordance  with  the  policy constantly pursued  by  the Italian 
Government,  a  considerable proportion of the  equipment  of US 
origin was  produced under  licence in Italy. 
In regard to future  programmes it is known  or it may  be  as-
sumed  that in the  period 1968-75 it would  be  necessary2s 
(a)  to  purchase  a  certain number  (60-100)  of light helicopters 
for  the  army.  The  possible  choices  would  seem  to  be  the 
Agusta-Bell  206A  (unit  cost  $0.096  million)  and  the  Nardi 
Hughes  OH  6A  (unit  cost  $0.072 million).  A total expend-
iture of  $6  million may  be  assumed.  This will,  however, 
go  to Italian industry in the  form  of production under 
licence; 
(b)  to replace  the  F  84  ~ the  possibility of purchasing the 
McDonnell-Douglas  RF-4E,  at a  total cost  of  $157  million, 
having  been  considered.  The  smaller number  of aircraft 
required  (44)  would  seem  to preclude  the  advantage  of 
1  See  Table  3/24. 
2  See  Table  3/25. 
760 production under  licence. It would,  moreover  be  the first 
time  that Italy had  made  a  purchase  of such size direct 
from  a  foreign  country without  some  kind ot industrial 
return  favour; 
(c)  to  replace  C-119  transport planes  and  to modernize  the 
transport  squadrons.  Various  solutions  would  seem  to  be 
possible.  According  to  American  sources1about  40  Transall 
or Lockheed  C-130  were  to  be  purchased together with 
60-80  smaller aircraft,  such as  the Fiat G222,  Breguet 
Br  941S  or Hawker  Siddeley Andover. 
With  regard to the  supplies first mentioned  (estimated 
$160  million),  no  form  of co-participation would  be 
advisable  other than subcontracting  (as is at present 
planned for the Atlantic)  in view  of the  small number  of 
aircraft required.  In the  second  case,  on  the other hand, 
the national industry might  find  a  market  worth about 
$75  million,  since  there is an Italian competitor. 
(d)  to  continue  production of Agusta-Bell helicopters to re-
place  the  army's  light aircraft.  The  market  here  is worth 
a  total of about  $10  million,  including the  possible pro-
duction of  AB  106  helicopters for  the  navy; 
(e)  possibly to manufacture  the  AM.3,  for  whic.h it is esti-
mated  that there is a  domestic  military market  worth about 
$4.5  million; 
(f)  possibly to  continue  with  the series production of the 
G91Y; 
(g)  to  modernize  the  missiles  carried by  the  navy,  creating a 
market  estimated at $12  million,  with  the  possibility of 
1  Aviation  Week  and Space  Technology,  February 1969. 
761 using  Indigo  and  Nettuno. 
The  total Italian military missile  market  in the  period 
1968-75  therefore  seems  to be  made  up  as  follows  as regards 
purchases: 
Programmes  under  way 
F  104S 
Agusta-Bell UH-1B 
Agusta-Sikorsky SH-3D 
Sparrow missiles 
Atlantic 
G91Y 
Agusta  A 101G 
Siai S-205 
Total 
New  programmes 
Army  helicopters 
Replacement F  84 F 
Replacement  C-119 
Medium  transport 
Helicopters 
AM.3 
G91Y 
Naval missiles 
Total 
$350 million 
s 10 million 
$  23  million 
$  3  million 
$105  million 
$  14 million 
$  20  million 
$  20.5 million 
$545.5  million 
s  6  million 
$157  million 
$160  million 
$  75  million 
$  10  million 
s  4.5  million 
$  70  million 
s 12 million 
$494.5  million 
It is there  evident that it will not  be  possible  to  carry out 
all the  necessary  programmes  during  the  period considered and 
it may  acccordingly  be  anticipated that  some  of  them  will have 
to  be  put off until the  following  period  (the  one  it will most probably be  impossible  to  carry out  would  seem  to  be  the 
replacement  of the F  84 F  by  the  RF-4E). 
On  this assumption,  a  total of $850 million would  be  spent 
in the  period 1968-75:  the Italian industry should receive 
orders,  either for its own  products  or for  equipment  produced 
under  licence,  for  a  total value  of about  $600  million  (in-
cluding· royalties  on  studies  commissioned abroad and  the 
price of parts bought  abroa~,  whilst  $250  million  would  be 
spent in Europe  (on  the  assumption  that the  Transall is chosen) 
or alternatively $90  million in Europe  and  $160  million in the 
US  (on  the  assumption that the  C-130 is chosen). 
In  the  following  five-year period,  however,  the situation of 
the  Italian military market  is less easy  to  foresee  owing  to 
the  absence  of any indications whatsoever  concerning pro-
grammes. 
It may  be  assumed  that in that period  the  bulk of spending 
will have  to  be  devoted to  the  purchase  of missiles either 
for  the  necessary modernization of the  missile  forces  or 
because  the  need  for  making  further aircraft replacements 
will be  less urgent,  the  Italian air force  having  been  pro-
vided with  fairly modern  fighters  (F  104S,  G91Y),  transport 
planes  (Transall,  C-130,  G222,  BR  941)  and helicopters in 
the  period 1970-75. 
In  the aircraft field,  the  sole  programme  of any  size is 
presumably  the  Panther.  The  F  84 F  will have  to  be  replaced 
and this may  well  be  done  with 175-200 Panthers.  Photographic 
missions  would  in that  case  be  carried out  by  the F-104G. 
On  the  other hand,  the  abandonment  of the  VAK  191  B programme, 
together with  the  decision not to purchase,  at all events  for 
the  moment,  British Harriers,  and  the  change  in the  G222  pro-
gramme  from  VTOL  aircraft to STOL  aircraft and later to 
763 conventional take-off planes,  create the  impression that in 
Italy the need  for  the  adoption of  VTOL  military aircraft is 
not keenly felt at present, it being preferred to  continue 
with helicopters. 
In the  period 1975-80  the  chief procurement  programmes  will 
therefore relate to: 
(a)  the  MRCA  75  Panther fighter  (in the  development  of  which 
Italy is participating through Fiat)  at a  total cost of 
1510  million; 
(b)  the  renewal  of the  long-range anti-aircraft and  tactical 
missile  forces at a  total cost  of $160  million.  As  for 
the  other European  countries,  it may  be  assumed  that this 
will be  done  with  US  equipment,  in view also of the  fact 
that the  EEC  industry  (excluding France)  has  nothing to 
offer in this sector; 
(c)  the  renewal  of air-to-air and  anti-tank missiles at a 
total cost  of  $8  million possibly with  EEC  prcd~cts). 
When  expenditure  for  maintenance  and  spares  (which  may  be 
estimated at $750  million)  is added  to  the  procurement  budget, 
the  needs  of the  Italian air force  as  regards aircraft and 
missiles amount  to a  total of  $2,291  million for  the  whole 
of the  period 1968-80. 
This  figure  is near  enough  to  that  calculated for  the  funds 
available  (assuming  that the  value  of the latter remains 
constant at the  1967  level),  even  though it is not  unlikely 
that expenditure  for  maintenance  and  repairs will have  to  be 
increased.  The  level of this expenditure  (estimated on  the 
basis of  the  1967  data)  appears  in point  of  fact  to  be  lower 
than  for  other European  countries,  which  may  in part  be  ex-
plained by  the  low  number  of hours  flown  by  Italian military 
764 aircraft  (again as  compared  with other countries). 
On  these  assumptions  the  Italian air force  would  in 1980  have 
a  value  of $1,536  million  (36%  of US  origin and  64%  EEC). 
This  level  could  be  reached  by  reducing  the percentage  of GNP 
earmarked  for procurements,  in accordance  with the  general 
trend of Italian policy  (defence  expenditure:  4%  of GNP  in 
1955;  3.1%  in 1960). 
3.2.4 West  Germany 
Financial resources:  Defence  budget  1967:  $5,358  million,  of 
which $624  million was  earmarked  for  missiles  (estimate  baaed 
on  1964  data). 
Total  funds  available for  1968-70:  with  expenditure  remaining 
constant at the  1967  level:  $7,478  million;  with an increase 
of  4%1 per year:  $9,734 million. 
Needs:  At  the  end  of 1967  the  German  air force  had  a  value  of 
$4,300  million  (74%  of  US  origin,  9.5%  UK  and  16.5%  EEC)2• 
So  far as the  future  is concerned,  the  German  military market 
undoubtedly  constitutes  one  of the  most  outstanding in Europe 
and  the  question as  to whether it will  tend  towards  a  policy 
of self-sufficiency,  European  co-production or even  procurement 
from  the  US  or US  co-production is therefore  of the  greatest 
importance  for  the  future  of  the  European  aerospace  industry. 
In  the  more  immediate  future,  i.e., during the  period up  to 
1975,  the German  air forces  will,  as  far as  can be  foreseen, 
have  to3: 
(a)  replace  the  Alouette helicopters.  Competitors already 
known  are  numerous  and  three  of  them  are  German-made 
(Bolkow  BO  105,  VFW  H5,  Dornier  Do  132),  one  is French 
(Sud  SA  340),  one  Italo-American  (Aguata-Bell 206)  and 
one  American  (Hughes  OH-6A). 
1  Average  annual  compound  rate.  2  See  Table 3/26.  3  See  Table  3/27. The  point acting in favour  of  the  first three is obviously 
their nationality.  On  the  other hand,  for all three  money 
will have  to  be  spent  in order to adapt  them  to military 
use  (estimated at $6  million for  the  BO  105 and  $13.7 
million for the  VFW  H5),  whilst in the  other oases  the 
military version of the helicopters is already in regular 
production. 
(b)  adopt  an  armed helicopter.  There  seems  to  be  a  move  towards 
a  joint Bolkow/Sud-Aviation design estimated to  cost  $75 
million in R&D;  the  only  competitor might  be  the  Lockheed 
Cheyenne  (US); 
(c)  introduce a  training helicopter,  for  which  there already 
exists a  Bolkow  design,  development  of which  would  cost 
$12.5 million in R&D; 
(d)  purchase  20-40 more  medium  helicopters  for  the  navy. 
These  might  be  some  more  CH-53A,  in addition to  those 
already ordered,  or Sikorsky SH-3D,  for  example,  con-
structed under  licence  by  the British company  of Westland. 
(e)  replace  the  Cobra anti-tank missile  by  Milan  and Hot 
missiles built by  Nord-Bolkow; 
(f)  introduce  an anti-aircraft missile  for protection against 
low-level and  low-speed attacks  (Nord-Bolkow Roland). 
(g)  introduce  a  ship-to-air missile.  It is planned to use 
the  American Standard 1A,  side  by  side  with which  there 
might  be  an  order  for  further British Seacats; 
(h)  intoduce  an air-to-ground missile in place of the Atlantic 
(Nord-Bolkow Kormoran). 
On  the  other hand,  because  of the  changed tactical requirements, 
it is thought  that the  Italo-German  VAK  191  B  (now  solely 
German)  aimed at the  production of a  vertical take-off fighter 
766 to replace  the Luftwaffe's G91  will not  proceed  beyond  the 
prototype stage. 
Consequently,  the  German  military market  for  the  period  round 
about  1970  (1968-72)  may  be  considered to  be  fairly clearly 
defined.  Assuming  as usual that replacement  will be  on  the 
basis of  equal operational efficiency and  excluding  R&D  ex-
penditure,  it may  be  estimated that the  amounts  spent will be 
as  follows: 
£50 million for  the  replacement  of the  Alouette  and  the 
training helicopters; 
$100  million for  armed helicopters; 
$40  million  for  medium  helicopters; 
$10 million for anti-tank and anti-aiTcraft missiles; 
$10  million for  ground-to-air and air-to-ground missiles  for 
the  navy; 
This gives  a  total of at least $210  million in addition to  the 
amounts  already earmarked  for  the RF-4E  ($500 million),  re-
placements to the F-104G  ($110  million)  and G  91  T'($23 mil-
lion),  the  CH-53A  ($350  million,  $250  million of it for  1969-
72),  Skyservant  ($2.5 million)  and  HFB  ($14 million)  programmef 
In all,  this would bring expenditure  for  the  1968-72 period, 
taking account  of the  commitments  for earlier programmes  (in 
particular,  UH-1D,  Atlantic and Transall)  to  a  total of 
$1,497  million for  new  equipment  alone. 
The  present situation in the  German  military aeronautical 
market  may  be  summarized as  follows: Forecast  of German  Military Demand  in the Period 1968-72 
(millions  of dollars) 
Programme  ~·---T--~  Pa:Y!'en_!s.  io  I  Others 
!Total  US  Germani· 
------------------·!---·  -----
RF .. 4E  500 
F 104G  110 
CH-!>3A 2  250 
UH-10 2  70 
Sky  servant  2.5 
HFB  320 
2 
14 
Atlantic Transall  220 
G 91  T  23 
Light helicopters3  50 
Training helicopters3  22.5 
Armed  helicopters3  175 
Medium  helicopters  40 
Tactical miseiles  10 
Naval missiles  10 
T 0 T A L 
400-t455  I 
10 
125 
35 
0+20 
0+20 
5 
100-t45 
60 
125 
35 
2.5 
14 
220 
23 
50-<,20 
22,5 
175+140 
0+20 
10 
5 
50 
0-t-10 
0-t-35 
0+40 
575-t-660  862-t-722  0+135  1,497 
'---------'----'--------'---1~ 
1  Including licence  fees. 
2  Period 1968-72. 
3  Including R&D. 
If account is taken of licence  fees  and  of the plant  which 
the  German  industry will have  to purchase  in the  US  for  the 
manufacture  of the  hardware  shown  in the  table as being en-
trusted to it, it emerges  that very probably  the  German 
military market,  as  was  anticipated,  will represent  for  the 
US  aerospace  industry a  value  of about  $800  million in the 
immediate  future.  There  is,  however,  also the  symptomatic 
768 tendency,  as appears  from  the  table itself,  to allocate  the 
remaining  50%  of  the  market  to German  industry while  indulging 
in the  various  forms  of international collaboration at  the 
R&D  phase,  particularly with France. 
With  regard  to  the  more  distant future,  i.e., the  years 
round about  1975,  forecasts  become  more  difficult.  Undoubtedly, 
if the  forecasts  concerning  the  immediate  future  should prove 
to  be  correct,  the  German  aerospace  industry would  increase 
its own  capacity considerably and  would  thereby be  in a  posi-
tion to satisfy national military needs,  at least  from  the 
technical and production point of view,  on its own,  or at 
most  under  a  system of European  collaboration in which  the 
role of leader  would  fall to it. 
If the  operational requirements  of the years round about  1975 
should  then  confirm  what  has,  in a  certain sense,  been  the 
presupposition underlying the entire German  R&D  programme, 
i.e.,  the  evolution of military aircraft towards  the  VTOL 
types,  the  German  aeronautical industry would  probably  be  in 
a  position to offer aircraft that would  be  competitive at 
the  international level to  foreign  countries also. 
In  the  aeronautical sector,  the  most  important  types  which 
Germany  must  put  into service after 1975  are: 
1.  A highly versatile supersonic  fighter plane  capable  of 
replacing the  present F-104G  and  G91  planes.  This is a 
problem  which is  mor~ or less  common  to all European 
countries and  to solve  which various attempts have  been 
made.  In particular,  Germany  tried first with the  VTOL 
formula  (VJ  101  and German-American  AVS  programmes,  both 
abandoned),  then with the  national  NKF  programme  and lastly 
with the  multinational  MRCA  75 Panther.  There  can be  no 
doubt  that,  for  this last type  of'aircraft also,  the Luftwaffe  will constitute  the  chief market,  which  may  be 
estimated (still on  the  basis of replacement at equal 
ope~ational value)  at about  $1,700  million. 
2.  A transport plane  with  VTOL  characteristics.  In  this 
connection, it is known  that much  of German  aeronautical 
R&D  is directed towards  the study of VTOL  planes,  whether 
fighters  (VAK  191  B,  VJ  101C,  AVS)  or transport planes. 
Insofar as present  operational requirements  make  the  intro-
duction of military transport planes  with  VTOL  character-
istics seem  hardly likely in the  near  future,  it is pos-
sible that the situation may  change  by  1975.  In this 
sector the German  industry has  a  prototype  under  test at 
present  - the  Dornier  Do  31  - and various  design studies 
under  way  with special appropriations  from  the  Ministry 
of Defence  (about  $9  million for 1967- Mack  Plan).  These 
are being carried out  by  five  firms  - Bolkow,  Dornier,  EWR, 
HFB  and  VFW  - combined  in a  study  committee  which is in 
turn split into four  groups,  consisting of specialists 
from  the  various  firms.  Their brief is to  examine: 
(a)  general problems  of  V/STOL  techniques  (under  VFW 
supervision; 
(b)  structures for  the aircraft of the  future  (under  EWR); 
(c)  control and navigating systems  (under  Dornier); 
(d)  the preparation of basic designs. 
The  last-named  group  is studying various solutions  for 
the  replacement  of the  Transall by  VTOL  planes,  namely 
12  types  of aircraft with payloads  of 5,  10  and  15  tons 
in the  form  of a  helicopter  (Bolkow),  a  jet-lift vertical 
take-off plane  (VFW  and  Dornier)  and  a  fan-lift aircraft 
(HFB,  Dornier,  EWR). 
770 It is therefore  more  than  probable  that such an  R&D  effort, 
which is equalled only by  the  US  work  - so  far unsuccessful 
- in the  same  sector,  will lead to  the  design of the  VTOL 
military transport plane  of 1975. 
Furthermore,  the  Do  31,  even if it does  not  go  into series 
production,  will continue  to  be  developed especially for 
the  purpose  of acquiring data useful for  the  abovementioned 
programmes.  An  amount  of  $4 million was  put aside  for this 
in 1968. 
3. Tactical and anti-aircraft missiles to replace  the  present 
Pershing, Sergeant,  Honest  John,  Nike  and Hawk. 
In this sector,  unlike  the  preceding  ones,  there is not 
sufficient German  R&D  activity to enable  them  to be  re-
placed  by  home-grown  products.  In all likelihood it will 
therefore  be  necessary to  buy  foreign again,  i.e., probably 
in the  US. 
However,  the  German  military market,  assuming  replacement 
is made  on  the  basis of equal  operational efficiency,  will 
after 1972 attain truly outstanding  dimensions.  In addition 
to  expenditure  on  the  completion of the  CH-53A  programme, 
it will be  necessary  to find: 
(a)  $1,700 million for  the  replacement  of the  F-104G 
(European  collaboration probable  in the Panther pro-
gramme); 
(b)  $750  million  for  the  replacement  of the missile  forces 
(except  for  the  shorter-range tactical and anti-air-
craft missiles),  probably with  purchases  in the  US; 
(c)  $400-500  million for  VTOL  transport planes,  probably 
of original German  design  or via European  collaboration; 
(d)  $50  million  for  the  replacement  of  traiuers,  probably 
of German  design  or  in collaboration. 
771 It should be  noted that,  even  assuming  that all the  programmes 
necessary to  maintain  the  German air force  at its present 
operational efficiency are  in fact  carried out,  the  total 
expenditure  necessary  ($7,905  million)  is only slightly 
higher  than  the  "minimum"  available  ($7,478  million). 
Furthermore,  Germany  is the  only European  country in which  de-
fence  expenditure  has  continued  to  increase  from  year to year 
as  a  percentage  of GNP,  growing  from  3.9%  in 1955  to  4.1%  in 
1961,  5.5%  in 1964  and  4.3%  in 1967.  Although  the  marked 
initial increase  was  justified by  the  need  to rebuild the 
armed  forces,  the  continuity of the  effort is obvious.  It 
therefore  seems  reasonable,  on  the  basis of German  military 
policy during the  past  decade,  to  assume  that expenditure  on 
procurement  will  continue  in the  future  to account  for at 
least a  constant  percentage  of GNP.  This  would  give  an  amount 
available  for aircraft and missiles of $9,734 million during 
1968-80 as against needs  (with operational efficiency equal 
to that in 1967)  to the  value  of $7,905  million.  It is evident 
that Germany  can appreciably increase  the  operational effi-
ciency of its air force  d~ring the  coming  decade,  and this 
will probably prove  to  be  the  case  since: 
(a)  From  the  time it was  built up  again,  the  Luftwaffe  has 
continually increased its own  operational efficiency by 
replacing aircraft by  equal  numbers  of others of higher 
performance  (and  therefore  increasing operational effi-
ciency)  if not  by  increasing outright  the  actual numbers. 
It should  be  noted that the original nucleus  of the Luft-
waffe at the  time  of it was  formed  was  already appreciable. 
(b)  An  increase in the  operational efficiency of the German 
armed  forces is probably in accordance  with  US  military 
policy in regard to Europe,  as it would  permit  a  gradual 
772 reduction  of the  US  (and British)armed  forces  in Europe 
and  would  perhaps  also offset the  uncertainty of the 
French attitude  towards  NATO. 
(c)  As  will be  seen later,  the  operational efficiency of the 
French armed  forces  probably reached its peak around 
1966-68  and  the  French  commitment  in this sense  seems 
likely to be  reduced;  the  same  may  be  said of the  United 
Kingdom  armed  forces1•  A strengthening of the  armed  forces 
of the  other European  countries is accordingly  indispensable 
if a  military balance  of power  is to  be  maintained  between 
East  and  West.  In the aircraft and  missile field only 
Germany  is economically strong enough  to undertake  such  a 
task and will in all probability therefore  tend  to  become 
militarily the  most  powerful  country in Europe. 
It must  not  be  forgotten,  moreover,  that,  whilst  the US  will 
inevitably have  to resort to  MAP  aid,  as  in the past,  in order 
to step up  the  armed  forces  of other countries,  in the  case 
of Germany it will suffice for  that  country to  devote  to  the 
purchase  of  armaments  a  proportion of  the  sum  it has  to  pay 
to the  US  for  the  maintenance  of the  US  armed  forces  on  its 
own  territory. 
Furthermore  Germany's  desire  to reduce  as  much  as possibie  this 
expenditure,  which is of  no  advantage  to  the  national industry, 
and  therefore  to supply her  own  armed  forces  with German-made 
equipment,  is quite  logical. 
This also explains  why,  on  the  basis of the above  forecasts, 
missile procurements are approximately balanced as  between  the 
German  industry and  the  US  for  the  period up  to about  1972-75 
1  Even  though,  in this case,  the  reduction is partly compen-
sated by  the  abandonment  of international defence  obligations 
outside Europe. 
773 and  then  come  mainly  from  the  German  industry.  Since,  however, 
the  German  aerospace  industry is not at present in a  position 
to  meet  the  requirements  of the  national armed  forces, 
Germany  must  inevitably have  recourse  to the  industries of 
other countries in the  form  of  joint design  and  construction. 
However~  on  the  assumption that replacements  of equipment  will 
be  made  on  the  basis of equal  operational efficiency  (an as-
sumption  which,  for  the  reasons  discussed above,  does  not 
seem  very probable),  the  German  air force  would  have  in 1980 
a  value  of $4,693  million  (38.5%  of  US  origin and  61.5%  EEC). 
3.2.5 France 
Financial resources:  Defence  budget  1967:  $4,785  millio~ of 
which $470  million were  earmarked  for aircraft and  missiles 
(estimate  on  the  basis of  data  for  1960-65). 
For 1968-80  total financial  resources at constant value  (196?): 
$4,700  million with  an  annual  compound  increase  of  4%:  $7,332 
million. 
Needs:  Obviously  the  French needs  for  supplies  of aircraft and 
missiles are strictly dependent  on  the  policy that will be 
followed  during  the  next  decade,  in particular in regard to 
the  nuclear strike force. 
Pending  a  final decision,  it may  be  assumed  that  the  original 
programme  for  the  nuclear strike  force  will  be  carried out  to 
completion,  albeit with  some  delay,  although it is not  very 
likely that it will be  developed  any  further. 
If these  assumptions are  admitted as valid,  the  expenditure 
on  aircraft and  missiles still necessary in order to  carry 
out  the  original nuclear strike  force  programme  would  amount 
to  a  total of about  $490  million,  the  greater part of  which 
would  have  to  be  met  in the  course  of 1970. 
774 1  The  draft  budget  of the French  armed  forces  for  1969  pro-
vides  for  the  following  expenditure  for  the  nuclear strike, 
force  (shown  side  by  side  with  the  amounts  originally laid 
down  in the  Loi  Programme): 
General  R&D 
Nuclear  programme  (arms  and 
propulsio~ 
Transport  and military uses 
of  space 
Tactical nuclear  weapons 
Total 
$110  million 
$379  million 
$375  million 
$  48.8  million 
$912.8  million 
(73) 
(420.2) 
(173) 
(79.8) 
(746) 
To  this must  be  added,  to be  charged against  the  "Annexe  des 
·Poudres"  budget,  $23.9  million  for  propellants  for  missiles 
(out  of  a  total budget  of  $36  million),  of  which  a  not  incon-
siderable part  may  conceivably  be  devoted  to  the  production 
of propellants  for  SSBS  and  MSBS,  in addition to  $10  million 
for  R&D  in the  propellant  field. 
Under  the  Loi Programme  for  1965-70  there  will therefore still 
be  available,  on  the  assumptions  mentioned  above,  about  $1,100 
million to  be  spent  in 1970  (or later,  depending  on  the  sums 
available in the  budget)  as against  the  $706  million provided 
for  in the  Loi  Programme  itself for  the  completion  of  the 
nuclear strike force.  Since  the  bulk  of  the  costs,  as  from 
1969,  relate to  the  work  on  the  nuclear submarines  Foudroyant 
and Terrible,  it is probable  that  only  a  small part of this 
sum  will be  devoted  to the French aerospace  industry. 
1 Air et Cosmos,  9  November  1968. 
775 In  the 'bonventional"  armaments  sector,  always  assuming  that 
French policy will  be  directed to  maintaining the  operational 
efficiency of  the  national air forces  constant at the  1967 
value1,  the  following  predictions  can  be  made  for  the  period 
up  to 1975: 
1.  Replacement  of the  present F-100,  Vautour  and  Mirage  III 
(partially)  by  Dassault  Mirage  F1  aircraft at a  cost esti-
mated at  $400  million.  In  the  draft  budget  for  1969  the·re 
is provision  (in addition to  the  above  amount)  for  the 
expenditure  of  $174  million  on  the  purchase  of a  series 
of 30  Mirage  1  aircraft  (reduced  from  40  owing  to French 
economic  difficulties)  and  the  completion of the  industrial 
plant necessary  for  production. 
2.  Construction  of  150  Jaguar aircraft at  a  total cost  of 
$250  million;  of this amount,  $88  million have  already 
been  spent in 1968  (purchase  of 50  Jaguar)  and  a  further 
$34 million  for  the  completion  of  the  necessary industrial 
plant are  provided  for  in the  1969  budget.  Consequently  the 
remainder  of the Jaguar programme  constitutes a  market  that 
may  be  estimated at  $136  million. 
3.  Replacement  of the  Magister,  Paris and  T  33  trainers by  a 
twin  jet of  joint Dassault/Dornier  design.  The  value  of 
the aircraft to  be  replaced in the French armed  forces 
aggregates  $125 million. 
4o  Replacement  of the  heavy Sikorsky H-34  helicopters  by Frelon 
helicopters,  at a  cost of $136  million.  This  replacement, 
1The  conventional value  of the French aircraft and  missile 
forces  (excluding the  nuclear strike force)  was  $3,335  mil-
lion at  the  end  of  1967.  See  Table  3/28. 
776 which  was  to  continue in 1969,  has  been  postponed  owing  to 
the  familiar  budget  cuts. 
5.  Construction of WG.13,  SA  340,  SA  330 helicopters at a 
total cost of $185  million. 
6.  Replacement  of the Etendard  and  Crusader  carrier-borne 
aircraft probably  by  aircraft developed  from  the  Mirage 
prototype,  at a  cost  of $100  million •. 
7.  In  the  missile  sector,  the  Mandragore  anti-missile  programme 
having  been abandoned,  practically the  whole  of the  French 
missile  forces  will have  to  be  replaced in the  course  of 
1975,  taking into account  also  the  requirements  of the 
nuclear strike force.  In this sector the  programmes  of 
which details have  been  issued provide  for: 
(a)  replacement  of the  SS.12  and  SS.11  by  the  Hot  and Harpon 
missilP.s; 
(b)  replacement  of Entac  by  Milan missiles; 
(c)  replacement  of the  AS.20  and  AS.30  by  AS.33  missiles 
(French); 
(d)  introduction of the  AS.37  Martel missile  (Franco-
British collaboration); 
(e)  introduction of the  Roland missiles; 
(f)  introduction of the Crotale anti-aircraft missiles. 
The  total cost of these  short-range missiles is estimated at 
about  $55 million. 
Longer-range  missiles should also  go  into service in the 
period 1970-75,  to replace  the  American  missiles  which are 
today generally in use  in France  (and  in the rest of Zurope). 
777 These  are: 
(a)  the Pluton tactical ballistic missile  with a  10-15 
kiloton nuclear  warhead  (to replace  Honest  John), 
the  first launchings  of which  are  planned  for  1969. 
A total of  40  launchers is planned. 
(b)  the  MM.38  sea-to-sea naval missile  with  a  range  of  40  km; 
(c)  an anti-aircraft missile  to  replace  Nike. 
The  total French  domestic  market  for  these  missiles is worth 
about  $300  million. 
Taking into account  also smaller orders  (Nord  262  - $40  mil-
lion;  Cessna  310  - $0.75  million and  the  further production 
of missiles  and aircraft in service at present  (Atlantic, 
Transall:  $150  million),  the  value  of  the  French military 
market  in  the  period 1970-75  may  be  set at  $1,500 million 
~xcluding expenditure  on  R&D  and  for  the  nuclear strike force). 
The  whole  of this market  (with  the  exception of payments  for 
licence  fees  for  some  types  of  power  units  and  airborne  equip-
ment)  will be  reserved for French aerospace  companies,  which 
will be  able  to operate either alone  or in collaboration with 
British or German  industries.  As  far as  the  period 1975-80 
is concerned,  forecasts  are  more  difficult,  largely because 
there  is no  knowing  in what  direction French defence  policy 
may  evolve. 
It is,  however,  probable  that  the French air force  will have 
to  equip itself with variable  geometry  fighters,  which  might 
be  developed or  derived  from  the  present Mirage  G  (as  an 
alternative  to the Panther),  and  with  STOL  transport aircraft 
(derived or developed  from  the  present Breguet  941)  and  fighter 
helicopters and  heavy  transport helicopters at a  total cost  of 
$1,500  million. 
778 All  these  types  of aircraft could  be  produced  by  the  French 
aerospace  industry,  which  has  already  carried out  the  basic 
R&D,  or  they  could  be  developed  in collaboration with the 
industries of other countries,  especially if these  types 
also  meet  the  operational requirements  of the  armed  forces  of 
the  various  countries interested in the  programmes. 
Finally,  expenditure  for  maintenance  and repairs during  the 
period 1968-80  may  be  estimated at $3,200  million. 
Even if we  assume  that any  further  development  of its own 
nuclear strike  force  is abandoned,  France  would  therefore 
need  $6,902  million1  for aircraft and  missile  procurements 
during the  period 1968-80,  and  this figure  is in good  agree-
ment  with that  of about  $7,300 million calculated on  the  basis 
of  an  assumed  annual increase  of  4%  in the  defence  expenditure, 
which  would  thus  represent  an  almost  constant  percentage  of 
GNP. 
On  these  assumptions  the  French  "conventional" aircraft and 
missile  forces  would  in 1980  be  worth  $3,807  million  (88%  of 
EEC  origin and  12%  produced  under Franco-British collabora-
tion)  as against  $3,335 million in 1967  (21%  US,  66%  EEC,  13% 
Franco-British collaborationf.  On  its own  account  the nuclear 
strike  force  would  be  worth  $7,600 million in 1980  (as against 
$1,640  million in 1967). 
The  changed  domestic  situation and  the  economic  difficulties 
that have  been alluded to  several times,  however,  suggest that 
in all probability the  French  armed  forces  will be  able  to 
1  See  Table  3/29. 
2  See  footnote  1  on  page  100. 
779 maintain the  level of efficiency reached about  1967  in the 
future  also.  In that  case  spending  on  procurements  would 
presumably  be  reduced,  for  the  period 1968-80,  to something 
in the  region of $4,700 million,  which  would automatically 
entail the  abandonment  of  some  of  the  more  ambitious pro-
grammes  in order  to  bring needs  into line  with expenditure 
(cut-back in the  Mirage  G programme  or its replacement  by 
the Panther,  abandonment  of  the  STOL  transport plane,  aban-
donment  of the Pluton,  MM.38  and anti-aircraft missiles, 
abandonment  of armed  helicopters and  reduction  of  the  heavy 
helicopter programme,  reduction in expenditure  for  maintenance 
and  spares  by  cutting down  the  number  of operational aircraft, 
etc.). 
3.2.6  United  Kingdom 
Financial resources:  Defence  budget  for 1967:  $5,292 million, 
of  which  an  estimated  $690  million are  earmarked  for  the pro-
curement  of aircraft and  missiles.  For 1968-80,  $8,280 mil-
lion would  thus  be  available  for procurements,  if it is as-
sumed  that  the  defence  budget  remains  constant at 1967  levels, 
or $10,764 million if it rises at an annual average  compound 
rate of  4%.  Since it is very probable  that  the  decisions  taken 
in 1964,  i.e.,  those  providing for  a  gradual  cut-back in de-
fence  spending to not  more  than  6%  of GNP,  will not  be  reversed 
even after 1970,  of  the  two  figures  given  above  it may  be 
presumed  that the  lower  one  is the  nearer to reality. Further-
more,  it should  be  remembered  that  t:~e  reduction  in Britain's 
military  commitments  outside  Europe  tends  to  lessen the  per-
centage  of the  defence  budget  spent  on aircraft and  missiles. 
Needs:  At  the  end  of 1967  the British aircraft and  missile 
forces  were  worth  $5,078  million  (25%  of  US  origin,  63% 
British,  10.5%  produced under Franco-British collaboration, 
780 1.5% of other origin). 
The  principal replacements  of aircraft and  missiles  which 
will be  necessary during the  period 1968-75 are: 
1.  Replacement  of  the  Honest  John tactical missiles by  more 
powerful versions of the  same  missile in the  United States, 
but it is also possible thatthis will not  be  necessary since 
these  missiles will be  required  for  use  by  the British 
forces  (BAOR)  in Germany. 
2.  Replacement  of the carrier-borne Sea  Vixen  and Scimitar. 
The  decision to  do  away  with aircraft carriers has  already 
been announced  and  for  this reason  such  replacements  will 
no  longer be  necessary. 
3.  Replacement  of the  Argosy,  Valetta,  Devon,  Heron,  Beverley, 
etc.,  transport aircraft.  Replacement  by  the Hercules  and 
Andover  can  be  taken as already  decided upon  as also  can 
the  cut-back in the  number  of transports. 
4.  Replacement  of the Jet Provost trainers  by  the  later pres-
surized version,  Jet Provost T.Mk  5. 
5.  Replacement  of the basic  trainer used in the first period, 
the  DHC  Chipmunk  most  probably  by  the British designed 
Beagle Pup-150. 
Accordingly,  the British military market  for  the  period 1970-
75,  as  far as  procurements are  concerned,  may  be  valued as 
follows,  taking into account  programmes at present under  way  or 
due  to be  started shortly: 
781 Jaguar and P.1127  fighters 
WG.13,  SA  340  and  SA  330  ~elicopters 
Nimrod  marine  reconnaissance aircraft 
Jet Provost T.Mk  5  trainers 
Beagle  Pup  basic  trainers 
Sea  King  helicopters 
Phantom  fighters 
Basset light transport 
Martel missiles 
Sea  Dart missiles 
Swingfire  missiles 
Rapier missiles 
Tactical missiles 
Total 
$510  million 
$280  million 
$240  million 
$  45  million 
$  20  million 
$  57.5 million 
$350  million 
$  1  million 
$  20 million 
$  3  million 
$  5  million 
$  5  million 
$  4o  million 
$1576.5 million 
For  the  period 1975-80 the  chief programmes  for military pro-
curements  in the aircraft sector should  concern: 
1.  A variable  geometry  fighter.~1c most  probable  candidate 
seems at present to be  the  MRCA  75  Panther and it is con-
ceivable  that,  against  the  background  of international 
collaboration in which this programme  is being  carried 
out,  contracts almost  equal  to  the  val~e of the  national 
market  for this  type  of aircraft,  at present estimated at 
$600-700  million,  might  be  placed with  the  British air-
craft industry. 
2.  A VTOL  fighter  developed  from  the P.1127,  the  technology 
of  which  does  not  seem  likely to  ensure  a  useful operation-
al life much  beyond  1975.  Resumption  of the  P.1154 pro-
gramme  would  be  feasible,  naturally with  the  necessary 
improvements.  However,  the  existence  of a  massive  German 
R&D  programme  in this sector seems  to point  to  the likeli-
hood  of  the  joint development  of an  Anglo-German  (or  Anglo-
782 Franco-German)design,  having regard also to  the  small size 
of the British domestic  military market  (estimated at $300 
million). 
3.  A VTOL  or STOL  transport aircraft,  which  al~o might  be 
developed after resumption  of the  abandoned  HS  681  pro-
gramme.  However,  the  possibility of  Anglo-German  collabo-
ration seems  more  probable.  The  market  may  be  estimated 
at $200  million. 
4.  Fighter heli< 'pters.  As  their development  with British 
R&D  is not  woi  ~h  while,  provided that they  can  be  developed 
in  collaborati, n  with France,  this solution is economically 
more  advantage~ us  than purchasing  in the  US  or production 
under  US  licen e.  The  market  may  be  estimated at  $80  million. 
5.  Heavy  transpor·  helicopters.  In this sector direct purchase 
of the  American  production licence  seems  probable.  The 
market  may  be  estimated at $150  million. 
6.  Short-range missiles  (air-to-air,  air-to-ground,  ground-to-
air,  anti-tank,  etc.). The  development  of  programmes  based 
on  national British R&D  is likely,  together with  forms  of 
Anglo-French  collaboration for  the  more  advanced  types. 
Total market  of  $71  million. 
7.  Ballistic missiles. Polaris will certainly be  obsolete  from 
the  operational point  of view before  1980.  It can  only  be 
replaced by missiles  (a  further  developed Poseidon?)  pro-
cured  in the  US  or  by  models  developed  from  the  French 
SSBS.  The  cost  of this programme  may  be  estimated at $900 
million and it seems  that it could be  carried out  only by 
resorting to direct purchase  from  the  US. 
Including $3,600  million for  the total expenditure  on  main-
tenance  and  spares,  the British aircraft and missile market 
783 in the period 1968-80  would  therefore  amount  to a  total of 
$7,727  million1,  which is thus slightly below the  amount  that 
would  be available if we  assume  a  defence  budget  remaining 
constant at 1967  levels and  the  same  distribution of appro-
priations amongst  the various  armed  forces.  In view of what 
was  stated earlier, it is not  improbable  that the  funds  avail-
able  for aircraft and missiles during the  period 1968-80  might 
in fact  be  reduced  to $7,600-7,700 million. 
On  the  assumptions  outlined above  the  value  of the British 
aircraft and missile  forces  in 1980  would  be  $5,250  million 
(42%  of  US  origin,  21%  British,  13%  the result of Franco-
British collaboration,  24%  the  result of collaboration between 
the  United Kingdom  and  the  other EEC  countrie~. 
3.3  R&D  Expenditure 
In  the  preceding section it was  assumed  that the EEC  industry 
would  supply the  armed  forces  of the Member  States with the 
bulk of their aircraft and missile supplies during  the period 
1968-80,  commensurate  with the  industry's development  poten-
tial on  the  basis  of  the  technological knowledge  acquired by 
it up  to 1967. 
Within  the  limits of the programmes  planned for  the period 
1968-80 it is therefore necessary to estimate  the  funds  re-
quired for  the  military  R&D  programmes  in order to  ensure 
the  satisfactory completion of the  production programmes. 
With  reference  to  the  more  significant of  the~an attempt 
has  been made  in the  following  table  to  estimate  the  cost of 
the military R&D  needed to  ensure  the  completion of  the  EEC 
and  UK  programmes  mentioned at various points in Section 1.3.2, 
1  See Table  3/31. 
784 basing the  estimate  of the  costs  on  examples  from  similar 
programmes  where  no  other data  were  available. 
In the  columns  headed  "EEC  and  UK  earospace  industry"  the 
cost of the  R&D  required for the electronics and avionics 
part of the  programme  has  been  deducted,  in addition to  the 
value  of the  contracts placed in other countries. 
The  table does  not  show  any  R&D  expenditure  for military uses 
of space  or  for  the  construction of atomic  or  thermonuclear 
weapons.  The  breakdown  of  R&D  expenditure  has  been  made  in 
accordance  with  the  basic assumptions  mentioned in the  general 
introduction. 
Smaller programmes  the  cost  of  whose  R&D  can  be  fully  covered 
by  the  estimated  funds  for  basic  R&D  (i.e.,  expenditure  which 
is not specifically earmarked for a  clearly defined programme) 
have  been  disregarded,  as also have  unsuccessful programmes. 
785 R&D  Expenditure  Necessary for Carrying Out  the Military Programmes 
Entrusted to EEC  and  UK  Industry during the Period 1968-80 
(Millions of dollars) 
r-··-------------r-----......-----r------. 
Total  I  EEC  !  UK  I 
R&D  aerospac~ aerospa<e 
cost  industry:  industr~ 
Programme 
Panther 
Trainers 
Mirage  G  (development) 
STOL  transport 
VTOL  transport 
VTOL  fighter plane 
Heavy  helicopters 
Light helicopters 
Training helicopters 
Fighter helicopters 
Air-to-air missiles 
Ground-to-air missiles 
Air-to-ground missiles 
Anti-aircraft missiles 
Naval missiles 
1,000 
40 
40 
100 
150 
1SO 
20 
50 
15 
175 
?f.) 
30 
30 
150 
60 
Naval  missiles  ?fJ 
Tactical missiles  ~o 
Anti-tank missiles  10 
Anti-tank missiles  10 
Basic  R&D,  failures,  vari- ~500 
ous 
TOTAL·  4,940 
786 
500 
40 
10:) 
110 
100 
18 
45 
15 
110 
15 
15 
70 
150 
7 
1,  ~00 
2,655 
3')0 
25 
25 
40 
15 
15 
7 
700 Side  by side  with this  R&D  "market"  there are  obviously the 
funds  earmarked  for  military R&D  in the  defence  budgets  of 
the  individual countries. 
These  may  be  estimated,  as  always  on  the basis of the  1967 
data and  on  the  two  assumptions  of  the  1967  value  remaining 
constant  or of an  annual  increase  of  4%,  as  follows  for  the 
period 1968-80: 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
France  (average  1960-65) 
Germany  (1967  data) 
(p.m.) 
(p.m.) 
Italy  (R&D  included in procurements, 
$  10  million 
$  20  million 
$  2,420-3,145 million 
$  1,130-1,470 million 
cannot  be  estimated) 
Bearing in mind  the  observations already made  concerning the 
trends in German  and French defence  expenditure,  a  sum  of 
$3,900  million would  therefore  seem  to  be  available  for  the 
EEC  countries  (to which  must  be  added  the  Italian expenditure, 
which  cannot  be  estimated)  as  compared  with needs  amounting 
to $4,260 million.  It is thus  evident that,  taking account  of 
Italian R&D  expenditure,  the  EEC  countries  should not in-
crease  expenditure  on  their  own  aerospace  R&D  beyond  the 
1967  level in order to carry out  the  programmes  necessary for 
supplying their  own  armed  forces,  but  should  merely  employ 
it more  efficiently.  In this  connection  the  study has  been 
based on  the  assumptions  that  R&D  funds  are  in fact  used in 
the  EEC  aerospace  industries and not  "transferred"  from  them, 
in a  some  disguised  form,  to  the British or  US  industries; it 
is only in this  way  that the  efficient use  of the effort  made 
will become  possible,  thus benefiting future  programmes  also. 
In regard to the  United  Kingdom,  on  the  other hand,  the sit-
uation is quite  different.  If it is assumed  that spending  on 
aerospace  R&D  remains  constant at the  1968  value,  a  total sum 
of $4,500 million would  be  available  for  1968-80  as against 
787 actual military requirements  of not  even  $1,200 million. 
It thus  emerges  that the United Kingdom  has an  excess  of 
funds  available  for aircraft and missile  R&D  in relation to 
the actual production orders possible.  Naturally this excess 
could be  used in the  form  of an  indirect subsidy to the  UK 
aerospace  industry,  in either the military or the civil sector, 
as  in fact  certain pointers indicate to  be  happening.  In  other 
words,  the  amounts  available in the British military budget 
are such as  to permit  lavish R&D  spending,  thus  maintaining 
the national aerospace  industry at a  high technological level. 
On  the  other hand,  the  military needs  are  not  such as  to  en-
able aircraft and missiles to be  produced in quantities  com-
mensurate  with  the  R&D  funds  available.  Obviously another in-
terpretation is also possible,  but this seems  to  be  more 
"journalistic".  It is that the  cost of British R&D  is much 
greater than that of other countries and  that  in  consequence 
the  production/R&D ratio is much  lower  by  comparison with 
what is found  elsewhere. 
A factor arguing in favour  of the first hypothesis is the 
great  number  of cancellations of British aerospace projects 
in the  recent years  when  they  had already reached a  relatively 
advanced stage  of  development.  Only  in a  few  cases  were  these 
cancellations warranted  on  the basis of the  excessive  cost 
of the  R&D  whilst  in all the  others  (TSR.2,  Blue Streak,  HS 
681,  P.1154,  etc.)  the  justification put  forward  was  precisely 
that of insufficient orders. 
788 1  3.4 Military Exports 
The  forecast  of military exports  from  the  EEC  to  other coun-
tries in the  period 1968-80  seems  to  be  somewhat  speculative, 
for various reasons: 
1. The  soundest  markets  for military aircraft and missiles 
are  those  areas  of the  world  marked  by  present  or potential 
national or international crises  (Asia,  South Africa,  the 
Middle  East).  In view,  however,  of  the instability of these 
regions it is impossible  to  foresee  what  direction will be 
taken  by  individual countries'  procurements,  which are, 
moreover,  dictated primarily by political considerations. 
2.  On  the  one  hand,  the  implementation of EEC  military programmes 
makes  the aircraft and missiles produced  by  the  EEC  aerospace 
industry more  "saleable",  owing  to  the  larger number  produced 
and,  especially,  to the actual possibility of demonstrating 
their qualities by putting them  into service  on  a  large 
scale in the  countries manufacturing  them.  On  the other hnnd 
however,  this increase in production might  be  obtained· 
through political intervention at government  level of the 
"Buy  EEC 11  type  without  any excessive  concern about  the ul-
timate  cost.  It might  therefore  happen that the  EEC  prod-
ucts,  although technically acceptable,  could be  too  costly 
for countries  outside  the  Community. 
3.  The  bulk of the  EEC  military market  would  be  reserved for 
the national industries and  taken away,  either directly 
or indirectly,  from  the  US  industry.  The  latter would 
therefore  find itself forced  to assume  a  still more 
1  See  in Table  3/32 the  chief types of aircraft exported 
by  the  European  countries and  the United States up  to 
1968. competitive  position on  the  remaining markets,  where  the 
EEC  in0ustries would  enjoy no  political protection. 
4.  To  sum  up,  it does  not  appear likely,  at all events  in the 
period under  consideration,  that the  EEC  industry will be 
able  to increase its own  exports  to  foreign  countries ap-
preciably.  It is therefore  assumed  that those  exports will 
remain practically constant at the  level reached in 1967 
and that consequently,  for  the period 1968-80,  they will 
amount  to a  total of $1,850  million. 
3.5 Conclusions 
The  following  tables summarize  the  conclusions that  can 
be  drawn  on  the  basis of the  observations  made  so  far. 
790 Funds  Available !or Military Aircraft and_Missile Procurements  and 
R&R,  1968-80  (Millions  o! dollars) 
---
~OT=l  Country  •  tf?rocure- R&D 
ntents 
-------· 
BElGIUM  Min.  456 
}  10 
466 
Max.  593  603 
Probable  590  600 
------ ~·---~-- ---~-----
NL  Min.  1,380 
}~ 
1,400 
Max.  1,794  1,8.14 
Probable  1,380  1,400 
ITAL  'Y  1  Mln.  2,280  - 2,280 
Max.  2,964  - 2,964 
Probable  2,300  - 2, 300 
c-·--·-
GERMANY  Min.  7,478  1 '130  s,ws 
Max.  9,734  1,470  11,204 
Probable  g,ooo  1,470  10,470 
FRANCE  Min.  4,700  2,420  7,120 
Max.  ?,332  3,145  10,477 
Probable!  s,ooo  2,400  7,400 
- --
fE<.  Mln.  16,294  3,580  19,874 
Max.  22,417  4,645  'Z7 ,062 
p:~ 
18, 2'70  3,900  22,140 
V-"  s,2oo  4,500  12,780 
Max.  10,764  s,sso  16,614 
Probable'  s,ooo  4,500 
112,500 ·-
•  Min.  = 1967  expenditure  x  12 
Max.  =  Increase of  4%  a  year by  comparison with 1967  expenditure 
1  The  R&D  expenditure is included in the  procurements  figures 
(see  p.111) 
791 BELGittM 
!Procurements 
Maintenanee,sparea 
T 0  T A L 
.. l 
Pr~urements 
Maintenance,sparea 
T 0  TAL 
ITAL.'i 
Procurements 
Maintenance,sparea 
T 0  T A L 
~ 
Procurements 
Maintenance,spare$ 
T 0  T A L 
FRANCE 
Procurements 
Maintenance,spares 
T 0  T A L 
lli 
Procurements 
Maintenance,spares 
R&D 
Exports 
T 0  T A L 
~ 
Procurements 
Maintenance,spares 
R&D 
Exports 
T 0  T A L 
Mil:.~  tary Aircraft and Missile Market  of EEC 
Industry 1968-80 
(Millions of dollars) 
I 
-r 
Needs 
·lt  Probable  Markt~ 
EECI  from  UK 
funds  I  for  C 
from  US  availab:Ire  aeros~r,ce 
TOTAL  from  indus  ry 
-- ------~·  - -· -------- ---~---------
503  356  17  130  283 
405  305  - 100  230 
908  661  17  230  590  513 
669  408  G9  192  295 
700  500  5  195  375 
1,369  908  74  387  1,380  670 
11541  1,~5  117  219  977 
750  G80  - 70  540 
2,291  11eas  117  289  2,300  1,517 
4,405  21559  443  1,403  1,959 
3,soo  27ooo  - 700  2,100 
7,905  51359  443  2,.103  91ooo  4,059 
3,702  31670  4  28  2,002 
3,20o  3,000  - 200  2,ooo 
6,902  6,670  4  228  s,ooo  4,802 
10,820  s119s  650  1,972 
}18,270 
61316 
8,555  7,285  5  1,265  s1o4s 
4,260  4,260  500  - :s,9oo  2,655 
- - - - - 1,200 
23,635  19,743  1 '155  3,237  22,170  15,416 
U'K  aero-
~pace indUstry 
~icluding  ie  .ectronil'!R 
4,127  - 2,894  1,233 
}81ooo 
2,198 
316oo  - :s140o  200  2,500 
11300  ..  1,300  ..  41soo  1,177 
- - - - - 1,200 
9,027  - 7,594  1,433  12,500  7,075 
l 
I 
I 
•on the  assumption that operational efficiency is maintained at the 1967  level. 
792 V
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
M
i
l
i
t
a
r
y
 
A
i
r
c
r
a
f
t
 
a
n
d
 
M
i
s
s
i
l
e
s
 
C
l
a
s
s
i
f
i
e
d
 
b
y
 
O
r
i
g
i
n
 
o
f
 
D
e
s
i
g
n
1
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
1
 
9
 
6
 
7
 
,
T
o
t
a
l
 
I
 
1
 
9
 
8
 
o
 
I
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
I
 
3
 
h
 
!
v
a
l
u
e
 
1
 
1
 
I
 
1
0
 
(
 
$
m
i
l
=
-
i
)
 
C
!
:
r
:
 
u
s
 
U
K
 
t
"
'
t
h
e
r
s
 
(
$
m
i
l
l
~
 
)
 
t
:
E
.
:
 
u
s
 
!
 
U
'
\
 
t
h
e
r
s
1
 
(
%
)
 
(
%
)
 
(
%
)
 
I
 
{
%
)
 
i
 
r
 
(
~
n
 
-
f
-
J
-
:
o
 
{
~
)
 
!
 
o
n
 
!
 
I
-
-
B
E
-
L
G
-
l
v
-
M
-
-
-
-
+
,
-
~
~
-
~
-
~
 
-
~
~
a
-
~
-
~
~
-
-
-
r
·
-
:
,
~
-
-
~
-
-
7
:
 
I
 
2
~
-
~
-
-
-
1
 
-
-
l
 
,
,
 
L
 
6
4
3
 
I
 
,
.
 
E
G
 
i
 
7
5
6
 
I
 
5
3
 
2
5
 
!
 
1
 
I
 
I
T
A
L
Y
 
1
~
4
0
7
 
I
 
2
0
 
6
0
 
1
1
,
5
3
5
 
l
 
1
)
4
 
3
5
 
I
 
6
£
R
:
.
1
A
N
Y
 
4
~
~
'
)
0
 
1
6
,
5
 
7
4
 
9
.
5
 
I
 
4
,
6
9
3
 
6
'
i
.
S
 
3
3
.
5
 
F
R
.
~
"
,
'
'
C
'
~
 
2
 
I
 
6
 
5
 
.
,
 
~
0
7
 
I
 
O
l
.
 
6
 
~
•
•
 
.
-
.
 
3
?
3
3
5
 
7
2
,
5
 
2
1
 
•
 
I
 
_
;
)
,
,
,
 
.
:
.
 
L
.
_
 
1
1
0
,
2
9
3
 
I
 
3
3
.
5
 
5
3
 
1
7
.
0
 
1
1
1
,
3
0
7
 
!
 
7
3
.
5
 
2
S
.
5
 
~
~
 
f
 
,
 
!
 
'
 
5
,
0
7
s
 
5
.
5
 
2
5
 
6
8
,
5
 
1
,
5
 
1
 
s
,
2
s
o
 
I
 
l
 
I
 
3
7
,
5
 
1
 
2
 
O
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
c
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
9
6
7
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
E
x
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
n
u
c
l
e
a
r
 
s
t
r
i
k
e
 
f
o
r
c
e
.
 
I
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
a
s
e
 
o
f
 
U
K
/
E
E
C
 
c
o
l
l
a
b
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
5
0
%
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
h
a
s
 
b
e
e
n
 
a
t
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
U
K
 
a
n
d
 
5
0
%
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
E
E
C
,
 
a
p
a
r
t
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
P
a
n
t
h
e
r
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
h
a
s
 
b
e
e
n
 
a
t
t
r
i
b
-
u
t
e
d
 
a
s
 
t
o
 
1
0
0
%
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
E
E
C
.
 
3
 
I
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
C
a
n
a
d
a
.
 Examination  of these  tables  shows  that,  for  the  period 1968-
80,  with  "probable"  funds  totalling $22,170 million available, 
the  countries  of  the  EEC  will need  a  sum  of $23,635  million 
for  procurements,  maintenance,  spares and  R&D. 
The  slight difference  between  the  two  figures  increases, 
however,  if the analysis is carried out at the  level of in-
dividual  countries.  It is seen at  once  that,  side  by  side 
with  countries  (Italy,  Neti~rlands)  in which  the  funds  avail-
able  and  the  requirements  balance  one  another almost  exactly, 
there  are  others  (Germany) 1n which  there is an excess  of 
available  funds  compared  with  requirements,  which offsets in 
the  total for  the  EEC,  those  countries  (Belgium,  France)  where 
the  needs  exceed  the  funds  that  may  be  assumed  to  be  available 
for  the  future. 
Hitherto such  imbalances  have  been  corrected: 
1.  In  the  case  of Germany  by  resorting to massive  purchases 
of aircraft and missiles  from  the  other countries  and 
making  almost  non-recoverable  capital investments in the 
development  of its own  missile  industry. 
2.  In  the  case  of France  the  situation will arise  only in the 
future  inasmuch as,  up  to  the  present,  thanks  to  the pro-
grammes  for  the nuclear strike  force  and  the  independent 
development  of its own  aircraft and missiles,  the  funds 
available  and  the  needs  have  balanced  each other and will 
continue  to  do  so  if military expenditure is maintained 
(in terms  of  proportion of  GNP)  at the  1967  level. 
The  tables  show  further that  there is a  possibility of  offering 
the  EEC  aerospace  industry a  total military market  (including 
exports  but  excluding electronics,  avionics  and  purchases 
abroad  of  equipment  or  licences)  of  the  order  of  $15,400  mil-
lion for  the  period 1968-80. 
794 Within  the  terms  of reference  of this study,  however,  in 
addition to  the  political will of the  individual governments, 
which  has  already been mentioned  several times,  such  a  pos-
si~ility also requires  the  creation of international bodies 
capable  of  compensating  for  the  misalignment  between  supply 
and  demand  in the  individual markets  and  presupposes  the 
effective use  of the  funds  available  to the  EEC  industries. 
This possibility is also primarily dependent  on  the  assumption 
that: 
1.  Germany  will in fact  be  responsible  for  the  development 
of her  own  air forces  in line with  the  funds  which  become 
available if its own  defence  budget is maintained at the 
1967  level in terms  of  the  percentage  of GNP.  In this case 
a  reduction in military expenditure  in France  as  a  propor-
tion of  GNP  would  not  have  an appreciable  effect  on  the  EEC 
as  a  whole. 
or: 
2.  Germany  will reduce  her  own  military expenditure,  as  a 
percentage  of GNP,  in such  a  way  as  to maintain  constant 
the  efficiency of its own  air forces,  but at the  same 
time  France  will maintain her  own  military expenditure at 
the  1967  level in  terms  of  the  percentage  of GNP. 
At  present,  of these  two  assumptions,  the  first  seems  to  be 
the  more  probable. 
As  regards  the  United  Kingdom,  it is obvious  that the  high 
level of military expenditure  reached in the  past is reflected 
in future  estimates  (which are  based  on historical data). 
There is thus a  marked  excess  of  funds  over needs  (in the 
neighbourhood  of $3,500  million for  the period). 
The  situation is,  moreover,  complicated by  the  fact  that the 
British aerospace  industry,  as  compared with that of the  EEC, 
795 is seen already to  be  too  large  for  the  funds  available in 
the  possible market  of  the  period 1968-80  ($7,075  million), 
to  which  there appear  to  be  various alternatives: 
1.  To  increase  the British air forces artificially beyond 
the  level at present  considered necessary.  This  way  would 
be  contrary to the  policy hitherto pursued  by  the  British 
Government. 
2.  To  step  up  further  the  technological potential of the 
national aerospace  industry  by  entrusting to it extensive 
R&D  programmes,  in particular the  development  of inter-
continental ballistic missiles.  This  way  would  also  be 
contrary to  the  policy  pursued  by  the British Government 
during the  past  decade. 
3.  To  transfer  the  excess  funds  to  other sectors  of  the aero-
space  industry  (civil aircraft,  space). 
4.  To  effect an appreciable  cut-back in expenditure allocated 
to  the  aerospace  sector,  the  funds  thus  saved  being  trans-
ferred  to  other sectors  of  the  national  economy,  a  drastic 
reduction in  the  size  and  technological  capacity of its 
own  aerospace  industry being accepted at the  same  time. 
5.  To  bring about  an  appreciable  and  continuous  increase  in 
exports,  both military and  civil,  so  as  to  enable  the  cuts 
in defence  spending mentioned in the  preceding assumption 
to  be  carried out  without  a  redimensioning  of the  aerospace 
industry being  necessary. 
To  sum  up,  the  problems  with  which  the  British domestic  mili-
tary market  is confronted  by  itc own  aerospace  industry 
are  totally different  from,  and.indeed  in a  certain sense 
are  opposite  of,  those  which  the  domestic  military market 
creates for  the  aerospace  industries of  the  EEC  countries. 
796 PART  3 
The international trade 1.  IMPORTS  AND  EXPORTS  OF  AIRCRAFT  AND  AERO-ENGINES1' 2 
In  the  United States,  the  demand  for aircraft and aero-
engines is covered almost  wholly  out  of national production. 
The  few  exceptions  include  imports  of  the  Caravelle  (France) 
and  the  BAC  111  (United Kingdom)  and  of the Rolls-Royce 
Dart and Spey  engines. 
The  outstanding feature  of American  imports is that purchases 
from  abroad  have  been  limited to  civil aircraft and  equipment 
not  produced in the  United States  (or not  produced  there at 
the  time  of import). 
Virtually the  same  applies  to British imports  of aircraft 
and  equipment.  The  British Government  has  always  backed a 
"Buy  British policy",  particularly in the  case  of  commercial 
aircraft,  and has  only imported  from  abroad  when  similar 
British types  were  not available3• 
1  This  section deals  only  with aircraft and aero-engines be-
cause  the  official statistics give  no  figures  for missiles. 
It will be  recalled,  however,  that since  1960  the  EEC  coun-
tries have  purchased the  American  missiles  Nike,  Honest 
John,  Sergeant,  Tartar,  Pershing,  Terrier and  the  British 
Seacat  missile,  at a  cost  of about  $700  million. 
The  United Kingdom  has  purchased Bullpup,  Sidewinder  and 
Polaris missiles  from  the United States at a  cost  of 
$650-700 million. 
2 
See  tables 3/33,  3/34 and  3/36-39. 
3  For  example,  imports  of the  Boeing  707,  which received its 
certificate five  years  before  the  corresponding British 
model  (VC10). 
799 As  regards  military aircraft,  special reference  should  be 
1 
made  to recent  purchases  of Phantoms  and Hercules  from  the 
United States. 
Overall,  the  percentage  of imports  in relation to  the  value 
of output  and  to national  demand  has  not  been high  (8-11%), 
except in one  or  two  years. 
On  the  other hand,  the  EEC  countries are  fairly heavily de-
2  pendent  on  the  foreign market.  From  1960-67,  the  EEC  imported 
aircraft and aero-engines  to  the  value  of 34%  of its own  pro-
duction and  30%  of its internal market3• 
This  dependence  of the  Community  on  outside production -
especially American  - becomes  even  more  significant when  one 
considers  the  types  of aircraft imported;  with the  exception 
of the  medium-range  Caravelle,  all commercial  jets in service 
with  EEC  airlines were  purchased abroad. 
The  marked  dependence  of  the  EEC  countries as  regards mili-
tary aircraft also is clearly demonstrated by  the  large  num-
bers,  including around  a  thousand F-1041s,  built in EEC 
countries under  licences  from  non-member  countries  (the  US 
in particular);  the  exception is France,  which  has  developed 
aircraft both  on its own  and  jointly with other countries. 
1  Partly built in the  United  Kingdom. 
2  From  countries not  member  of the European  Community. 
3  Annual  value  of imports  between  $350  and  420  million 
(545  million in 1967);  total value  (1960-67)  $3,264 
million. 
800 It will be  recalled that the  main  causes  of this dependence 
are as  follows: 
1. The  long period of reconstruction,  which  has seriously 
limited the  contribution of the  German  and  Italian in-
dustries to both design and  construction work. 
2o  The  Netherlands  and Belgium have  made  no  major contribution 
because  their aircraft industries are small. 
3.  The  structure of  the  industry in the individual countries, 
combined  with limited overall national  demand  and  the 
variety of such  demand,  has  made  it impossible either to 
work  out  valid independent aircraft programmes  or to con-
struct,  even  under licence, all the  types required for 
each national market. 
This state of affairs has also had an adverse effect on  ex-
ports;  again excepting France,  aircraft exports  from  the EEC 
to outside  countries have  been  few  and  on  a  minor scale. 
Since 1960,  only France  has  been in a  position both to  cover 
its military,  and  some  of its civil,  requirements1  out  of do-
mestic production,  and  to export effectively. French products, 
including the  Caravelle,  Mirage,  Alouette  and Fan Jet Falcon 
and Turbomeca  engines,  were  principally responsible  for  the 
increase in EEC  exports  from  1960  to 1967  at an average  rate 
(14.7%)  which is much  higher than the  American  figure  (3.8%) 
and is beaten only  by  the British figure  (15.9%). 
EEC  exports  increased 2.6  times  overall,  from  $152  to 397 
million,  over  the  period under  review and,  by  1967,  were 
equal to  76o5%  of British exports  ($519  million)  and 17.6% 
of American  exports  ($2,250  million)  (Fig.  21). 
1  With  the  Caravelle,  although the  engine  was  imported. 
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 The  EEC  share  in total exports  of aircraft and  engines  from 
the  EEC,  the  United Kingdom  and  the United States rose  from 
6.8%  in 1960  to  12.5%  in 1967;  this increase  may  be  attrib-
uted partly to  a  more  vigorous  export  policy a11a  partly to 
the  fact  that the absolute value  of  American  exports re-
mained  constant  (except in 1967). 
From  1960  to  1967,  exports  from  the  EEC  to  outside  countries 
were  worth  $2,000 million,  which  was  about  two-thirds  of the 
value  of imports  and,  on  average,  some  20%  of total Community 
output.  Since,  over the period under review,  EEC  internal 
demand  amounted  to  115%  of the  value  of the  Community  air-
craft industry's total output  and since,  as  was  already noted, 
exports averaged  20%  of that value,  it maY- be  argued theoret-
ically that the  EEC  industry's output  should have  been  35% 
higher than it in fact  was. 
Apart  from  exports to non-member  countries,  mainly  in Africa, 
trade  within the  Community  was  by  no  means  negligible in a 
1  number  of years  (Table  3/35)  • 
In the  United States,  the  percentage  of national output  taken 
up  by external demand  is not very high  (10-11%  up  to  1962), 
despite  the  high absolute  figure  for annual  exports  (around 
$1,600 million). 
The  figures  quoted above  do  not,  however,  give  a  complete 
picture of American  exports.  There  are  two  other kinds  of 
exports  which are  difficult to quantify and are  not  included 
in the statistics for exports  of goods  (in this case,  aircraft, 
and  components).  We  are referring here  to  the  enormous 
1  Particularly between  1963 and  1965  in the  case  of the 
F-104.  Over  the  whole  period under review,  exports within 
the  Community  were  worth about  $2,000 million,  which  was 
20%  of total Community  output. 
803 quantities of aircraft and aero-engines  delivered to European 
and  other countries  on  MAP  account  and  the  granting of con-
struction licences.  American  exports  slowed  down  somewhat 
from  1963  to 1966,  but  recovered sharply in 1967. 
The  foreign  market  provides  major  outlets for  the British 
aircraft industry. 
Despite  the  drop  in the  number  of  exportable  types  as  compared 
with previous  years,  27%  of British output  went  abroad in the 
period 1960-67.  This  was  achieved  through substantial exports 
of  components1,  aircraft,  including the Jet Provost  and 
Lightning  (military)  and  the  Viscount,  BAC  111,  HS  125  and 
HS  748  (civil),  and engines  (Dart,  Viper and Spey). 
The  importance  of aircraft exports to the  EEC  countries and 
the United Kingdom  can easily be  appreciated by  comparing 
their exports per head2with  the  American  figure: 
Aircraft exports  per head  (1967) 
EEC  countries 
($) 
2,428 
UK 
($) 
2,043 
us 
($) 
1,616 
The  main  reasons  for exporting vary  from  country to  country. 
For many  years,  the United States have  followed  the  policy of 
"off shore"  purchases  on  the  military side  and have  to  some 
extent  discouraged foreign sales of strategic equipment  (in-
cluding aircraft). 
In 1963,  the  difficult balance  of  payments  situation called 
for  a  change  of direction.  There  was  a  shift towards  a  "Buy 
American"  policy,  particularly as regards  the  other members 
of  NATO,  although this was  partly offset by  the direct 
1  Approximately  40%  of total British exports. 
2  i.e., per  employee  in the  aerospace  industry. 
804 production of sub-systems and parts  by  the  purchasing  coun-
1  try  • 
Exports also lengthen production runs  and  thus substantially 
reduce unit  costa.  This  would  appear to be  a  determining 
factor for manufacturers  in  the  case  of commercial aircraft, 
even allowing for  the  fact that the  American  home  market is 
already very large. 
Both factors  had  even  greater significance in the  United 
Kingdom,  owing  to  the precarious  balance  of  payments situa-
tion and  the  limited character of  home·  demand. 
Because  of the  close ties between  government  and  firms,  both 
factors are  important at all levels,  even  though the  cancel-
lation of certain military aircraft suitable for  export  and 
the  special features  of a  number  of commercial aircraft would 
appear to be  inconsistent with this statement. 
Problems relating to the  balance  of payments  and  the  growth 
of demand  are also basic factors  in EEC  exports. 
The  second  would  appear to  be  the  more  important,  however, 
in view of the  inadequacy of internal  demand  and  the  improve-
ment  in the  balance  of payments. 
The  export aid policies adopted  by  the  United States,  the 
United Kingdom  and  the  EEC  countries  may  not  be  a  direct 
consequence  of these  factors  but  they are  certainly closely 
linked with  them.  The  most  significant of the various  forms 
of direct and  indirect export aids are  loans  and credit guar-
antees.  So  far as  the aircraft industry is concerned,  the 
maximum  period for payment  laid down  by  the  Berne  Union2 
1 
2 
As  in the  case  of the UK-built Phantoms. 
Set up  in 1923;  one  provision of its statute is that inter-
national loans shall not  exceed the  limits  for  normal  com-
mercial transactions. 
805 would appear to have  been  overtaken by events,  particularly 
as regards exports to the  developing countries. 
In the United States,  export  loans are  granted by  the Export-
Import  Bank,  which is a  government  credit agency,  up  to a 
1  maximum  of  60%  of the  value  of the  order  • 
The  maximum  term  for export  loans  for aircraft and  equipment 
is seven years under  the rules of the Eximbank.  The  Bank's 
total working  capital amounts  to $9,000 million. 
In  1967,  a  total of $792  million was  loaned in respect of 
aircraft exports,  and this represented 77%  of all loans  by 
2  the Eximbank  that year  • 
In the United Kingdom,  the  Export  Credits Guarantee Depart-
ment  (ECGD)  serves much  the  same  purpose as the  American 
Eximbank.  The  ECGD  allows  from  seven to 10 years  for repay-
ment  depending  on  the  types  of aircraft exported. 
There are  no  similar permanent  institutions in the  EEC  coun-
tries,  but  some  of the latter have  concluded contracts allow-
ing 12  years  for  payment  in respect  of a  number  of commercial 
transactions,  especially with East  Eruopean  countries. 
The  bulk of exports  (78%)  from  the EEC,  the United Kingdom 
and  the United States consist of aeronautical products  made 
by  the  airframes branch. 
1  Of  the  remaining  40%,  half is normally paid in cash by  the 
purchaser and  the  other half is lent by  the  exporting firm. 
2  Changes  in the  Eximbank's  regulations are at present under 
consideration.  Its working  capital is to  be  raised to 
$13,500  million,  the  repayment  period will be  extended  from 
seven to 10 years,  and  loans will be  inc~ased from  60  to 70% 
of the price  (in which  case  the  cash payment  by  the  purchaser 
will be  cut to  10%  of the value  of the  order).  However,  de-
spite the  proposed increase in available  funds,  consideration 
is being given to  a  cut in loans  for  exports of commercial 
aircraft. 
806 On  average,  50%  of British exports  come  from  the  engines 
branch  (Fig.  22),  but  the  EEC  countries  and  the United States 
export mainly aircraft and airframes  (78%). 
The  table  which  follows  shows  the percentage  contributed to 
total exports  by  each  country,  and  by  the  airframes and en-
gines branches,  from  1960  to 1967: 
Ff 
Total  -..., 
I  EEC  UK  exports  1 
i 
1  2  1 +  2 + 3 
Airframes  10.3  10,5  79.2  100,0 
Engines  9,8  35.8  54,4  100.0 
Aeronautical products  10,:3  16.0  73.7  100,0 
(Branches:  airframes 
engines) 
and 
Military aircraft exports1  are  estimated to account  for 65-70% 
of the  overall figure,  with variations between  the  three  areas& 
EEC  (74%),  US  (77%)  and  UK  (45%). 
From  1960  to  1967,  the  destination of exports  was  (Fig.  23) 
as  follows2: 
~~xportfngcountry  --
EEC  UK:.  us3 
Destination  ---------------
~----·  ---- .. 
EEC  - 23.4%  27.0~ 
UK  11.5~  - 4,7% 
us  17.9.%  20,0%.  -
Rest· of world  70.5%  56.6%  68. 3;( 
1  About  $13,000 million over  the  eight  years  (1960-67). 
2  The  actual percentages vary  from  year to year. 
3  Civil exports  only;  military  ex~orts appear as an overall 
figure  for security reasons. 
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 In all three  cases,  the  majority of exports  go  to the  countries 
covered by  the  heading  "Rest  of world". 
From  1960  to 1967,  imports  were  distributed geographically 
(Fig.  23)  as  follows: 
~g  countr1e1 
--·-
PI  ~-
EEC
1 
UK  u  s 
EEC  - 20.7  11 ,9 
UK  19.5  - 33 ,0 
lJS  71,6  43.4 
Rest of world  8.9  35,9  55 .1 
It will be  noted in particular that the  EEC  countries import 
mainly  from  the  United States  (71.6%),  whereas  the  United 
States obtain a  majority of their imports  (55.1%)  from  the 
2  "Rest of the  world"  and principally from  Canada  • 
The  EEC  countries had a  constant deficit  on  trade in aeronauti-
cal products,  while  the United States and  the United Kingdom 
had a  constant surplus  (Table  3/40). 
With the exception of 1965  and  19663,  however,  the  United 
Kingdom  had a  constant deficit with the  United States. 
The  EEC's  final deficit  on  trade  in aeronautical products  with 
countries outside  the  Community,  which  varied annually between 
$65  and 276  million,  is the result of a  deficit with the United 
4 
Kingdom  and  the  United States and a  surplus with the  "Rest  of 
the  world". 
1  Exports  to  countries outside the  Community  only. 
2  Where  a  number  of American  Companies  have  subsidiaries. 
3  Years  when  the  BAC  111  was  being exported. 
4 Averaging about  $300  million annually. 
810 The  following table  shows  the  percentage  contribution of in-
ternational trade  in aeronautical products  to  the national 
economy: 
---------------:;·-- .. --- .  i  I 
190,)  1 ~e-1  1'3l·~:  '19[<',  1~-,;,~  19()~:.  n·:1G  j1~t.;7 
t---·-- ------------------ ----~------ -----·-- ----- --- ----- ·····  -- : 
'EEC  -
Aircraft exportt3  as  pe:t·- I  I 
oentage  of visible exports 0,6  0,7  0.7  OtE·  0,5  o,:,  0,7  0,'1 
imports as per- I  Aircraft 
1,3  1,0  o.s  0.9  0,9  1.1  oentage  of visible imports  1.  7  1.3 
UK 
I  Aircraft exports as per-
centage  of visible exports 3,3  3,6  2.7  2.5  2.0  2,8  :S,9  3,8 
Aircraft imports  I  as per- I 
centage  of visible  importe>  1,6  1.1  1. '\  I  1.0  0.9  0.9  1.1  2,0  i 
us 
Aircraft exports as per-
.,. 4 !  centage of visible exports 8,9  e-.2  9.4  6,4  6,2  ~>. 7  7.4 
I 
O.G I 
Aircraft imports as per- I 
centage  of visible imports 0,4  1,0  0,8  0.5  0.7  1.2  1.0 
I 
In relation to  the  balance  of visible trade,  which is in defi-
1 
cit  for  the  United Kingdom  and in surplus  for  the  EEC  and  the 
United States,  the  balance  on  trade  in aeronautical products: 
- reduces  the  surplus of the  EEC  countries; 
- reduces  the United Kingdom's  deficit; 
2  - contributes to the United States'  surplus  • 
1 
From  1960  to  1967 
2 
Running at 20-30%  annually. 
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 Table  3/7a 
Number  of Jet and  Turbo~op Aircraft in 
EUROP~ 
Category and Type 
of Aircraft  EEC  UK 
us 
Others  TOTAL 
I--B::_:_7_:..'-7;__ ___  ..:...u~s---+----:-:----'-:(1_4..:....l  --t-------("_-·l_-'  ______  <_9_)_+----- (31 >  (971  -·t 
B 707  US  60  (3)  25  (4)  9  (3)  94  (10)  314  <'111) 
~----------------+------~-~-~-----------+------------4------------+---------~--
oc  8  51  us  44  (11)  4  (6)  48  (17)  154  (14)  1' 
----~-~~-----~----~-----------+-----------~~--------·--1--------------+-----------
DC  B  60  US  22  (11)  22  (11 l  :-.;;,  (76) 
~t-~------1---1---f---~ 
8 ~T  ____  u_,s ____  4-_______  <_1s_J __  ~--------'~_l  __  ~---------<s_l  __  +------<_2_9_l~-------'-62  __  l  __ 
B 720  US  2  2  131 
cv wi-990  -us  -1------+.  _-- 2 ": 9 :~~~T:.s~--T~~:i-----1~3~~~~~(~2~l_-_  -++  ----~1-3~~~~~~(~2~1  =+r--==-s--7=~~~~~-=~ 
VC  10  UK  29  (5) 
~C1·!E  T  UK  -----~--1_7  _______  +-_s  ____  -+  __  2_2 ______  -+--------J 
I  co~~coRDE  UK /F  (13)  <Bl  (21 1  (351 
~otal  -long range  - -,0-4--(-59-l--+--71---(-31-)--~-5-5---f-~-6-l-4--2-~---(1_2_6_l~--6-92---(-3Q-_s_J  __ 
CA?..'.VELLE  F  B7  (12)  67  (3)  154  (15)  20 
~~-~-----------~-----------+----------~------~~4-------~~-+--~--------
~--L_1_o_,_, ____  u_s  _____  +--------r---------~----------4----------~------~(9~. 
B  /27  US  31  (12)  6  (2)  37  (14)  405  (186) 
1!  B 737  US  ___  1_1  _(  16_)_-+------(4_:..)  __  +-------.:.(_5  ):...__+-_1_1 ____  (  __  25_)-4----7--(  1_4  __  1)_ 
0  DC  9  US  18  (44)  40  (19)  53  (63)  145  (1311) 
~  --~-C-Il~-----~~----------2----(1--)--4---2-5----{3_1_)  __  +---5----~_:.._-+__:..3_2  ____  _:..{~32~)-4---5-9--~-~(-3~)--
)-
~  lRI0£1H  UK  25  (43)  25  (43) 
·H  ~-------------~r--------~~-r-----------4------------+-----------4------------; 
~ L  F  28  NL  (1)  (5)  (6) 
~ irotal medium/short  149  (86)  50  (78}  118  (34)  317  (198)  637 
~  tRWSY  UKrang •  .------------+---404--------~---5--------~--445---------~---5--------J 
wu  BRiTAN~IA  UK  ~ 
~  t---L-~--2--1-00  _____  u_s----;------------t------------~----------~-----------;---~ 10 ~--~< 3 ~1--;l 
~  ------+------------i-------~~-r------- CL  44  C  1  (5)  4  (1)  5  (6)  21  g  ~T-o--ta  __  l __  l_o_n_g __  r_a_n_g_e1------------+--4~s'----~,5~l--4---9-----(~1~l~~5~4----~(67 )-+--~36~---(~37 l~l 
(553) 
H  I  F  27  Nl  23  (  11 )  35  (  :>)  58  (  13 l  47  t 
cv  600  us  2  2  92  (21) 
m  r---·~------~--~------------i------------~-------------r-------------r---------·---1 
~  ~~-~~----~u~s-----4-----------~------------+------------~-----------4----a  ____ __  t_..,  -~gcTR~  _______  us  12  12  129  --~ 
~  ~----~-----------~~------------4-----------~-------~~~l------------·l  ,g  ~  FH  227  US  6t> 
~ ~ ~-------------~-------------~-----------4-----------~~----------~-------------, 
E-4 t  ~LD  UK-- 6  11  17  j 
~  ~GUl-RO  UK  19  19  --------t 
"~1~&~·-----Y~K----+------------~---9·--------- ___:---------~--12  ________  -4------------, 
~  Vl~r:tu~n  UK  39  83  ?.8  150  32 
•H  --=:._---+--·-----·-·------·--+--------+--------i--------·• 
't:l  ~H~rH  ~I':YV/.N  UK  ( 1)  __ , 
~  YS  '11  (j  ··------f---------!--------~~~---·------------ --- 2  (::C)  I 
"otal medium7shor -----;;---(:;;)·- 1n --------4--c.f·,------(- 2-
1 -4- 27 -o  ____  <nl  37:,  (42l 
rang  -----....,...----J----------------------------
Source:  Flight International  "World Airline Survey" 
836 Service and  on  Order,  by Continents - (April 1968) 
CANI\OA 
Central & 
South  AfRICA 
Middle 
East 
Far 
East 
Whole 
World 
~----------~A_m_e_r_i_c_a----~-------------+-----------~-----------j----------~ 
+---·----t---·-------__j3}  (1)  --'-(1_4~)  --+~----~(1_4_S~)-_ 
1  (1)  9  (3)  7  (3)  10  (8)  25  (14)  40.')  (150) 
~-2_4  _____  <_3_>_~----6------~~--s___  ~  r--2~_7  __  ~1~34~1~ 
6  (  1  0 )  2  1  ( 11 }  6  7  (  1  08 ) 
(9)  (2)  (13)  (115) 
4  3  146 
3  2  (1)  16  ( 1)  91  (4) 
4  2  35  {5)  I 
r----------;~------------r--·---------~-----------~----------~---------~ 
~----------4---1_o  ________  r-__  s ____  ~(1~>~~1_4  ________  -r---~s  ________  +-~s~;  ____  ~<~--
r---------(4_l  __  lr----------t---------~1  ________  (2_l __  r--------'7_l  __  ~l-------(_&_9_l  __ _ 
31  (27)  33  (3)  24  (7)  32  {14)  80  (€C)  :1122  (532) 
t------------;---1,_4  _________  ~~1~7~----~(~3)~--+-~7~--------+--1=2~------+-=22~4--- (18) 
~--1  _____  (_6~)~_1_1  _____  (_5~)-1  ___  7 ______  -4--~4---------:-~35~--~(1_)~~~~~0  (~-l 
1  (4)  (2)  {3)  (8)  19  (1E'3)=1 
r-----------+-----------~----------~----------- ~------~~~~~-~~~--
18  (18)  11  181  3  1  (61  2t.}  !229>  I 
4  (2)  3  3  __lli_j~  __  _r;8)  -~ 
f----------+------~__:__-+--------·-+-s-------;---4-- I  34  (·~3)  i 
(6) 
(6)  19  1  61  (16)  !  1121  {323) 
~--·--------+------------r----------4-----------~------------~-------------
{28)  (17)  27  40 
9 
1------------~----------i------------- ·---------+-----------!---------·---
48 
~----------4-------------r----------~------------+----·-------T-------------
11  (3) 
~----------4-----------~-----------r-----------+----------~ 
2  2C:l  (6) 
3  2  95  (9) 
5  (2)  22  127  (9)  262  (24) 
~----------+---4~------~-----------r-----------r-----------T-9~~~'--~(_2~1L__ 
4  6  18 
1  10  152 
~----------~-----------4------------r-----------r--------------~------------
7  <s)  I  n  (5)  (1) 
3  6  ( 1)  4  (1) 
23  42 
~-----------+--2-5-----,-8-)~~------------~----------r--13-----(~1-5~)-1 1--.~----~~l~ 
1---40  _______  -t-__  1_1 ______  ~  __  1_5 ____  (2_)__,:_6_  - 44  i  _;5::_~;---
_--2----- __  5  ___  (_9_)_  --------==~~~2---=- (2 1  i:  __ ='~=-L2~ 
~-- (1)  65  _(?.S.LJ  37  (2)  13  - _?~- (?i.;)  '<:: .·  (~C'~l)  -
837 Table 3/7b 
Number  of Jet and Turboprop  Aircraft in Service and  on  Order in 
EEC  Member  Countries  (April 1968) 
Categori and -T;;~--1 
I 
- -! 
FRANCl  G£RMA."JY  ITALY  BENELUX  jWhele  of EEC  of A rcraft 
B 747  us  (4)  (3)  {4)  (3) 
I 
(14) 
B 707  us  32  (2)  19  9  (1)  60  (3) 
DC  8<51  us  8  ( 1)  16  {4)  20  (6)  44  ( 11)  ., 
DC  8.::>60  us  flO 
s:l  B SST  us  (6)  (3)  (6)  (3)  (18}  Q1 
Jot  8  720  us 
flO 
s:: 
0  cv  850-990  us 
....:I  vc  10  UK 
COMET  UK  .,  COt\ COR DE  UK IF  (B)  (3)  (2)  I 
(13) 
~  I  ., 
I  -~- l  I 
-··--- .,..,  Total long range  40  (21)  19  (9)  (14)  29  {15)  104  (!19) 
0 
I  I 
•  Jot  flO  CAR.\VELLE  F  53  (?)  3  (1)  21  (4)  10  rn  (12)  Ps:l 
Q1 
Jot  8727  us  (10)  27  (1)  4  (1)  31  (12) 
~  B 737  us  11  (16)  11  (16) 
~ 
0  DC  9  us  12  (28)  6  (16)  18  (44)  ..d 
tO  BAC  Ill  UK  2  ( 1)  2  (  1)  'Ia-
::l  F  28  NL  (1)  (1) 
·rl 
ttl  TRJOEJI:T  UK 
d) 
:::&:  l"otal med-ium/short  53  (17)  43  (20)  I  33  (32)  20  (17)  149  (&5)  -- range 
CD  ARGOSY  UK 
flO  BRITAt-.NIA  UK  s:l 
Q1  L :382-100  USA  Jot 
flO  CL  44  c 
s:l 
0 
....:I  Total long range  I 
F  27  NL  1  (10)  4  12  6  (1)  23  (11) 
cv  600  USA  2  2 
PI  cv  6.:0  USA  oe 
~bO  ELEC'TRA  USA  12  12  s:l 
Q1 
FH  227  USA  k 
~  HERALD  UK  2  4  6 
~ 
I 
0  VAI>:GUARD  UK  ..d 
Ol  HS  748  UK  'if  VISCOUNT  UK  14  10  14  1  I  39  p  I  or-1  i  "d  ., 
l 
X  Total  medium/shor~  ]  15  (10)  16  30  21  (1)  82  (11) 
range 
Source:  Flight International "World  Airline Survey". 
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 Table 3/8a  Value  of Turbojet 
(April 1968) 
EUROPF.. 
Type  of Aircraft 
EEC.  UK  Others  TOTAL 
-
B  747  us  (336)  (192)  (215)  (744)  r--- --
B 707  us  504  (25)  ?10  (33)  76  (~)  7S·O  (84) 
•  DC  8  51  us  370  (92}  33  (51)  403  (143) 
tiD  1------ -
R  DC  8  GO  us  185  (92)  185  (92) 
aS  --
Jot  8  SST  us  (864)  (288)  (240)  (1392) 
tiD 
f------ ·-
R  8720  us  14  14 
0  -------
H  cv  C.E:0-990  us  78  (12}  78  (12) 
----
~~~  iO  l.JK  241.  (42)  244  (42) 
~  CC~·~E.T  UK  65  20  EO 
G) 
~- ----·- ..., 
CCI-.COF\DE  UK/F  ( 328)  (201)  (529) 
~  s..  ~tall~ng  ~ange  874  (1645)  519  (756)  406  (637)  1799  (:1.)38) 
~ . Ct.r~AVELLE  F  313  (43)  241  ( 11)  554  (54} 
bO -·  R  L 1011  us  a$  ----- s..  8727  us  242  (94)  47  (15)  289  (109) 
.f.)  r----· 
s..  B 737  us  46  (67)  {17)  {21)  46  (105) 
0  f---
76  (185)  (60)  {265)  .s:l  DC  9  us  108  244 
Ul  ------~  .. --- -
's- B/.C  Ill  UK  8  (3)  95  {118)  18  121  ( 121) 
----
~  TRIDENT  UK  110  {189)  110  (189) 
·rl 
rt:J  F28  Nl  (3)  (16)  {19)  G) 
:£  Total medium/short  685  {395)  205  (324)  474  (143)  1364  (862) 
raiJge 
8  8  J.RGOSY  UK  .,  r--- 148  18  166 
bO  Sf?! T  t.r!:~ I A  UK 
~ 
l  362-100  aS  us  s..  1--·------- 4  (21)  CL  44  c  17  (4)  21  (25) 
bO 
160  (21)  (4)  195  (25)  s::  Total long range  35 
0 
H  F27  NL  16  tB)  25  ( 1)  41  (9) 
cv  roo  us  10  10 
12  -
p.  cv  640  us 
0  s..  _.i!:_E C  T~~-___  ~~-- 29  29 
p. 
0  HI  227  us  ,.a  •  s..  tl() 
==s  s:: 
~ aS 
S..  ~IH~/.LO  UK  8  16  24 
.f.)  V/.r;Gut.RD  UK  55  55 
S.. 
-~·  ... 
0  _!:'§..]!&__  UK  14  5  19 
.s:l  - -
Ul  VI  E.((: 1J~IT  _y_r. ___  47  100  33  180 
"a- ~110;{1  ~KYVI.N  Ui<  ==s  .....  -----·  --- ·-------
tt:f  Y5  11  G 
G)  Total  med~um;sh~i7  -11o-·-·--f8r - 18;--·--·  63  ( 1)  X  ran  e  ~58  (9)  ---·  Source:  compiled by SORIS  from Flight International "World .lirline Sllr·  vey 
840 lnd Turboprop  Aircraft in Service and  on  Order,  by  Continents  ----
($millions) 
us  CAN~DA 
Central & 
South 
America 
AFRll.A 
Middle 
East 
Far 
East 
Whole 
World 
----
t-----{.:..:2;..:.3..;;_2f_;,j  l-~l--------+---------+------.:<.7:..::..;2),_+-----'-'(  2::...;_4  ...  1_ -+---~<  ~3r, )j  ____  l,_Yt:.:.:l_ 
~---2_6~  _____  (_9_32_l~1 
___  8 _____  (B_l-+_-7_G  ____  (_25_l_~  __  5_9 ______  (_2_5_)~---8-~  ____  (_67_)~--2_10  ___  ~11E)  ~~5  (1/~~--
_1_2~4  (11Bl  202  (2sl  so  42  2s2  2243  u::~)l 
._____;_30  __  2_....;.(_638___:.)~--50  __  ___;_(8_4...:..)--l---1-7 _____  1-----·-----4-------~f--8---...;.(_~,2~)  Sf,2  {~-()~;) 
(2976)  (432)  ----+-----...;.<9_6~)-+-----'-<6_2_4;_i  1
1
---t;~-
943  21  2"1  29  22  10~...0 
r-----------~-----------~----------~----------+---------~---------~--------------
342  18  12  (6)  96  (6)  546  (24) 
t----------4---------·---1------------l-------------r-----------+-----------+----------
34  17  ~5  {t.L'i  i---------t--------1--------:-----------l--------+-------+--------- I  19  <  41  53  19  214  \4 ! 
~--------~---------+----------~l------------~----------1--------------------- (882)  (101)  (50}  (176)  ~17;.>_•)  +-----------i----------+-------·---------------;-----------+-----·-----;---------- 5519  (7874)  260  (650)  220  (25)  175  (101)  195  (24:;,)  f/J7  (1352)  f.. 77 5  ( 1 32-': 3) 
~----------~-----------~----------~-------------+----- ----
72  50  61  ( 11 )  25  43  805  (65) 
+-------(-1-69_2_)~------------+-----------4-----------~------------+-----------+------(-1-~C--:2i-
~-----~--~4---------~-+--------~~Jr----------;-----------~----------~·-------·------ 3159  (1451}  8  (46)  86  (39)  55  ~1  273  (8)  3S01  (ES:S) 
1------~~~4-------~~-+--------~~lf--------------+-----------+------------+----------- 30  (592)  4  (171  (8)  {12)  (331  I  BO  Pc7i 
613  {563)  76  (76)  46  (34)  13  29  (25)  I  1C21 
-t---------t-------+--------t--------~  ~-------+--------i----------
(S'G3i 
224  (11)  15  (8)  11  11  (4)  382  (144) 
18  150  (it:9; 
( 1S) 
4098  {4309)  88  {139)  197  (89)  127  (23)  91  374  (70)  6339  ( 51.92) 
~--10~----~--------~----------~----------~·----------~,----------r--1-8  _______ _ 
11  177 
(8)  (5) 
( 25) 
(33) 
33  4  (2)  15  2  89  (6)  164  (17) 
451  '(103)  20  ·~51  (103) 
~-~~----4-----------+---------~r----------~----------+----------;-------~~--
39  20  29 
~---------~---------+-----------~l-----------~------------+-----------+----------- 310  2  24  365 
1------------~----------+----------~------------~----------~~---------- -----------·- 52  ( 1 )  6  ( 4 )  58  ( 5) 
~----------~-----------+----------~-------------r-----------+-~--------~-----------
4  8  ( 1)  6  4  ( 1) 
67  122 
40  ~----------;------------+---------~-~-----------~----------~----------~~---------·- (13)  21  (24)  so  (37) 
13  18  7  53  357 
1------------4-------------+----------~------------r-----------+-----------~------------
~----19.~L  -·---------t--------+-----J'...:.1..i.-j  l~--------~-----·------(-~.!.~1 
__  3 __  (~~----- 3  9  !15!  1.1  t3l  --~~---Jfi.L 
9;v  (1  (1)  127  (3S)  I  33  (1)  15  232  (33)  'lt."37  {:':.~.;; 
'---~____]_1_.  4_) '-~L------'·--- ___  _.. _______  _..  _______  _.__  ----·---
841 Table  3/8b 
te~o~;;-;;d·  Typ;l 
f  A~rcraft 
Ca 
0 
8  747  us 
B 707  us 
DC  8<51  us 
DC  8.:>&0  us 
8  SST  us 
I 
B  720  us 
CV  8S0-SS0  u~ 
vc  10  UK 
CO~·!ET  UK 
CC~COKuC  ~i< 
1-. 
~ota1 1ong range 
t.RAVELLE  F 
I  s  121  us 
I 
B  737  us 
DC  9  us 
Bt.C  Ill  UK 
f  23  NL 
TRIDENT  UK 
Total medium/short 
- rang~ 
ARGOSY  UK 
BRIT/.t;NIA  Ui< 
L 382-100  us, 
CL  44  c 
Total long range 
F'  27  NL 
cv  600  us 
C'J  6~  us 
ELlCTRA  us 
'  I  Fh  227  us 
I 
PiP..\LD  UK 
VP,r..u:.RD  UK 
HS  748  UK 
\, i::.ccuNT  Ul< 
Total  meC.ium/shor~ 
Value  of Turbojet and Turboprop  Aircraft in Service and  on Order in  - . 
EEC  Membe~ Countries  (April 1968)  ($millions) 
------·-·-
i 
FRANC I  GERMANI  ITAL I  £H~ELUX  !  Whole  EEC 
----·-----· 
(96)  (72)  (96)  (72)  (335) 
2G8.8  (1~.6)  159,6  75.6  (8,4) 
i 
504  (25) 
(j7.2  (8,4)  134.8  (33,6} .  168.0  (50) 
I 
370  (92) 
(288)  (144)  (288)  (144)  (864) 
I 
I 
(201,6)  (75.&)  (50.8)  (328) 
! 
I 
; 
-~- ·--
336.0  (610.6)  159.6  (291.6)  134.8  (417.6)  I 24::>  6  (325.2)  874  (1,645!  __ 
190,6  (25.2)  10.4  (3.4)  75,6  '  (14 ,4) I 
36,4  I 313  (43) 
(78)  210.6  (8)  3~  4  (8) 
I 
242  (94) 
46.0  (67)  46  (67) 
50,b  (117 ,8)  25.4  (67,2)  76  (185) 
8,0  {3)  8  (3) 
(3)  (3) 
--f----
190,6  (103.2)  I  275,0  (84,4)  126.2  (132,2)  ':1~.2  (75,2)  I  685  (395) 
I 
t 
I 
0.7  (7,3)  2,9  8.2  4,2  {0,7)  16  (8) 
10,0  10 
29,0  29 
2,6  5.4  8 
16,9  12.0  16,9  1.2  47 
: 
17.6  (7.3)  !  17.5  30.5  I  44.4  {0.7)  110  (8) 
... a.ne  .... 
Source:  compiled  by SORIS  from Flight International "World  Airl~ne Survey" 
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 Table 3/16a 
Military Aircraft and Missile Forces  of the 
Country  FRM~CE  GER!.If,NY  ITALY 
-
UK I 
1~1:-ner  ~ther  ~-cner 
Origin  EEC  us  urOJ: 
EEC.  Ut<  us  Europ.  EEC.  UK  us  Europ 
coun- coun- ~o1,1n- tries'  tries  r~es 
Ballistic 
missiles  [27_j 
Bomt:>ers  62 
t~n~~rs  .  12 
~g  er/etr~krt  79{2sol  109  369  709  [5~  110 [2oJ  285[165 J  ~~rcra 
Reconna~ssance  j  59  20  [~  [18]  iircraft' 115  40 
Tacticaai~g~~~ft  50 
Transports  !  336  110  222  49  39  2  92 
Resecu~ aircraft  8 
Commun~c~i~8Pift110  45[12]  18[125]  21  5 
Observat~~¥craf~ 200  237  428  40  152 
Helicopters  I  318[460]  280  345  50  54{13~  [12]  2  120 
Trainers  364  200  495 [2s]  422  1  108  36 
TOTJ.L  ~,298[737]  1  ,102[12]  1,s<J1[1so]  99  1,762[273]  :so1  [so]  2  730[165] 
I  -I 
Overall Total  3,400 [ 749}  3'  758  [423]  1~033 [ 215 J 
-
[  ]  1968  orders. EEC  Countries in December  1967  by  Country  of Origin 
f3ELG  ILJM  NL  I 
TOT f.L  EEC. 
10the:r  ~.ther!  Other 
EEC  UK  us  Europ.  f::EC  Ul<  us  urop;.  EE(  UK  us  Europ  coun- coun  tries  coun-
trie1  tries 
[2~ 
62 
12 
[1ooJ  321  295 8o~  1,332 ~7~!  1,719 [.32§ 
[g]  60 
r  :~'  159  [t:.~  135  I 27•1 
L  "I  50 
[1]  4  53  12  34  572  [1]1  53  328 
8 
9  149  B2~l  59  ~2] 
I  12  157  64  6~0  650  I 
:;s [2s]  13  8..1)  12  26  726  ~9~  64  983 B:s~ 
113  38  60  274  .140  ~~~  970  I 
16:s G32]  4  582  157  [9]  12  762 GoiJ  4516 6o?~l 111  ~.938[55~ 
I  I  I  I 
749  0:s~  931  b1~  9,871  B.63~ 
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 Country 
Q;?IGI"l  EEC 
B!lliitio  m ss  es 
Bombers  310.0 
Tankers 
~!~!!:i1iailll 
1,320,0 
aircraft  290,0 
Tactical  sui¥~r 
a~rcr 
Transports  317.6 
88&\ilUli!firEftrt  !  rcraft  7.0 
Observa  1.on  ft  10,0  aircra 
Helicopters  229,5 
Trainers  110.0 
Missiles  28,0 
Total  2,622.1 
Overall Total 
Table  3/17a 
Book  Value  of Aircraft and 
FRANCE  GERMANY' 
UK  us  ••  EEC  UK  us  •• 
I 
100,0 
105.0  330.0  1,157,0 
115,0  500,0 
8,0  440,0  10,0  27.0 
o.s 
0.75  16.9 
9,0  1.6 
145.0  30,0  15,0  495,0 
15.0  115,0  264,0 
330,0  15,0  3,0  747,0 
712,75  1,063.5  28,0  3,190,5 
3,335  *  4,282 
*  Excluding the nuclear strike force. 
••  Other European countries 
860 
ITALY 
EEC  UK  us 
99.0  710,0 
105,0 
2.5  160.0 
5,0 
20,0  38.0 
40,2  45.0 
4,5  178,0 
276.2  1,131,0 
1,408 
•• 
1,0 
1.0 Missiles Held  by  the  EEG  Countries  on  31  December  1967 
($millions) 
BELGIUM  NL  TOTI.L  EEC 
---- --,--
EEC  UK  us  **  EE  UK  us  **  EEC  Ul(  us  1** 
j 
310.0 
100.0 
150.0  160,0  359 ,(.  ;,ao9 .o  2,491.0 
55.0  35,\.l  565,0  535.0 
1,3  1.0  90.0  15.0  7(6.4  10,0  285.0 
0.5 
1.0  28.9  1.75 
1,0  12.6  9,0 
8.0  7.0  12.5  1,5  20.0  300,Q  16.5  705.0 
19,0  33,0  2,0  23.0  2ES,2  380 .o 
5.0  133,0  3,0  2.5  11 ..... ,0  55.5  5,5  1,502,0  1.0 
184.3  1.0  423,0  87.5  4,0  552,0  -4,233.6  32,0  6,009.3 L 
608  643  10,21o 
861 Table  3/18 
Estimate  of Military Aircraft and Missiles in Service in the  US 
(December  1967)  (Numbers  and value) 
i:~as  dre- u  re 
USAF  USN  USMC  US  Army  *  or  fina!l 
TOTAL  Value  l<ial leaz 
I 
$mill.)  ($mil  .) 
Ballistic  d 
missiles  1,054  656  - - 1,700  764 
Strategic  bombers  540  - - - 540  -
I  1  ,_ 
rra.nker  aircraft  650  - 60  - 710  s,ooo  1  -
Fighter/strike aircraft  4,200  1,300  1,000  - 61soo  10,470  I  2,3so 
Reconnaissance aircraft  700  700  75  - 1,475  :s,300 
I 
684 
rractical support aircraft  600  - 76  - 676  270  26  I 
Transports  31ooo  1 ,40o  200  200  41soo  s19Jo 
I 
5~0 
Rescue  aircraft  100  50  - - 150  '50  -
aelicopters  500  1,ooo  800  6,600  8,':!00  21sso  470 
Communications aircraft  350  270  - 825  1,445  200  10 
Pbservation aircraft  500  50  - 1,500  27oso  100  57 
~rainers  4,000  1 ,soo  - 3~8  s,s2o  1,710  n ... a 
!Drones  n.n  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  - n.a 
I 
Air-air missiles  n.a  n.a  n.a  - n.a  - 30 
Anti-aircraft missiles  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  - 685 
Air-ground missiles  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  - n.a 
~nti-submarine missiles  - n.a  - - n.a  - -
~nti-tank missiles  - - n.n  n.a  n.a  - 126 
~actical missiles  n.a  n.a  - n.a  n.a  - 117 
T 0  T A L  (Excluding missiles)151140  6,270  2,211  9,443  33,064  40,650 
I 
AIAA  data 1968:  at 30 June  1967  at 30 June  1969  (estimate) 
* Excluding  spares 
Aircraft in active  service  USAF 
USN+US:.<.AC 
~S t,r~~o/.J 
Total aircraft  24,022 
Helicopters  -~~~ 
Grand total  ~,~4 
862 
15,044 
n,r,o6 
11 1 &E.4 
22,[,28 
s~ 
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 Table 3/20 
Belgian Air Force  - Situation at the End  of 1967 
! 
Type1  Entry  Due  for  Source  Book  Country I 
Aircraft or missile  into  Number 
service  replace 
ment 
REPUBLIC  r  84F'  c  50 -ss 
LOCKHEED  F  104  G  c  60  -65 
DOUGLAS  C 47/DC  3  T  50-55 
DOUGLAS  DC  6  T  50-55 
DOUGLAS  DC  4  T  50-55 
I 
FAIRCHILD  C 119 G  T  55-60 
LOCKHEED  1F  104  G  Tr  60-65 
LOCKHEED  T 33  Tr  ss-ro 
PIPER  L  18  Tr  50-55 
SIKORSKY  S 58  I{  60-65 
t.QM  33  D  60-65 
NIKE  .AI'I  60-65 
HAWK  AM  60-65 
SIDEWINDER  A..(Jjf\1-\  60-65 
H().1EST  JOI-N  TM  00~5 
HAWKER  HUNTER  c  55--60 
PERCIVAL  PEMBROKE  T  50-55 
DASSAULT  MIRAGE  5  c  70-75 
JAGUAR  0  MIRAGE  5  c  70-75 
DASSAULT  FALCON  T  1967 
FOUGA  MAG IS  TER  Tr  55-60 
SUO  ALOUETTE  II  1-l  65-70 
ENTAC  Tl"'\  60-65 
ss 11  Tl"\  55-GO 
OORN I ER  Do  27  T'r'  60-b5 
AVRO  CF-100  c  50-55 
STAMPE  &  RENARD  SV4  Ti.- 45-50 
Sources  SORIS  estimate 
Type 
Tr = Trainer or communications aircraft 
C  =  Combat  aircraft  (fighter,  strike, 
tactical reconnaissance 
D  = Drone,  remote  controlled target or 
reconnaissance aircraft 
H  = 
AM= 
AG/AM  = 
TM  = 
Helicopter 
Anti-a1rcraft missile 
Air-to-ground or air-to-air missile 
Tactical missile  (ground-ground or 
anti-tank) 
T  = Transport aircraft 
-70 
75-t 
70+ 
70+ 
70+ 
70+ 
7St 
70+ 
-70 
70+ 
70+ 
75+ 
75+ 
75+ 
70+ 
-65 
70+ 
eo+ 
BOi-
BO-t 
70+ 
75+ 
75+ 
70+ 
75+ 
-60 
-70 
2 
of  value  of 
supply2  Smill.  origin 
MAP  221  - us 
L  75  120 
MAP  25  40 
MAP  12  l 
MAP  4 
90 
MAP  2 
MAP  35 
p  13  20 
MAP  25  13 
VAP  157  -
p  13  7 
MAP  n.a..  1 
MAP  B sq.  60 
l  2 bad.  GO 
l  n.a.  2  Total 
MAP  n.a.  10  $1'.  423 
L  220  - ul<.rotal 
p  4  1  $M  1 
p  88 
}  150 
FRA.'lCE 
p  18 
p  1  1,3 
p  48  19 
p  63  8 
p  n.a.  }  Total  5  MAP  n.a..  $M  183 
p  12  1 
GERY.t.·n· 
r  ..  ta.t $M 1 
CAN AUA 
MAP  5l  - uta..d~M-
BELG lUI'\ 
R  65  - rr  .. ta.1SM-
Grand  TOTAL  $millions  60S 
Source  of supply 
P  = Purchased 
L = Produced under licence 
R  = National  R&D 
MAP  = Military Aid Planning 
NM  =  Naval aissile  N =  Naval aircraft  (reconnaissance or anti-submarine) 
BAGAM  = Ballistic air-to-ground or air-to-air missile  B = Bomber 
B(t)= Light helicopter  T(T)  = Tactical transport  BM  = Ballistic missile 
H(H)=  Heavy  helicopter  T(L)  =  Light  transport 
C/Tr=  Combat/trainer aircraft  T(S)  = Strategic transport 
866 
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 Table 3/22 
Netherlands  Air Force  - Situation at the End  of 1967 
-:ype  1 I 
Entry I  Du•  f~r  Source  Book  F1  Aircraft or missile  into  rep.Lace 
~~ppl~ 
Number  value  f 
service  ment.  $mill.  origin 
--- --
REPUBliC  F 84  F  c  50-55  -70  MAP  175  - us 
LOCKHEED  F  104 G  c  60-6~  75+  L  95 
1192  MAP  25 
GRU'I.MAN  S 2  A  " 
55-60  40  MAP  26  20 
LOCKHEED  NUPTUNE  N  55-60  -70  MAP  17  -
DOUGLAS  C 47  T  50-55  -70  MAP  n.a.  -
LOCKHEED  TF  104  G  Tr  60-65  75+  p  14  22 
SNB  5  Tr  55-60  -?O  MAP  6  1 
L  18/L 21  Tr  55--60  -70  MI.P  64  -
N.A.  T  6  Tr  50-55  -7o  MAP  260  -
SIKORSKY  5  55  H  55-60  -7o  MAP  f..  -
SIKORSKY  SH-34  11  65-70  75-f- p  20  20 
MCt.-1  33  D  ro-Gs  -75  MI.P  n.r.  1 
SIDEWINDER  AG/AM  60-65  75+  L  n.a..  3 
HAWr<  AM  60-65  75+  L  '\2  sq.  50 
NIKE  AM  60-65  75+  MA.P  6  sq.  45 
TERRIER  NM  55-&0  70+  WP  n.a.  5  Total 
HONEST  JOHN  TM  60-65  70+  MAP  n.a.  10  $M  369 
GRU~AN S 2  F  N  55-60  --=70  MAP  17  15  CANADA  I 
CANAOA1R  F  5  c  70+  80+  p  10:  167  Total 
D H C  BEAVER  Tr  55-60  75+  p  9  1  SM  183 
HA\oiKER  HUNTER  c  50-55  -6s  L  20C  - Ul( 
'1ESTLAND  WASP  H  60-65  75+  p  12  1.5  Total 
SEACAT  Af'l  60--65  75+  p  n.a.  2.5  $M  4 
r----· 
ATLANTIC  ~  70+  80+  p  9  55  FRANCE. 
SUD  ALOUETTE  H  60-65  75+  p  77  9 
ss 11  ™ 
55-60  ?Ot  MAP  n.a..  !  3 
Total 
AS  12  AG/AM  60-65  ?S+  p  n.,..  $M  67 
AGUSTA-BELL  AB  204  B  H  60-65  75+  p  8  3.5 
ITALY-
~  .. t.J.t$M  3.5 
'FOKKER  F  27  T  60-65  75+  R  12  15  NL 
FOJ<.KER  S 11  Tr  50-55  70+  R  40  0.5  Total 
FOKKER  S 14  Tr  55-60  70-J- R  20  1.5  $M  17 
Source:  SORIS  estimate.  Ia rand Total  $M  643.5  --
1•2  For symbols  see Table 3/20 
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 Table  3/24 
Italian Air Force  - Situation at the  End  of 1967 
I 
Type1  Entry  Due  for  I  Source  Book  Country  Aircraft or missile  into  replace- of  2  Number  value  of 
service  ment  su;e;el.J.  $mill.  origin 
I 
I 
Lockheed F 104 G  c  60-65  75-80 
; 
L  125  200  us  I 
I 
No:-t.h  Am!!r i can F  86  K  c  55-60  -70 
I 
L  60  -
I 
Republic  F  84 F  c  55-60  70-7S  MAP 
I 
100  160 
Lockheed  F  104 S  c  65-70  80- I  L  165  330 
GrUIIIr.lan  S2A  1'4  55-60  -70 
I 
MAP 
I 
40  -
Beech  C 45  T  50-55  -70  MAP  5  -
Douglas C 47  T  50-55  -70  I  MAP  5  -
Douglas  DC  6  T  55-60  -70  I  p  2  -
Convair rN  440  T  55-60  -70  p  5  -
Fairchild C 119  G  T  55-60  7Q-75  MAP  5C  160 
Lockheed  TF'  104 G  Tr  60-65  75-80  p  28  45 
North  American  TG  Tr  50-55  -70  MAP  n.a.  -
Lockheed  T 33  A  Tr  55-60  -70  MAP  n.a.  -
Cessna 0-1E  Tr  55-60  --'70  MAP  120  -
Piper L 18/L 21  Tr  55-60  -70  MAP  n.a.  -
Bell UH -18  1:1  65-70  75--80  L  25  10 
Sikorsky SH- 3D  I  h  65-70  l 
75-80  L  24  23 
Bell  47  H  60-65  I  75-80  L  50  5 
I 
Sikorsky Hu-19  H  55-60  I  -70  p 
I 
4  -
HA'iw'K  AM 
I 
60-65  75+  L  4 bo.tt.  90 
I  TARTAR  NM  60-65  70-f.  p  n.a. 
}  I 
TERRIER  NM  60-65 
' 
70+  p  n.a.  15 
SIDEWINDER  AG/AM  60-65  75+  p  n.a. 
I 
SPARROW 
I 
AG/AM  65-70  so+  p  n.a.  3 
Het-IEST  JO!fl  Tl"\  60-65  70-t  MAP  508  20  I  I 
I 
NIKE  AM  60-65  75+  I  MAP  3(..C.'I'I1j",  50  Total 
I  '  $M1,131  I 
I 
Westland Whirlwind  11  I  55-60  -70  i 
p  1 
2  - UK 
I 
Total $M  •  I  t 
ATLANTIC  Ill  l  70 _:f5  80+ 
I 
p  18  105  FRANCi;. 
AS  20  AG/AM  55-60  -70  p  n.a.  2 
ss  11  ™ 
55-60  70+  I 
MAP  n.a.  2 
CT  2C  D  60-65  75+  L  n.a.  0,5  Total  Sf' 
)  109 
I 
FIAT  G91  c  55-60  70+  R  170  85  I  TAU 
FIAT  G 91Y  c  65-70  75+  R  20  14 
Piaggio P  166  T  $5--60  75+  R  21  5 
FIAT  G 222  T  65-70  -so  R  2  2.5 
SIAl  S  2C5  Tr  65-70  -so  R  4  0.2 
Macchi  MB  326  Tr  60-65  75+  R  100  40 
FIAT  G 599  Tr  50-55  --70  R  n.a.  -
Augusta  A 101G  li  65-70 
I 
-80  R  12  20  Total  Sl 
I 
I  !  156 
l 
~OSQUITO  Tl'1  60-65  75 ...  L  n.a.  1 
Total  $1' 
1  --I--
Gro.nd  Total  1,407  $1'1 
Source:  SORIS  estimate 
1,2 
For  symbols  see Table 3/20 
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 Table 3/26 
~erman Air Foree - Situation at the End  of 1967 
----
Country l 
1  Entry  Due  /source  Book 
Aircraft or  Type  into  for  1 of  Number  value  of 
missile  service  replace~ supply2  $mill.  origin 
ment 
REPUBLIC  F 84f  c  55-W  ·65  MAP  450  ..  U5 
R[f'IJBL I  C RF  81\F  c  55-60  ··65  MAP  180  -
LOCKH[EO  F 104  F  c  6()  ... 65  -65  MAP  30  -
LOCKHEED  F 104  G  c  60-65  75+- p  60  !  1 ,oso  c  60-65  75-f  PIL  599 
c  b5-70  75+  L  50  110 
1.\c  DONNELL  RF-4E  c  70-75  BOt  p  88  500 
GRUf.'W.N  HU-16  tl  55-60  70+  p  8  I 
0,5 
OOUGtAS  C 47  T  55-60  70-t  M.A.P  I  2'1  13  • 
I 
DOUGU.S  DC  6  T  55-GO  70+  p  4  t  10  CO:-JV/.1 R CV  440  T  55-off.)  ?Of.  p  6 
LOOKHEED  JET  STAR  T  60-65  75f  p  2  I 
4 
NORTH  AM£R I  CAN  T GA  Tr  55-60  -65  p  88  -
LOCKHEED  T 33  Tr  55-60  -70  p  192  30 
PIPER  L 18  C  Tr  55-60  -70  p  40  -
CESSNA  T 37  Tt"  60-65  75fo  p  47  12 
CESSNA  T 38  Tr  60-65  75+  p  46  2 
LOCKHEED  1f 104  G  Tr  60-65  75-1  p  137  220 
SIKORSKY  H 34  H  55-60  -75  p  115  l  -
VERTOL  H 21  H  60-65  -75  p  32  -
S I  KOKSKY  CH-53A  H  70-75  80~  p  135  350  I 
BELL  UH-10  t;  65-70  OOf.  L  352  140  I 
t.QM  61  0  55-60  75+  p  n.a.  3  I  HAWK  AM  60-65  751- L  9bo.t..~  200  I 
I  NIKE  AM  60-65  75+  p  6bt'tt.l  100  I 
'  PERSHING  TM  60-65  751- p  3tx..t.t  253 
HONEST  JOHN  Tl'l  60-65  ?Of- p  12bq.,.tt  20 
SERGEANT  T~  60-65  75.f.  p  4bc..tc  166 
SIDEWINDER  AK  60-65  75&- l  n.a.  5  Tot.._t  SK3190. 5 
CANADAIR  SABRE  V  c  55-60  -65  MAP 
I  75j_•  CA!JADA 
CANADA I  R SJ.'.BRE  VI  c  55-60  -65  p  225  - Tola.i  Sr\ .. 
--
DORN I  ER  £b  27  Tr  ss.-60  -70  R  428  1.6  GERMANY 
OORN I  ER  Do  28  Tr  60 .. 65  75t  R  3  0.4 
OORNtER  SKYSERVANT  Tr  70-75  BOt- R  125  2.5 
HFB  320  T  6S.70  6()1.  R  15  14.0 
BOU<OW  COBRA  Til'\  00-65  70t  R  n.a. 
___:j 
T .. tu.l  ·sM  23.5 
-
1  2  '  For symbols  see Table  3/20.  Source:  SORIS  estimate. 
872 Table 3/26  continued 
German  Air Force  - Situation at the End  of 1967 
Entry  Due  I 
I  1  Aircraft or missil1  into  for  Type 
replace~  service 
ment 
liAl;.'KER  SEA  HAWK  c  55-60  -65 
FAIREY  GANNET  N  55-60  -65 
PERCIVAL  PE~SROKE  T  55-60  ?Of 
BRISTOL  SYCAMORE  ~  55-60  70-1 
SEACAT  AM  65-70  75f-
PIAGGIO  P  149  0  Tr  55-60  -70 
FIAT  G 91  R  c  60-65  70+ 
F·BG  K  c  55-60  -G5 
FIAT G 91  T  Tr  55-GO  75+ 
Tr  65--70  75&-
AGUSTA  BELL  47  H  60-65  70f 
~TLANTIC  N  6>70  SO+ 
TRANSALL  T  65-70  80+ 
FOUGA  MAGISTER,  Tr  55-60  7t>+ 
Tr  55-60  70t 
SUO  ALOUETTE  ..,  60-65  75-t 
NORD.  NORATLAS  T  55-60  -70 
T  55-60  ·70 
ss  11  TM  55-60  70+ 
AS  12  AG/AM  60-65  701-
AS  30  AG/AM  60-65  75t 
AS  20  AG/AM  60  ... 65  75+ 
Source:  SORIS  est1mate 
1
t 2  For  symbols  see Table  3/20. 
873 
I 
Source  _I  Book 
of  2.  Number  value 
supply  Smill. 
p  68  -
p  16  -
p  49  10 
p  50  15 
p  n.a.  3 
L  ;:>00  2 
L  369  330 
p  88  -
L  45  40 
L  25  23 
p  45  5 
J  20  115 
J  110  440 
p  62  !  50  L  188 
p  300  25 
p  25  -
L  148  -
p  n.a, 
p  n.a. 
10  p  n.a. 
p  n.a. 
Grand Total 
Country 
of 
origin 
UK 
81128 
ITALY 
SM400 
.  GERI>:/J'~Y  + 
FRI<~~Cf 
TOT.  Sl'\555 
FRANCe 
TOT.  SM 85 
SM  41282 T
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-Table  3/28 
•  French Air Force  - Situation at the  End  of 1967 
.. ~--
Aircraft or  Type1 
missile 
'·~· 
Republic F  84  F,  RF  84  F  c 
N.:.,rth  Atner i can  F100  c 
Dou9las  Skyraider  c 
LTV  Crusader  c 
Boeing  KC  135  T 
Ocvglas C 47  T 
Dc-uglas  DC  8  T 
Douglas  DC  6  T 
Ccnvair  PBY-&  T 
Beech  18  Tr 
Douglas B 26  Tr 
Lockheed  T 33A  Tr 
North  ~~erican TG  Tr 
Cessna 310  Tr 
Cessna  0..1  Tr 
Piper PA-22  Tr 
Piper L 18/ L 21  Tr 
Bell 47  H 
Si~orsky H 34  H 
Vcrtol  H 21  H 
Sikorsky H 19  H 
lockheed Neptune  N 
HAWK  AM 
*  Excluding the nuclear 
strike force 
I 
Entry  Due  into 
I  for 
service  rep  lac• 
ment 
50-57  64-68 
55-57  68-72 
59  -70 
60-65  74-·77 
60-64  75+ 
-60  -70 
60-65  75+ 
55-60  ·-75 
50-55  ·--70 
50-55  -70 
50-b5  -70 
55-60  -G8 
55-60  -68 
GS-70  -80 
55-60  70+ 
55-60  70+ 
55-60  70+ 
55- GO  70+ 
55-GO  -72 
55-60  -70 
55-60  -70 
55-60  -70 
60-65  -75 
Sourcea  SORIS 
1
t 2  For symbols  see Table 3/20 
875 
Source 
of  Number  - supply.: 
MAP  120 
MAP  67 
p  50 
p  42 
p  12 
p  100 
p  1 
p  6 
?  :s 
MAP  45 
p  20 
p  50 
p  150 
p  12 
MAP  100 
p  22 
MAP  115 
p  84 
l  136 
p  20 
p  40 
MAP  59 
L  3 reg  • 
Book  Country I 
value  of 
$mill.  origin 
- us 
47 
-
42 
100 
-
1 
1  .. 
- -
15 
0.75 
5 
}  4 
9 
136 
- -
-
200 Table 3/28 continued  * 
French Air Force  - Situation at the End  of 1967 
--------------------~--------~--------r---------,·---------.-------~--------
fcountry I 
Aircraft or 
missile 
TARTAR 
tiONEST  JOI-tl 
NIKE 
JAGUAR 
WG  13 
SA  340 
SA  3~0 
ATLANTIC 
TRA!~SALL 
Dassault MIRAGE  F1 
Dassault MIRAGE  I II 
Dassault.  MYSTERE 
ETENDARD 
VA\JTOUR 
Dassault MIRAGE  IV A 
Breguet  AL I ZE 
Nord  NORATLAS 
Breguet  SMIARA 
Oassau lt. FALCON 
Type 1 
NM 
Tl"'\ 
AM 
c 
H 
H 
H 
"  T 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
8 
N 
T 
T 
T 
Entry 
into 
service 
60-65 
60-65 
60-65 
70+ 
70+ 
70+-
70+ 
65-70 
65-70 
69+ 
60-65 
55-60 
60-65 
55-60 
6D-65 
60-65 
55-60 
55-60 
65-70 
Due  Source 
for  of 
replace·  supply2 
ment 
70-
70+ 
75+ 
80+ 
80+ 
80+ 
80-J 
80-f-
80+ 
eo+ 
70+ 
70+ 
73f 
-75 
75+ 
-75 
-75 
-75 
eo-
p 
p 
p 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
Excluding the nuclear 
strike force 
Source:  SORIS  estimate 
192 For  symbols see Tabla 3/20 
Number 
5  DOG 
5  ba.ti. 
2 brig. 
150 
230 
100 
130 
40 
50 
100 
35e 
270 
85 
80 
62 
75 
165 
8 
2 
Book 
value 
$mill. 
10 
10 
of  ' 
origin 
100  Total  SH 
685.7::, 
250  FRANCE  +  Ut< 
160 
12.5 
13  Total  SM 
230 
200 
400 
540 
50 
80 
310 
60 
eo 
e 
2.6 
435.~0 
FRANCE+ 
GEF~lk:\IY 
Total  SH 
430 
FRA"lC E. Table 3/28 continued 
French Air Force*  - Situation at the End  of 1967 
1  Entry  Due  Source  Book  Country  Aircraft or  Type  into  for  of  Number  value  of  missile  service  replace·  suppl~  Smill. 
ment  origin 
FLAM ANT  T  55-60  -75  R  120  12  France 
Nord  262  T  65-70  804- R  30  15  cont'd 
Potez PARIS  Tr  55-60  70+  R  44 
}  110 
Fouga  IYIAGISTER  Tr  55-60  70+  R  320 
BRCXJSSARO  Tr  55-60  .-75  R  110  7 
Nord  3400  Tr  55-GO  .-75  R  100  5 
Nord  3202  Tr  55-60  -75  R  100  5 
Sud  ALOUETTE  H  55-65  -75  R  288  24 
OJ INN  H  55-bO  -70  R  50  2.5 
Sud  FRELON  H  65-70  so+  R  23  20 
CT  20  0  60-65  75+  R  - 3 
ss  12  TM  GD-65  70+  - R  -
AS  12  AG/AM  60-65  -75  R  -
ss  11  Tl'1  55-60  70-+  R  -
AS  20  AG/AM  60-65  75+  R  - 25 
ENTAC  TM  55-60  70+  R  -
MALAFON  NM  60-65  75+  R  so 
Matra 530/511  AM  60-65  75+  R  -
MASJRCA  Af"\  60-65  75+  R  -
AS  30  AM  60-65  75-f- R  - - Total  SM 
1,782.5 
Grand Total  $11  3,334,8 
•  Excluding the
1
nuclear 
str ke  force 
Source1  SORIS  estimate 
1  2  '  For  symbols  see Table  3/20 
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 Table 3/30 
British Air Force  - Situation at the End  of 1967 
Aircraft or  l  1 Entry  Due 
missile  Type  into  for re-
service  placemen~ 
i"\cDonnell  PHANT(}.I  c  65·  "70  .. oo 
LN:kheed  HERCULES  T  65 .. "/0  -80 
Douglas  C 47  T  50-55  -70 
tl  ~  Harvard  '!r 
l  50... 55  ... ?o 
\•:est land SEA  K  lNG  f1  65.70  75+ 
'..'esiland  \o/HIRLWIND  H  55.60  ... 75 
·,.:est.land  \&.'ESSEX  H  60-65  75+ 
Hiller 12  H  55-60  --70 
',-lest.land  SIOUX  H  G0-65  70.. 
t.GM  37  0  55.60  75+ 
I'.CM  33  0  55-GO  75+ 
0•)Lf,RIS  8Mi  GS.70  75+ 
QI..11.LPUP  flGAMI  60.65  75+ 
SIGEWINDER  ~wAMj  60  ... 65  75+ 
''~WEST JOK>-J  Tl'\  55+60  70.. 
COi\PORAL  Til\  55+60  ..  70 
f..susta  SIOUX  H  60.65 
'HC  BEAVER  T  60.65 
(i  H C  CHIPMUNK  Tr  50.55  -75 
.HNDIVJK  D  60.65  75+ 
;;ALKARA  TM  6().65  75+ 
~'AGU.AR  c  70..  80+ 
1-'G  13  H  70..  00+ 
SA  340  H  70..  80+ 
Source:  SORIS  estimate. 
1  2  '  For symbols see Table 3/20 
879 
Source 
of  2  Number  K~li!.  supply' 
p  148  350 
p  66  150 
MAP  4  -
HAP  2  -
L  GO  57.5 
L  102  -
L  50  30 
p  41  -
L  100  10 
p  15  }  5  p  -
p  64  638 
L  n.a.  22.2 
p  n  •  .a.  2 
p  508  20 
p  n.a.  -
p  50  5 
p  46  3.5 
L  200  40 
p  150  5 
J  - - I 
J  150  240 
J  280  200 
J  600  75 
Country 
of 
origin 
us 
Total  iM 
1,280 
ITALY 
Total  $M 
5 
CANA04 
Total  SM 
-43,5 
AUSTRALIA 
Total  s~ 
5 
UK+ FRt.NCE Table 3/30  continued 
British Air Force  - Situation at the  End  of 1967 
1  Entry  Due  for 
Aircraft or  Type  into  replace-
missile  service ment 
sA  :no  H  70+  80.. 
MARTEL  AI'\  70+  80• 
S:_~d  ALOUETTE  H  60...65  70.. 
AS  30  flG/M  60-65  ... 75 
55  11  ™  GO-G5  ... 7s 
Glo~ter JAVEL IN  c  55-.60  -68 
H S.A  HARRIER  c  70+  80... 
BAC  LIGHTNING  c  60-65  75+ 
U S  A  HJNTER  c  55-60  70+ 
0  H  SCIMITAR  c  55-60  -70 
0  H  SEA  VIXEN  c  55 .. 60  ..  70 
H S  A  EUCCANEER  c  60  ... 65  -75 
Avro  VULCA."'  B  55  ... 60  70• 
H p  VICTOR  B  55.60  70.. 
OAC  CANBERRA  B  50-55  70... 
Fairey -GANNET  I'C  50··55  ... 68 
Av.ro  SHACKLETCN  H  50-55  ..  70 
H S  A  NIMROD  N  70..  eo... 
Vickers VC  10  T  60-65  eo... 
Bristol BRITANNIA  T  55-60  70... 
Vickers VALETTA  T  45-50  -70 
Percival  PEMBROKE  T  50-55  ..  75 
Beagle  BASSET  T  65·70  .. so 
A S  ARGOSY  T  60.65  70... 
H S  A.  ANDOVER  T  60.65  75+ 
Avro  ANSON  T  40-45  .. 70 
Blackburn  BEVERLEY  T  55·60  .. Ga 
0  H  DEV~  T  45 ... 50  70... 
D H  Ca.iET  T  55-60  70... 
Sources  SORIS  estimate. 
1  2  '  For  symbols  see Table 3/20 
880 
Source 
Number I  Country  of  Value 
supply2  I  $mill.  of origin 
,l;O"'t\1."4 
UK+ F 
c  50  5 
c  n.a..  20  Total  SM 
540 
p  19  1.5  FRANCE 
p  11ooo  } 5  p  -
Total  $1"\ 
6.5 
R  68  - UK 
R  90  270 
R  204  510 
R  200  -
R  76  75 
R  80  8U 
R  115  I  275 
R 
}  120  6(.() 
R 
R  144  220 
R  15  -
R  75  -
R  38  240 
R  14  100 
R  23  90 
R  40  12 
R  40  8 
R  20  2 
R  56  120 
R  37  46 
R  40  -
R  :so  -
R  40  4 
R  5  -Table 3/30 continued 
British Air Force  - Situation at the  End  of 1967 
Aircraft  1-~ ~~Due  for  Source  Number  Value  Country of  or  ~pe , J.nto  replace·  of  2  missile  service l  ment  supply  $mill•  origin 
D.H.  H~RON  T  5C..55  70+  R  9  2  UK  oont'd 
Bristol 170  T  50-55  .;.70  R  2  -
Scottish TWIN  PIONEER  T  55 .. 60  70.J;  R  36  11 
~i;':Jrl  BELFAST  T  65-70  75+  R  10  75 
Vicker~ VISCOUNT  T  55-60  ... 70  R  2  2 
D H  DOnNIE  Tr  G0-65  .. ao  R  20  14.5 
Folland  Gr~AT  Tr  55-60  70+  R  105  80 
Bt.C  Ja PROVOST  Tr  ss  ... r,o  70+  R  200  -
Vickers VARSITY  Tr  50.. 55  .. 70  R  30  -
H S A  !-liNTER  Tr  50  ... 55  ·75  R  135  135 
CAC  JET  PROVOST  T 5  Tr  70+  ... so  R  100  45 
Scotti sh  PI o:.:EER  Tr  55-60  70+  R  40  3 
Avster  AOP  MK  9  Tr  50-55  ... ?o  R  - -
\:e~tland B£LVEDC:RE,  ..  60-65  7().;.  R  26  25 
Cr i stol SYCA:·IORE  H  50... 55  70+  R  12  -
Saro  SKEETER  H  55-60  70+  R  so  -
Westland  SCOUT!WA~  1-1  60-65  -75  R  120  12 
BLOODHOUND  AM  55-60  75+  R  400  40 
FIRESTREAK  A.~H  55-&0  75+  R  n, a,  }  A.()'AM 
3 
f~ED  TOP  60..65  ... so  R  n.a. 
DLUE  STEEL  LV\ CAM  60-65  70...  R  n.a,  40 
5EACAT /TIGERCAT  I.M  G0-65  ·75  R  n,a.  10 
SEASLUG  AM  60...G5  754  R  n. a.  3 
TH.JtlOERB I  RD  At"\  55-60  75•  R  n,a,  40 
SEA  DfflT  f'll"l  70..  eo.  R  n. a,  3 
VIGILANT  TM  60  ..  65  ..  75  R  n,a,  3 
SWINGFIRE  Tl"i  70..  .. so  R  n. a,  -
RAPIER  AM  70+  80.  R  n,a,  - Total  $1"\ 
3,198.5 
Grand Total  $t15107B.5 
Source:  SORIS  estimate. 
1  2  '  For symbols  see Table 3/20. 
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 Table 3/32 
Main  Types  of 
Type  1  In productioll  ·National 
Country  Aircraft  from  - to  +  output 
(number) 
FRANCE  Oassault OURAGAN  c  1949- i955  478 
Dassaul  t  ~ws  lTRE  c  1951-1950  420 
Oassault  MIRAGE  Ill  f/..5  c  1956+  soo  June 68 
Sud  I-1AG I  STER  Tr  195~ +  591  Jan. 68 
Sud  ALOUETTE  11/1 I I  H (L}  1955+  1'765 Jan.68 
Super  SUPER  FRELON  1-1  (H)  1962+  52  June 67 
ITALY  FIAT  G  91  R/T  c  195&+  348  --
Macchi  1~3  326  Tr  1957+  150 
Piaggio  P  148/149  Tr  1951-1956  149 
GER:·1/ .. : l'(  Dorn1er  Do  27  Tr  1955+  570  June66 
SWEDEN  SAAB  J  29  c  1949-1956  6&1 
SAt..8  J  35  [JRf,!<Er~  c  1955+  596 
Sto.AB  105  XT  C/Tr  1963+  180 
Ct.Nt.DA  De  Havilland  BEAVER  Tr  1947+  1)670  Dec .67 
De  Havilland OTTER  T  (T)  1951-1968  soo Aug. 6S 
De  Havilland CARIBOU  T  (T)  1958+  265 
De  Havilland  BUFFALO  T  (T)  1864+  34 
De  Havilland TWIN  OTTER  T  (T)  1%5+  129  Jan.68 
Canada i r  CL  41  Tr  1900+  210Sept.67 
Ut(  De  Havilland VAI-:PIRE  C/Tr  1943-1958  3,268 
Gloster  II.ETEOR  c  1945-1958  3,41& 
Ha1'1ker  SEA  HA\o.K  c  1947--1%0  538 
English  Electric  CAN9ERRA  .B  1949-1964  1,  1CO  + 
De  Havilland  VEr-:OM  C/Tr  1949--1960  1  '1C:3 
Folland  GllAT  Tr  1<?55+  1.:5 
HSA  BUCCMlf[R  c  195H+  192 
HSA  HU!HfR  c  1951-f  1  '739 
BAC  167  I  JET  PROVOST  Tr  1955+  ro1  June68 
HSA  t.tlOCtVER  I  748  T  {T)  1959 ;- 144lept.68 
+  Orders  and deliveries.  (
00
)  Production under licence taken 
arbitrarily as  10% 
{o)comprending sales of "unserviceable" aircraft originally procured 
by the  arme~ forces  of the selling country andMAP  transfers,  exclui  •  ing product1on under  icence. 
Estimate  baaed  .:m  "newn  :12rice  in 1968.  The  figures listed are  mere-
ly intended to give an iaea of the  volume  of exports by types. 
1 For  symbols  see Table 3/20. 
884 ~ilitnry Aircraft Exported 
(R&D  independent  of country of origin) 
p-roduct.,  ~I!-t  ~  o 'lal ~  il  itary T  Civil  jNa ~ .mil. !N il.sales i  under  mJ.ll. tary  a l2S  ~  sales  +oraers  as  as  ~er..:.  l~cen~e  "f(JI/.l  +  orders  +j  abroad  +I  percenta~  e  ~en  a~(  a  rca  +  !  (numbel3  (number).  (number)j  ~(o)  (number)!?to~otal  o  tot LJ 
I  (number)  ~  /b  -
~ {.:_!  :;s')  'l·io  - 7:~. 3 
I 
1C:O 
- 4C.)  ?70  1L;J  I 
- 6;?  100 
149  '349  5:.-8  ~n  - f-S. 5  100 
2eo  877  !.37  1  ,  .. 
.) '  - 70.5  "iC.-0 
100  11865  :..oo  ("l)  e~& ;  n.a,  ?0.1  81 
- 52  2:5  ~1  2  4-1,2  95.() 
319  (;67  .:?~il.  1  ~·~I  - 53.7  100 
383  533  100  21  4  53.3  99 
196  345  71  75  3  42  99 
50  (,2()  4?3  51  +  n.a.  74.~1  85.1 
- 661  651  30  - 100  100 
- 596  550  45  - 92.3  100  - 180  160  20  - 89  100 
- 1,670  - 1,107  +  141  +  - n.a. 
- 500  66  400  34  13.2  80 
- 265  8  2S3  4  3  99 
- 34  +  15  19  +  - 44.1  100 
- 129  66  12  34  51,1  60.4 
- 210  190  20  - 90,5  100 
532  3,soo  2,225  1,151  - 85  100 
372  3,788  2,984  933  - 86,4  100 
- 538  434  13G  - 80,7  100 
443  1  15t.3  900  10- _,J  - 78.6  100 
390  1,510  1 ,o31  147  - 87,2  100 
175  320  105  40  - 54.7  100 
- 192  176  16  - 91.7  1('0 
4W  2,199  1'  130  636  - &3.3  100 
- 607  48~>  122  - 79,9  1CO 
41  185  37  19  78  25  44.f 
1-----
885 
Val  ue-Ot 
mil .sales 
cad 
(00) 
abr 
$H 
u·~ 
or,  _,_. 
0.!1 
55 
9~} 
25 
1  !J2 
?·~ 
r, 
n 
2 
59 
1 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
.a. 
,83 
.2 
.1 
n .a. 
60  * 
220  * 
33  * 
3 .G 
10  * 
4GO  * 
450  * 
es  * 
3;.~  * 
5&  * 
29  * 
~.(;} • 4 
f.C  v  * 
so  * 
~) * Table 3/32  continued 
Main  Types  of 
1  In production 
Country  Aircraft  Type  from -to 
cont'd 
UK  e:.c  P!(C;\'0ST  Tr  1950-1964 
Perc i ..-;,]  r;.:-.~::~?or< E  T  (T)  1940-1958 
8ri5lol  170  T  (L)  1945-1958 
De  Havilland CCV[  T  (T)  1945--
\.,'c·s tJ <'nd  SCOUT  H (L)  1959-
Br idol SYCt.::or:E  H (L)  1947-195& 
F+G  HU.r;st.LL  T  (S}  1364+  --
ATU.~iTIC  N  1964+ 
us  --
Lock hu;  d  F  eo  c  1944-1949 
Lockl'"(•ed  T  33  Tr  1948-1959 
Rcpt•bl i c  F 84  c  1946-1952 
Rcp:Jt·ll c  F  84  F  c  195~-1955 
North  Aneric~n F 86  c  1947-1956 
North  A~erican F  100  c  1953-1960 
Lockhe-ed  F  104  c  1954+ 
l~ort hrop  F  5.  IT  38  c  1959+ 
lTV  CRUS/-DER  c  1955-1965 
"~c  Oonncll  PHAr~T(l~l,  c  1958+ 
Oougl i1G  S•~YnA'~·:r<  c  1952+ 
Cessna  T  37  I/!.  37  Tr  1954-1-
Lockheed  NEPTU~E  N  1'944 + 
Lcckhee:d  CR I  O~J  I•J  1958+ 
lcckhced  HERC~LES  T  (S)  1954 + 
Ccs~na T 41  Tr  1950 + 
Sikors~y S  55  H  (L}  1949-1958 
s i ko:-~-k)'  $  s~;  H  (L)  1954+ 
Sikorsky  CH  53  H (H)  1964+ 
Sikorsky S  61  H  (H)  1959+ 
8dl 47  H (L)  194C+ 
Bell  I  f~CiQGOI S  H (l)  1956-1-
Vc·rtoJ  107  H  (1-1)  1958+ 
For headings see Table  3/32 
886 Military Aircraft Exported 
-- -·-
I 
National  Praduct.  N~f+~n~~ Milita~ Civil  Nat.mil.IMil.aaleJ~ Value  o'f  output+  un  er 
TOTAL  + 
m~  ~ ar  sales  +  ordersaal  as  ~er- mil.aale  licence  orders  abroad+' sales  ~rcentaft. cen  a~e  abroad  (number)  abroad + 
(number)  (numberl  and  (
0
)  (number)( gf}tota  '  of to a  a.  $M  (oo)  (I?-~m~e~J 
a 
tnumber,  %  ~ 
461  - 461  373  113  - 80.9  100  6  *  161  - 1G1  07  71  3  54  98  15  *  I 
214  - 214  2  813  12G  1  46.5  30  *  542  Oct.67  - 540  43  114  385  8  25,1  12  *  181  Jan.65  - 181  142  :5;)  4  78,4  97,6  2  *  I 
180  - 180  101  &2  1"1  56,1  90,5  6  * 
169  - 169  160  'J  - 94,6  100  '7.7  ~ 
72  - 72  EO  12  - 23.4  100  69 
1,  736  - 11 73G  1,  736  113  - 100  100  40  *  5,691  866  61557  2,481  1,4:J5  - 43  100  770  *  4_,437  - 4,437  2,401  2,··~1  - 54,2  100  1, 200  *  3..)'429  - 3,429  1,742  1'  ~\i4  - 50,7  100  11175  *  7..)'053  2,200  9,253  6,287  3,174  - 86.5  100  21-::oo  *  2__,294  - ~,294  2,294  34()  - 100  100  350  *  796  1,67/  2,423  295  549  - YJ,7  100  r, 120 
1_,142 July 6€  290  1,432  780  652  - 3  100  950  *  1_, 261  - 1,261  1,219  42  - 96.5  100  67.7 
3,ooo Sept.  68  - 31ooo  2,816  18~  - 94  100  ~,091 
2_,0CO  Jul~ 6(  - 21ooo  1,846 
1J224 June  68  - 1,224  n.a.  430  - n.2.  100  110  *  1,101  116  1,227  ,,049  167  - 94.2  100  120 
255  - 255  230  25  - 90.2  100  127,5 
1_,100  Jan.  68  - ,,100  909  195  13  82.6  99  525 
11_, 149  Jan.  66  430  11,579  459  (-4  n.?..  q  4,5  1 •. 50 
1_,200  Dec.  58  589  ,,789  7"$  1f.O  o.c;.  59  50  45  *  1_,793  Jan.  67  331  2)124  n.a.  379  n.L~-.  n.a.  n,a.  123  *  247  June  68  - 247  112  135  -
~:). 4  100  324 
480  June  67  190  676  430  25  25  SG  96.3  45  * 
~550 Jan.  68  175E4  6,114  1,487  ~~··2  ?)  ~·25  +  3i.  7  n.a.  30  *  4_,590  Jan.  68  66(1  s,250  t.1 5oo  H9  7'5  ~;:,,&  ~8,5  50  *  520  Jan.  68  39  559  46[:  +  !1  1?  s~  .. s  %  18  • 
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